Joint Action for Prevention

Civil Society and Government

Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
c/o European Centre for Conflict Prevention
Laan van Meerdervoort 70
2517 AN Den Haag
The Netherlands
Tel.: + 31 70 3110970
Fax: + 31 70 3600194
info@conflict-prevention.net
www.gppac.net
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Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict

Prevention and Peacebuilding

Edited by Paul van Tongeren and Christine van Empel
Introduction by Catherine Barnes
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10. REFLECTIONS

P. van Tongeren, GPPAC
In recent years, there has been increased recognition of the role civil society organizations (CSOs) can play as partners with governments and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. This potential role has been articulated in government policy documents and acknowledged by various UN reports and declarations, including reports published by the Security Council, and regional organizations. Translating these statements and principles into systemized working modalities and effective practice remains erratic however. But there are a number of promising examples of good practice and opportunities to learn from. For example, some governments have begun to develop policies on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, often with the active involvement of national and international CSOs who have been consulted on the contents and on how best to implement the new objectives. This paper concentrates on examining some of the issues in forging appropriate and effective partnerships between governments and CSOs to work with conflicts at home and internationally.

This issue paper follows from a discussion paper written by Catherine Barnes. That paper intended to stimulate the discussion for a strategy meeting of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) on strengthening cooperation between governments, foundations and civil society working together on conflict and peace issues, which took place in October 2006. Building upon the theoretical framework of Catherine Barnes this issue paper presents fourteen extended case studies from many regions in the world. Some of these cases are a follow up from the earlier discussion paper, others are newly presented.

GPPAC is an international network of civil society organizations working for conflict prevention and peacebuilding and stressing a shift from “reaction” to “prevention”. In seeking to stimulate discussion, this paper can serve as a starting point for mapping out the field of possible modes of engagement – especially between governments and CSOs – and identifying some of the challenges encountered in the process. The paper looks into the opportunities and challenges for such a constructive partnership.

This issue paper will be used as input for different GPPAC meetings, among other the International Steering Group meeting in Buenos Aires in April 2008 and a second strategy meeting with GPPAC members from the regions, governments and donors on end 2008/ beginning 2009.

The two brief opening chapters provide a background in civil society and civil society-government cooperation. Cases studies are presented in the three following chapters. The structure of these chapters is built through a division in three different categories:
1. Policy development and legislative processes;
2. Civilian crisis response violence prevention and peacebuilding;

The following three chapters highlight cooperation with the UN, humanitarian advocacy campaigns and multi-stakeholder partnerships respectively, followed by a chapter on funding relations. The paper concludes with several reflections that bring the cases together and present suggestions pertaining to the future of conflict prevention and peace building.

Persons mentioned below were responsible for the overall coordination of this paper, which has been made possible by the financial support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Paul van Tongeren (Secretary General GPPAC), Christine van Empel (Interim Program Coordinator Interaction and Advocacy), Renske Heemskerk (Program Coordinator Interaction and Advocacy).
There is growing recognition of the role civil society organizations (CSOs) can play in responding, managing and preventing conflict as well as in post-conflict peacebuilding. Equally, recognition is spreading that governments and CSOs can be useful if not indispensable partners to each other in any of the activities just mentioned. This paper explores the various ways in which state institutions, governments, international bodies and CSOs can work at various levels (local, national, international) in the interest of peacebuilding and responding to conflict.

States are a diverse group. They range from effectively functioning bodies that operate in a legally defined and enforceable framework and have a well-established democratic tradition to non-functioning entities where democracy and the rule of law are virtually absent. CSOs tend to thrive in the former and be under severe pressure in the latter. There is also a great diversity of CSOs worldwide. They may range from spontaneous (community-based) initiatives and churches to major international NGOs with agencies around the world.

Conflicts tend to move in stages and CSOs can play different but valuable roles in each phase of a conflict: from early warning at the start to mediation when a conflict is already going on and awareness-raising in a post-conflict situation, to prevent the same from happening again. Precisely which roles CSOs assume depend not only on the nature and the severity of the conflict itself but also – even more important – on the kind of relationship a CSO has with the government. These can vary widely, from the cooperation and even cooptation on one side of the spectrum to confrontation and even hostility on the other. The general assumption remains that states ‘own’ conflicts, in the sense that they bear primary responsibility for initiating and ending conflicts. By extension, it is also thought that conflict prevention, peacebuilding and related activities fall within the remit of the state. Hence, they mistrust non-state initiatives in this arena. But there is a growing body of evidence that challenges this consensus (perhaps in parallel with the undeniable fact that many initiators of conflict today also tend to be non-state actors). This paper highlights a number of them.

In the policy arena, collaborations between representatives from governments and CSOs are contingent on the prevailing culture, administrative and otherwise. Thus, joint consultation and policy building follows a highly structured path in the case of Germany. It is very formal and proceeds cautiously in Japan, while in the United Kingdom cooperation is very close, as the examples from Chapter 3 illustrate. A very interesting case is provided by Mongolia, where a poorly resourced but ambitious government and an equally ambitious civil society find common ground in the promotion of a single issue: the creation of a nuclear weapons free region in northeast Asia.

In the area of preparing action, the USA example from Chapter 4 makes it clear that not only have governments and CSOs different starting points (to simplify: bottom-up and top-down), they also have different perspectives on what a conflict is about and thus on how to solve it. The tried and tested way of bringing these differences out in the open, discuss them and proceed on a common path is communication.

Communication is the key. Not only does conflict management, peacebuilding and conflict-prevention themselves benefit from open communication, it is also beneficial for any CSO-government cooperation in response to conflict, as Chapter 5 illustrates. For example, Nepal has been enriched with a Ministry of Peace following a joint approach of the conflict with Maoist insurgents. Kenya has set up an elaborate system of inclusive policy consultations in response to the country’s various violent crises. Germany has done the same in preparation of possible international response and it also has operationalised the new approach by setting up a funding program, called zivik. Kyrgyzstan’s very own brand of on-the-spot consultation prevented an explosive situation to spin out of control. Two of these countries (Kyrgyzstan and Kenya) saw their new-found consultation models being tested in December 2007, when both countries held national parliamentary elections.

These are mostly policy initiatives, actions and responses that have taken place at the local and national
level. But recent experiences at the United Nations have shown that CSO involvement is also possible at the highest international diplomatic level. Chapter 6 describes this process as it relates to the advent of the concept of human security and its recognition by the UN and indeed the establishment of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Outside of the UN circles, many civil initiatives are taken and some have led to remarkable results in an astonishingly short period of time, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. As is explained in Chapter 7, which analyses the discourse and impact of this and other campaigns, a key ingredient in its success has been close collaboration between the civil initiative (campaign), various governments and key UN structures.

Confidence building measures are necessary to bring governments and CSOs closer together and get them to cooperate. The case studies from this paper show that confidence is best built by open communication, followed by what can aptly be described as ‘show, don’t tell’. Once collaboration is seen to work and complementarity is seen to be a working concept rather than vacuous terminology, the basis for durable collaboration appears to have been laid, as many of the case studies exemplify.

The future can be gleaned from the elaborate peacebuilding infrastructure that has been set up in Kenya and the international response infrastructure for funding peacebuilding, of which zivik in Germany is the most elaborate example. Peacebuilding is now also seen as an area in which the UN has been insufficient. The Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is focusing more on the management of conflicts than on prevention of conflicts. Some progress has been made over the recent years for instance with the Peace Building Commission. However a better international infrastructure on conflict prevention and peacebuilding is needed. Many global issues are addressed at the global level by UN agencies, but there is no overall agency on Peacebuilding. This brings in a need for cooperation between the different actors in the field. There is scope for a multi-stakeholder approach at the global level, which has already been in place for a number of other global issues.

The key issue will be the availability of resources. It has been pointed out many times – and indeed it is done again in this paper – that ample resources, financial and otherwise, are available to deal with the fallout of conflicts: humanitarian aid, peace missions, reconstruction aid. But very little is available for the business of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. With this in mind, the paper contains a modest proposal for a Global Fund and/or a small secretariat, which will be instrumental in sourcing funds for various initiatives, in the spirit of public-private cooperation and aimed at peacebuilding, especially in the South. The German zivik could act as an example for this. As is said in the chapter that proposes the Global Fund: “We need, in fact, a global zivik.”
The Security Council stressed that the essential responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments, and that the United Nations and the international community can play an important role in support of national efforts for conflict prevention and can assist in building national capacity in this field and recognized the important supporting role of civil society. The Security Council reaffirmed the need for this strategy to be based on engagement with governments, regional and subregional organizations as well as civil society organizations, as appropriate, reflecting the widest possible range of opinions. The Security Council underlined the potential contributions of a vibrant and diverse civil society in conflict prevention, as well as in the peaceful settlement of disputes. They noted that a well-functioning civil society has the advantage of specialized knowledge, capabilities, experience, links with key constituencies, influence and resources, which can assist parties in conflict to achieve peaceful solution to disputes. The Security Council noted that a vigorous and inclusive civil society could provide community leadership, help shape public opinion, and facilitate as well as contribute to reconciliation between conflicting communities. The Security Council also underscored the role that these actors could play in providing a bridge to dialogue and other confidence-building measures between parties in conflict.  


As concluded by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict that:

“the prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term, too hard – intellectually, technically, and politically – to be the responsibility of any single institution or government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared, and labour divided among actors.”  


As stated in the UN Progress Report on the prevention of Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General urges:

“I encourage new and existing organs of the United Nations, including the GA, the SC, the HRC and the PBC, to deepen their engagement with civil society and with other actors that play important roles in conflict prevention. To this end, I urge Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue with civil society.”  

Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/891, 2006, p. 29
Catherine Barnes

1.1 Civil society: more than NGOs

‘Civil society’ resists easy definition, especially when discussing it as a global development. Every society has its own distinct forms of social organization, cultural and political traditions, as well as contemporary state and economic structures – all of which are central to the development of civil society and shape its specific features. Most broadly understood, however, civil society refers to the web of social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities with the aim of extracting profit), and the private life of families and individuals. Interlinked with the concept of ‘civil society’ is the idea of social capital: the values, traditions and networks that enable coordination and cooperation between people. Civil society therefore involves qualities associated with relationships, with values, and with organizational forms. Civil society takes form through various types of association. Ranging from officially constituted institutions to small, informal community groups, these associations give expression and direction to the social, political, spiritual and cultural needs of members. By reflecting diverse interests and values, they enable the articulation, mobilization and pursuit of the aspirations of the different constituent elements within a society. As such, civil society groups can be a factor in war as well as a force for peace.

Figure 1 illustrates many – though not all – of the types of groupings that can potentially comprise civil society, broadly understood. Some would contest the inclusion of some of these groupings as a part of civil society, more narrowly defined. Yet all have played important roles in responding to conflict. What becomes clear is that civil society is far more than public benefit non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet NGOs with technical-professional skills play an important role in providing services, promoting change and working with conflict. A comprehensive exploration of the roles played by civil society in conflict and peacebuilding is presented in *Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War and Building Peace*.

Some stress the political role of civil society, viewing it as the space for cultivating ‘civic’ values and processes for citizens to engage in public life by channelling their interests and aspirations through peaceful deliberative processes. Civil society interfaces with the state through parliamentary institutions (with parliamentarians often seen as serving a bridging role as the elected representatives of civil society), through other forms of policy dialogue, and even through direct displays of power through protest movements and activism. Furthermore, civil society groups can help to monitor and constrain the arbitrary exercise of state power and, increasingly, the behaviour of private businesses and even multinational corporations. Therefore civil society enables different groupings in society to debate differences, reach compromise, form priorities, and – sometimes – develop consensus on a higher common purpose. Civil society does not replace the state. At its worst, an authoritarian government can constrict – or even crush – the functioning of civil society through methods that violate human rights. Yet it is difficult for civil society to thrive amidst lawlessness and widespread violence. A flourishing civil society typically depends upon the security and predictability provided by an effective state run by democratic governments that ensures the rule of law. If these conditions are not present, people – through civil society organizing -strive to create the elements of self-governance and security. In so doing, they are recreating the basis for democratic government, which rests on the consent of the governed. Thus civil society and democratic states are highly complementary and even interdependent. Protracted conflict affects the ways CSOs operate, often fragmenting and undermining an already weak civil society. It furthermore tends to polarize groups along conflict divides – sometimes to the point where seemingly independent CSOs become highly partisan organizations in support of the war effort.
of one of the parties. Furthermore, armed conflict tends to constrain the ability of civil society to act autonomously, as governments and armed groups exert pressure on those under their control to conform. One of the goals of applied initiatives can be the long-term objective of strengthening an independent civil society structures that help to bridge conflict divides.

Figure 1: Civil society: diverse sectoral and organisational forms
### Civil society roles in structural prevention to address the causes of conflict

2. Making governments & state structures more responsive – through participation in political processes, policy dialogue, monitoring, advocacy campaigns, and protests.
3. Alleviating social tensions and conflict – through challenging xenophobia and discrimination, facilitating dialogue, promoting tolerance and a culture of peace.
4. Strengthening capacities to mediate conflict and manage differences – through conflict resolution training, mediation services, education, promoting rule of law.

### Civil society roles in early operational crisis response and during violent conflict

5. Early warning of emerging crises – monitoring, analysis, and communication strategies to raise awareness and generate attention.
7. Mobilizing political will for response – lobbying and campaigning, sensitizing domestic audiences.
8. Developing & strengthening ‘constituencies for peace’ and public awareness work, facilitating social dialogue, public protests.
9. Violence reduction and monitoring; creating ‘zones of peace’
10. Humanitarian relief & support to war-affected communities.

### Civil society roles in peacemaking

11. Facilitating communication and generating alternatives – Track II dialogue processes.
12. Creating a ‘pragmatic peace’ at the local level, strengthening local CSO capacities for conflict transformation & peacebuilding through public dialogue.
13. Developing a negotiation agenda and vision for the future that addresses the causes and consequences of conflict.
14. Participating in the political negotiations.
15. Facilitating / mediating political negotiations process.

### Preventing reoccurrence and post-settlement peacebuilding

16. Public education & awareness-raising on the peace agreement and consolidating support.
17. Facilitating the rehabilitation of war-affected relationships & communities; laying the groundwork for reconciliation.
18. Contributing to transitional justice processes.
19. Resumption of initiatives contributing to structural prevention – encouraging good governance, reconstruction and development, mediating social conflict, promoting human rights.
1.3 Partnerships for peace

While it is rare for grassroots efforts to transform wider systems of conflict and war, it is also not possible for these wider systems to be transformed without stimulating changes at the community level. Therefore many analysts and practitioners are agreed with John Paul Lederach’s observation that there is a need to build peace from the bottom-up, the top-down and the middle-out.\(^3\) Yet the methodologies for crossing the scale barrier, simultaneously and in a coordinated manner, are not well developed. Therefore the key seems to be in negotiating dynamic and strategic partnerships between different actors concerned about the conflict – including governments, IGOs and CSOs. This can then be operationalised through stronger mechanisms and resources for interaction between IGOs, CSOs and governments in order to institutionalize the capacity for prevention.

Partnerships for peace may be the antidote to systems and networks sustaining war. To achieve this potential, there should be increased acknowledgement of the legitimate role of CSOs in peace and security matters. However CSOs should not be considered instruments to carry out agendas set by others. Rather they should be seen as complementing partners with valuable contributions to make in providing information and analysis, policy development, strategy design and program implementation. As noted, the potential of such partnerships has been increasingly acknowledged in the past few years.

As concluded by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict that “the prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term, too hard - intellectually, technically, and politically- to be the responsibility of any single institution or government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared, and labour divided among actors.”\(^4\)

This necessity to work together in partnership, and to complement each other is also stated in the recent UN Progress Report on the prevention of Armed Conflict, in the Secretary-General urges “Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue with civil society.”\(^5\)

Also discussions within the EU are taking place in the framework of the ‘Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’, acknowledging the importance to include views of civil society in civilian crisis management policy orientations. Experience on the ground shows that the necessity of multiple actors urgently requires rethinking in how to intensify inter-agency cooperation in planning and implementation, also in order to avoid duplicating efforts by others. Under the Finnish Presidency of the EU, some recommendations were agreed by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) in November 2006 and subsequently endorsed by the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union. Importantly, the recommendations envisage regular information exchange, inclusion of NGO expertise in fact-finding or pre-planning missions, feedback from NGOs in lessons learnt processes, the establishment of NGO liaison functions at headquarters and mission level, some degree of collaboration on training, the possible inclusion of NGO experts in national rosters for ESDP missions, and pro-active engagement at policy and operational level.\(^6\) These recommendations, jointly developed by the EU and

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5 Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/891, p. 29. 2006.
NGOs, started to be implemented under the German and Portuguese Presidencies of the EU and will be revised after an assessment under the Slovene Presidency during the first half of 2008. The EU also adopted recently a new Civilian Headline Goal for 2010, which will “identify and exploit possible synergies” with NGOs and CSOs. Finally, under the new Instrument for Stability, the European Commission has established a Peace-Building Partnership. This Partnership aims to build capacities of EU’s partners in crisis response, including NGOs, and to improve the dialogue between NGO actors and policy makers at the level of the European Union. All these initiatives are still very new and are currently under development.

A useful overview of the strengths and weaknesses of civil society organizations and the challenges they face in peacebuilding work was included in a recent World Bank report on civil society and peacebuilding.

### Summary of CSO Strengths, Weaknesses and Challenges

| **Strengths** | Better information on ‘reality on the ground’  
| | CSOs can work where government can not (areas)  
| | CSOs can speak to parties government can not reach  
| | CSOs can work on social change issues government often can not  
| | CSOs are better grounded; particularly CBOs enjoy trust and legitimacy  
| | CSOs can inform and monitor policies (the view from below)  
| | CSOs operate more flexibly and adapted to the context |
| **Limitations/ weakneses** | Limited organizational capacity, internal governance, funding. Often a local focus (particularly CBOs). Weak networking and coordination mechanisms among CSOs Questionable constituency base and legitimacy of NGOs Often tense relations with, disregard & mistrust from government Capacity to act in situations of violent conflict equally hampered NGOs may weaken the state, by substituting service delivery for too long |
| **Challenges** | Sheer diversity of CSOs: different motivations, capacities, contributions Effectiveness of CSOs peacebuilding initiatives difficult to measure Tension between having constituency ties (leading partisanship) and impartiality/ neutrality considered crucial for effective civil society peacebuilding Key conditions for peace are often out of reach for CSOs |


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The final report of the World Bank was published in December 2006. It is however not available on the World Bank website.
Catherine Barnes*

2.1 Foreign and domestic: complex relationships & levels of analysis

There is widespread international agreement that primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments and other local actors. Local ownership of peacebuilding is likely to result in more legitimate processes and sustainable outcomes. The primary role of outsiders is to create spaces and support inclusive processes that enable those directly involved to make decisions about the specific arrangements for addressing the causes of conflict.

When discussing cooperation between governments and CSOs working on peacebuilding, it is important to clarify whether this is principally in the domestic sphere of addressing conflict(s) within the country / sub-region versus principally in the international sphere of addressing conflicts abroad.

* Catherine Barnes, Conciliation Resources (see note 1).

Domestic

The relationship between national civil society formations with the government in responding to conflict in their midst is dynamically complex. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between ‘government’ per se and the wider array of state structures. As the government of the day is likely to be a party to conflict to a greater or lesser extent, it may be questionable whether other state institutions (such as the parliament, the judiciary, or local authorities) are perceived as a credible and capable actor in responding to conflict. Nevertheless, all the domestic actors are ‘stakeholders’ to the conflict. They therefore share a degree in responsibility for fostering the basis of their future (with governments having a primary obligation). Their cooperation may focus on resolving a specific conflict, on addressing underlying contradictions that give rise to ongoing tensions, or on transforming relationships marred by persistent conflict and building a culture of peace. Their efforts to address conflict are likely to have structural, legal, institutional, social and resource implications. As such, the potential field of cooperation is multidimensional across a broad spectrum of issues and range from close strategic partnerships to adversarial pressure to simple competition for control and influence.

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**Figure 2: Key actors and arenas for Government-CSO engagement in conflict issues**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Domestic Civil Society</th>
<th>International Civil Society</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government in power</td>
<td>NGOs, CBOs, identity-based associations, faith-based, professional bodies, social-political movements,</td>
<td>Specialist NGOs working with ‘local’ partners; transnational alliances; global coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parliament / Legislature (often multi-party)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3. State institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security sector</td>
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<td>Judicial Ministries</td>
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<td>4. Local &amp; regional govt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Independent chartered bodies (commissions, QUANGOs, media)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States

1. Government in power
2. Parliament / Legislature (often multi-party)
3. State institutions
   - Security sector
   - Judicial Ministries
4. Local & regional govt
5. Independent chartered bodies (commissions, QUANGOs, media)

Domestic Civil Society

- NGOs, CBOs, identity-based associations, faith-based, professional bodies, social-political movements,

International Civil Society

- Specialist NGOs working with ‘local’ partners; transnational alliances; global coalitions
International
The relationship between CSOs and governments concerning policies and practices in response principally to conflicts ‘elsewhere’ can be slightly more abstract and is likely to be more formal, conducted through existing communication channels and procedures. A government’s approach to foreign policy and international action is typically subject to competing interests and priorities. Policies on trade and the economy may take priority over policies on prevention and peacebuilding – even to the point where, for example, the arms trade directly contributes to the escalation of armed conflict. Furthermore, the government may not always act on its principles. While it may be concerned about the situation in country x, it may refrain from getting actively involved because it would upset an important ally.

These distinctions between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ are made more complicated by the fact that domestic CSOs often have links with international CSOs, who in turn have links with a range of governments with an interest in a conflict-affected country. Furthermore, IGOs often play a significant role in responding to armed conflict. Their mandate and operations are influenced both by the response of the government of the Member State(s) in which the conflict takes place, as well as by the interests of other Member States and the rules and principles of the IGO’s charter. All of these actors may, in turn, be influenced by civil society activists and others, such as the private sector. This complexity creates both opportunities and constraints for responding to conflict. Those in government or civil society who are committed to sustainable peacebuilding have to undertake a careful analysis of the multiple factors at stake and map the available channels for effective influence.

Challenge Given the complexity of actors, interests and issues operating in the global system, how can peacebuilders best champion and implement coherent policies? How can governmental and civil society actors cooperate to move prevention and peacebuilding up the agenda of political concern?

Challenge Both government officials and CSOs working on public policy issues tend to focused on a specific topic as education or on economic and development issues, and so on. This can create obstacles to analyzing and implementing holistic and comprehensive peacebuilding. What are the mechanisms and processes to facilitate multi-sectoral cooperation capable of addressing the complexity of conflict?

What is clear is that cooperation among well-meaning parties at all levels – within civil society, at the governmental and regional level, and at the global level – is required. That position was underlined in the UN Secretary-General’s Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict of September 7, 2006: in which the Secretary General “urge[d] Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue with civil society, for example, by inviting civil society representatives to provide regular briefings to pertinent bodies.”

2.2 CSOs and governments: cooperation, co-optation, and confrontation

In general, there are a number of barriers to cooperation. Partnership between government and CSOs is often characterized by mistrust. In many conflict situations, large parts of the population mistrusts government, and civil society peace activists avoid making direct connections to governmental actors. Mutual misperceptions and lack of understanding of the other’s institutional imperatives. Government officials may question the quality, legitimacy and accountability of specific NGOs – or of civil society organizations more generally. They may not see their relevance or believe that they can create more trouble than they resolve.

They may also resent the often hostile tone that some civil society actors may adopt in their critique of the government and perceive them as having essentially political motives in seeking to undermine the government’s authority.

Civil society actors may, in turn, be deeply suspicious of the motives and commitment of ‘officials’. They may have considerable ideological or political differences and believe the contradictions are insurmountable without becoming too compromised. In some cases, all these concerns are well-founded. Furthermore there are situations when it may be inappropriate or worse to engage, perhaps especially when the state is controlled by an oppressive regime and will only engage with CSOs if they are fully co-opted and subject to government control. Alternately, CSOs may object to a government’s foreign policy as a whole. Disagreement with a government’s stance in one country or conflict (such as the ‘war against terrorism’) may make them cautious of cooperating too closely with the same government on a different situation, for fear of becoming / being perceived as a tool of the government. Conversely, in some countries the boundaries between the state and civil society is extremely blurred, as when many parts of civil society have institutional access to the state, routinely play a role in policy development, and receive the bulk of their funding from their government. This may lead some to loose their ‘critical edge’ and become more like outsourcing agencies to deliver government services.

The potentials and possibilities for engagement between governments and CSOs are embedded in the wider political, social and legal context of the country. Constructive engagement between CSOs and governments are far more likely in well-established democracy with a strong rule-of-law establishment than in authoritarian dictatorships, where truly independent civic groups may be seen as more of a threat than an asset. Yet in any context there are likely to be diverse ways of relating ranging from extremely close to extremely confrontational. The engagement of government with CSOs differs between governments from the North and the South. Northern governments tend to be more open towards input from civil society organizations. The type of interaction varies, ranging from informal meetings with CSOs to structured mechanisms for a regular dialogue. Southern governments seem to be less open to cooperation with CSOs but of course there are developing countries in which this is not the case. But in discussing the different mechanisms for cooperation the various level of interaction with CSOs undertaken by Northern and Southern governments should be taken into account.

The distinctive identities and roles played by CSOs and governments can make engagement complex. Some of this complexity is inherent in the distinctive identities and roles of NGOs as independent actors. This can generate a creative tension between strategies based on cooperative engagement with governmental decision makers versus strategies that deploy confrontation to generate political pressure for change.

CSOs need to deliberate and analyze the values and political positioning that characterizes their relationships with governments, so as to engage more effectively, ethically and strategically in responding to conflict. There is a range of potential approaches.\textsuperscript{12}

- **Complicit** – as citizens and as organizational groups embedded in a country’s civil society, we are party to the decisions that our governments make in our name.
- **Contractual** – when CSOs implement government policies and programs through their work, often by receiving funding from governments.
- **Contributing** – through participation in policy dialogue and recommendations for appropriate responses to specific situations or issues.
- **Complementarity** – working in parallel as separate/autonomous entities within the same system of issues and relationships.
- **Contesting / Confronting** – when CSOs challenge government actions, priorities, and behaviours.

Yet in times when it is an advantage for governments and CSOs to work together, their engagement can be assisted by developing both formal-institutional mechanisms and personal-relationship experience to facilitate effective cooperation – as will be discussed in Section 5. Strong collaborative working relationships are more likely when all parties have developed a shared

\textsuperscript{12} This ‘5-Cs’ framework was developed by the participants in the GPPAC London ‘Brainstorming’ Meeting in December 2003, with key inputs from Andy Carl and Simon Fisher.
frame of reference and a common set of desired objectives, as well as mutual perceptions of reliability and trust. There is a spectrum of modalities for engagement, as illustrated in the following figure. They can be understood as ranging along an axis of degrees of autonomy and separation.

**Challenge** How can governments and CSOs cooperate without undermining the distinctive strengths of each (e.g. independence and flexibility of CSOs; formal legal political accountability and representativeness of governments).

The following three chapters explore some of the potential areas for cooperation between governments and CSOs in the arena of prevention and peacebuilding so as to provide a starting point for discussion. It does not attempt to be an exhaustive catalogue of all the potential arenas for cooperation or issues that arise in developing partnerships in these areas.

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**Spectrum of Government-CSO interaction in working with conflict**

- **Sub-contractor;**
  - CSO implements government policy without independent input / voice

- **Ad hoc case or topic specific engagement:**
  - Policy advocacy or project work

- **Oppositional confrontation:**
  - Pressure for change

- **Strategic partnership:**
  - Jointly developed frameworks & implementation

- **Infrequent informal consultation / information exchange**

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*Figure 3: Spectrum of Government-CSO interaction in working with conflict*
3 POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

3.1 Introduction

*Catherine Barnes*

One of the aims of many peacebuilders is to mobilize political support for constructive action to address conflicts and their causes. NGOs have a crucial and ever increasing role in contributing information, arguments and energy to influencing decision-making processes. They can directly address policy makers and address those who, in turn, influence them.

Civil society actors can make an important contribution by identifying overlooked problems and policy gaps, analyzing issues and recommending solutions. In short, they can identify the central agenda of issues that need to be addressed in responding to a conflict situation and dealing with peace and security issues more widely. Civil society groups can analyze the situation, formulate recommendations, develop policy options and engage in policy dialogue to address conflicts. They can also mobilize advocacy campaigns to generate political will amongst decision-makers and implement strategies to achieve the desired results.

These capacities can be directed towards influencing both government policy and national legislation. While CSOs can lobby government and parliamentarians to introduce new laws that either address the causes of conflict or create mechanisms for managing conflict more peacefully and effectively, it is more common for them to engage in policy processes with relevant government ministries.

Government officials and CSOs can engage in a number of collaborative processes for developing policy frameworks and developing action plans to implement them.13

1. Conceptual exchange, learning and analysis of problematic issues and possible solutions
2. Formulating the overall direction of policy and specific policy objectives
3. Strategizing and planning specific measures to implement policy
4. Awareness-raising, advocacy and lobbying to generate the political conditions necessary for a new policy agenda to be adopted and implemented.

There are numerous ways in which civil society engages governments and vice versa. Broadly speaking these engagements move along the continuum provided at the end of the previous chapter; they are also contingent on the prevailing culture, administrative and otherwise. Thus, joint consultation and policy building follows a highly structured path in the case of Germany. It is very formal and proceeds cautiously in Japan, while in the United Kingdom cooperation is very close. A very interesting case is provided by Mongolia, where a poorly resourced but ambitious government and an equally ambitious civil society find common ground in the promotion of a single issue: the creation of a nuclear weapons free region in northeast Asia.

Policy development in the UK and DFID

In the United Kingdom, specialist NGOs are often at the forefront of identifying policy challenges. They undertake public awareness raising to generate pressure for a government response and engage in policy dialogue with relevant government officials, parliamentarians and civil servants to promote awareness of the issues and recommend steps to address them. In its policymaking processes, many government departments will in turn consult with relevant NGOs in advance of preparing policy papers and then hold public consultations when those papers are in their draft stage before they are revised and adopted by the government as official policy. For example, when DFID developed its Preventing Violent Conflict14 policy paper in 2006-07, it held an initial consultation roundtable with peacebuilding NGOs to brainstorm ideas. It then opened up to a public consultation eliciting ideas for how DFID, and the UK government more widely, should address its three policy goals: putting greater emphasis on preventing violent conflict; improve the effectiveness of responses to violent conflict; making all DFID’s development work ‘conflict-sensitive’. While the government ultimately decided the contents of the policy, civil society organizations made substantive inputs into its content.
3.2 Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGO Joint Public Series Cooperation

*Meredith Joyce*15

Japan does not have a strong tradition of civil society/government cooperation. But mutual understanding is growing, as both sectors work together in new ways to prepare Japan’s contributions to a few United Nations forums.

Despite its large population and industrialized economy, Japan lacks a strong tradition of civil society organizations, particularly apparent in fields related to peace and security. The Japanese government has traditionally viewed civil society organizations as being in opposition to the state – as ‘anti-government’ rather than ‘non-governmental’ groups. This has prevented much significant cooperation and interaction between governments and civil society organizations, and contributed to a situation where civil society remains weak, and the political will to engage with civil society even weaker. Despite recent political upheavals the Japanese public still generally holds the government in esteem. This has led to a situation with very few platforms for interaction and cooperation between CSOs and government.

This case is particularly true for peace-related CSOs. While organizations working on environmental and developmental issues have grown in scope and influence over past decades, it is only since the 1990s since CSOs have grown to have a real voice in relation to peace. Issues such as peacebuilding and security are seen by the government as state issues, and therefore only government-supported organizations are encouraged to be active in such international arenas. This has led to a particularly significant lack of cooperation and dialogue relating to these issues.

**Outline of Public Forums**

As a step towards filling these gaps, various Japanese GPPAC member organizations have organized a series of Public Forums with the joint sponsorship of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). These forums provide a rare opportunity for dialogue between the government and civil society, and have taken place five times since 2005. The coordinating CSOs are the Citizens’ Centre for Diplomacy, Japan International Volunteer Centre and Peace Boat (regional secretariat for GPPAC Northeast Asia). Government level coordination has been carried out by the United Nations Planning and Administration Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Recent participation from the private sector in the form of the Global Compact Japan Network has also added a new dimension, despite their as yet small numbers.

The primary goal of these public forums is to shape Japan’s policy priorities relating to the United Nations, with input not only from the government but also from NGOs, the private sector, UN agencies in Japan, and embassies based in Tokyo. Concrete objectives include action at the General Assembly / Security Council level (such as adoption of resolutions), and creating impact upon UN bodies in which Japan plays a leading role, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), the Human Security Unit (HSU) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC). These public forums will be the initial step toward the development of an ongoing structure for CSO input, for example in the shape of an annual consultation.

The public forums feature plenary sessions as well as smaller workshops and symposiums, and provide a space for opinion exchange between NGOs, international agencies, government officials and members of the general public. Each forum has attracted around 200 participants.
Workshops at each forum focus on the four themes of development, peacebuilding, disarmament and human rights, along with a major overall theme for each session – the most recent being climate change. This focus serves as a common meeting point for the parties and such engagement therefore serves as an indirect method for CSOs to raise issues regarding Japanese foreign policy and Japan’s international role. While the public forums take place only twice a year, there is continued contact throughout the other months, with regular visits to and meetings with MOFA, creating a wider process beyond the individual events.

Results
The public forums have had several concrete outcomes, including recommendations for the Outcomes Document of the Millennium +5 Summit, held September 14-16, 2005 at the UN Headquarters in New York. The forums, officially co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as a comprehensive policy consultation prior to the Summit. Further, at the UNGA Informal Interactive Hearing with Civil Society at UN Headquarters in June 2005, Akira Kawasaki of Peace Boat (and also the coordinator of the Public Forums) presented recommendations entitled “Demilitarize Security and Develop Non-Violent Ways.” The recent focus of the forums on human security, a topic of key concern for both CSOs and the Japanese government, has also led to significant opportunities. A particular indication of the importance of these public forums is demonstrated in Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura’s address at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly, where he notably said that the Japanese government “values exchange with corporations, academics, NGOs and various other actors in public forums, while at the same time cooperating with the UN Global Compact.”

Better understanding
The process leading up to the forums, along with the challenges encountered along the way, has in itself been of great importance for building and improving relationships between government and CSOs. Given the traditional relationship between CSOs and the government in Japan, a tendency for Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to feel that NGOs are in direct opposition to the government has been evident. Indeed, some officials have gone so far to view this collaboration as a device for CSOs to gather more ‘ammunition’ to be used against the government. Yet this ongoing cooperation, with common goals, has provided a time-consuming yet highly meaningful opportunity for CSOs to demonstrate the potential for a complementary rather than oppositional relationship to be developed.

A further challenge has been the vertical and very compartmentalized structure of the government. While CSOs aim to work horizontally, collaborating with several organizations working on interrelated issues, government officials have focused on issues directly within their official field of responsibility. In practice, this means that Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucrats rarely involve other ministries, even where their portfolios are perhaps more appropriate (for example in regards to environmental or trade related issues). This leads, among others, to a lack of official engagement in fields for which MOFA has no designated division, such as peacebuilding. MOFA has also tended to steer away from including politicians in the process, viewing their involvement as a pressure rather than as adding value. Furthermore, the position within MOFA of the UN Planning and Administration Division and its related divisions is relatively weak. No government budget,
beyond the provision of a venue, is provided for these, which has lead to further challenges in implementation.

While this compartmentalization of divisions can at times lead to difficulties, the opportunity to understand these structures and the government’s working mechanisms has also been very important. An understanding of these structures also enables CSOs to approach the government in a more strategic manner. For example, in the case of the recent situation in Burma, CSOs have been able to use the knowledge of governmental mechanisms strategically, to ask for a roundtable with a variety of government stakeholders, including divisions relating to both human rights and Southeast Asia. Similarly, MOFA divisions which deal with related issues and yet had thus far been operating totally separately have been brought to the same table through the public forum process. This has provided a space for discussion between different divisions on comprehensive policy directions.

**Better cooperation and constructive dialogue**

Similar to the government’s compartmentalization of issues, CSOs have also tended to have a more single issue-based approach. These forums have also succeeded in bringing organizations working on diverse and yet interrelated issues together, giving them more capacity to collaborate. Particularly important for such cross-cutting fields as conflict prevention and peacebuilding, this approach has nurtured a deeper and more diverse understanding on behalf of civil society also. This multilayered approach has also proven effective when dealing with the media.

Considering the short history and relatively weak nature of NGOs in Japan, a culture of constructive dialogue has not yet been nurtured within Japanese civil society. The scale at which civil society activity and cross-cutting activities such as the public forums takes place remains relatively small. Insufficient media attention is a problem, as is the shortage of staff with the capacity to devote significant time and effort specifically to these public forums and the surrounding process. Finally, differences in evaluation processes between have been a challenge. The dominant view within MOFA is that a certain phrase being included in an official statement submitted to UN can be considered a significant outcome, whereas CSOs tend to place more emphasis on the follow up action and public outreach.

**Next steps**

Two public forums are planned for 2008, in February and August. The lessons learned and relationships developed with government through these forums will be an invaluable asset to NGO policy advocacy efforts relating to the 2008 G8 Summit, due to be held in July on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) is also planned for 2008, and MOFA has explicitly indicated that it also wishes to continue to include civil society in this process. The public forums held on either side of the G8 Summit and TICAD will feed in to the forum process, laying the foundations for a CSO channel of input, as well as leading to greater government willingness to consider and incorporate CSO recommendations and proposals into policy priorities.

Currently, the only official outcomes of the forum are in the form of the chair’s factual summary, which is uploaded to the MOFA website reporting on each public forum. As the next step, we aim for the government to adopt and announce brief yet official annual policy papers regarding Japan’s UN policy, based on the public forums. An extension of this will be the preparation of an official joint paper, with the collaboration of CSOs and the government. Following the outcomes of the 6th public forum in February, TICAD and the Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War in May, and the G8 in July, we hope to present this paper in August, in time for the commencement of the General Assembly in September.
3.3 FriEnt: Working Group on Development and Peace in Germany

*Natascha Zupan*

In Germany, a new infrastructure has been set up around peace and development issues. Government and non-government actors jointly formulate areas – both topical and geographical – of intervention.

In theory, peace building sometimes sounds like creating a good meal: one needs well-selected ingredients of high quality, an assortment of fine spices, some creativity and of course certain technical skills. In reality, it’s different: There is no single cook to decide about the ‘right’ components, and instead of ingredients to choose, there is a huge variety of organizations, multilateral institutions, state agencies and civil society organizations from the North and South engaged in post conflict societies. Nonetheless, the idea of closer cooperation between different actors, the need for coherent, multi-layered approaches to peace building and the necessity for ongoing reflection and learning are not only widely acknowledged, but fundamental to the peace building discourse ever since it emerged in the early nineties.

Seven German governmental and non-governmental organizations working in the field of development cooperation and peace building came together in 2000 in order to discuss possibilities of closer cooperation amongst each other. One year later, on 1 September 2001, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Church Development Service (EED), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Misereor / Catholic Central Agency for Development Aid (KZE), the Civil Peace Service Group (CPS) and the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management in cooperation with the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) founded the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt). Its main objectives are:

- promoting the role of peace building in the members’ strategies and activities
- capacity building
- promoting joint learning against a backdrop of different perspectives and approaches and
- supporting its members in networking and cooperation.

**Structure and activities**

In order to meet this goals as well as pool competences and resources, a unique and innovative structure was set up. A Steering Committee comprising one representative of each member organization sets the political guidelines and is responsible for the overall strategic governance of the Working Group. Additionally, all member organizations have established Points of Contact in order to support exchange and mutual feedback between the member organizations themselves and with the FriEnt team.

The FriEnt team itself is the “melting pot” of the Working Group: Each FriEnt member organization delegates one staff member to the FriEnt team to work jointly on selected countries and issues. They usually spend between 30 and 50 per cent of their working time in their own organizations. The team is headed by a team leader and also comprises a communication manager and a secretary. Three main functions are given to the team. It acts as:

- an information and knowledge gateway;
- a platform for networking and joint learning;
- a resource for advisory services and capacity building.

Hence, the FriEnt team offers several activities to its member organizations and the broader national as well as international development cooperation and peace building community:

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16 Natascha Zupan studied Middle Eastern Studies and History in Marburg. Early in 2003, she joined the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an Advisor for Peace Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. Since 2004, she is the head of the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt).

17 One or two German political foundations have been members of FriEnt so far: Besides the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which only recently left the Working Group, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung participated in the first phase. In September 2007, The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung joint FriEnt.

18 www.frient.de/en.
• workshops, country-specific round tables and panel discussions;
• news and background information (newsletter FriEnt Impulse and website);
• publications (briefing papers, workshop reports and guidelines);
• training and expert advice on country- and issue-specific strategies, methods and best practices.

Identifying common interests and setting the agenda

Ever since the Working Group was founded, the Steering Committee together with the FriEnt team engaged in a process of identifying countries and issues of common interest to all member organizations. So far, the FriEnt team has developed projects and implemented its activities on a range of so called priority countries and topics:

Topics:
• Dealing with spoilers in peace processes
• Methods for peace and conflict-sensitive planning, monitoring and evaluation
• Peace building and security
• Prevention within the framework of development cooperation
• Religion, development cooperation and conflict
• Transitional Justice
• War Economies

Countries:
• Chad/Sudan
• Colombia
• Israel & Palestine / Middle East
• Nepal

Over time, the criteria for selecting topics and countries and the working methods of the team have been adapted according to the needs of the member organizations and the experiences and lessons learnt. While the criteria of ‘joint interest and needs’ of all member organizations and the idea of merging them into one project was crucial at the beginning, it became more and more obvious, that a ‘one size fits all’ approach does not always meet the needs of the different members. Consequently, the team identified countries and topics where at least three members had an interest. It also started to distinguish between ‘discourse and joint learning’ and the ‘operational level’. Workshops and round tables on priority countries and topics for all member organizations and the wider community are now organized, addressing general questions and providing space for exchange of information and experiences, networking and joint learning. Besides this, FriEnt team members offer advice and capacity building to individual members, addressing the specific needs of one organization.

Having laid the foundation for an institutionalized dialogue and co-operation between state and civil society within the Steering Committee and the FriEnt team in the first phase of the Working Group (2001-2004), FriEnt further developed its structure, its communication and outreach and its activities in the second phase (2004-2007); and only recently started the third phase (2007-2010). FriEnt has adapted its activities to the changing political and institutional context as well as the needs expressed by its member organizations. The evolving debate on ‘development and security’ and a ‘governance-approach’ to countries in crisis or post-conflict societies widened the theatre of (state) actors. It also posed new political and practical challenges to aid agencies and peace building organizations. Today, the FriEnt team not only engages with a broader range of national actors, including the military, and international organizations, it also addresses strategic and political challenges within its country and topic specific activities such as dealing with Hamas (Israel & Palestine; Spoiler), regional dimensions of conflict and peace building in Chad/Sudan, or the sequencing of activities/interventions and cooperation between civilian and military actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Agenda setting, providing new approaches and insights as well as raising innovative and critical questions have become more relevant for the Working Group. The FriEnt team, for example, organized a workshop on the Responsibility to Protect and published a briefing paper on the topic.19 FriEnt also introduced the concept of Transitional Justice to its member organizations and the wider community in Germany. The Transitional Justice...
concept fits very well into the FriEnt agenda: it contains different mechanisms (prosecution, truth seeking, vetting / institutional reforms, and reparations); it allows to focus and operationalise peace building activities in post conflict societies and also involves complementarity of different state and civil society actors.

Since 2004, FriEnt’s activities focus on specific experiences and challenges, tensions that may arise and courses of action for governmental and non-governmental actors. The team has organized several Round Table discussions, provided training and advise to individual FriEnt Member organizations, and published a FriEnt Briefing as well as a Guidance Paper on Transitional Justice. Within the framework of the international conference Building a Future on Peace and Justice, FriEnt widened its international network and cooperated with the BMZ and the Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) – Swisspeace in organizing two workshops on the nexus between development and transitional justice as well as justice mechanisms and the question of legitimacy.

Lessons learnt
A couple of lessons on state – civil society cooperation in peace building can be learnt from the specific structural set-up, working methods and processes of FriEnt:

1) Time, patience and creativity needed
An institutionalized dialogue, consultation and co-operation mechanism like the Working Group needs time to build trust and mutual understanding, patience from all actors to deal with errors or misunderstandings, and creativity to find solutions to problems in an ever changing, dynamic context.

2) Nothing is ‘for free’
Neither the continued facilitation of joint processes or co-operative activities, nor the provision of relevant information, expertise and advice or the identification of new topics, questions and challenges are ‘for free’. A cooperation mechanism like FriEnt does not need too much resources for its activities, but it needs experienced staff members, who are able to transfer theories into practical approaches, who follow up processes over a longer period of time and who are flexible to adjust activities according to the needs.

3) Providing new ground for reflection
Because of its multi-institutional composition, the Working Group and, more particular, the FriEnt team can create space for an open and critical reflection about given peace building paradigms, approaches and practice. The state-civil society partnership on equal footing allows members to reflect about their role and perspectives vis à vis the other actors.

4) Being close to practice
The multi-institutional structure of the FriEnt team creates a unique focal point for different processes and discussions. Working within their institutions and the team, each staff member can channel relevant activities, possibilities for co-operation, practice and needs oriented questions into both directions, i.e. via FriEnt to the other FriEnt members and the wider community.

19 The report on the workshop is available on: www.frient.de/downloads/R2P-Workshop%20Documentation_2006.pdf
20 The FriEnt Briefing For the Sake of Peace... and the FriEnt Guidance Paper Transitional Justice and Dealing with the Past can be downloaded at: www.frient.de/en/topics/justice.asp
21 The studies and expert papers commissioned for the workshops as well as the workshop report are available on: www.frient.de/en/topics/publications.asp?Thema=Transitional%20Justice
3.4 Mongolia: Blue Banner cooperation with Mongolian government

Jargalsaikhan Enksaikhan

The Mongolian government wants its part of the world to become free of nuclear weapons. But it lacks resources and has other priorities too. So it avails itself of the services of a local NGO to help promote this part of its foreign policy – and a real partnership is born.

Blue Banner is a Mongolian non-governmental organization established in 2005 to promote nuclear non-proliferation and Mongolia’s initiative to turn the country into a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). It is independent from the government or any of its agencies and does not depend on nor receive instruction or any financial support from the government. It believes that the government of Mongolia needs to promote more vigorously the policy of establishing and institutionalizing the concept of the single-State NWFZ. It also believes that independent NGOs and think tanks can make useful practical suggestions to the government on the ways and means of promoting the initiative, including the form and content of the future zone. To that end it undertakes special area studies and presents its findings and recommendations to the general public or the government as the case may be.

Blue Banner was established in the spirit of the Mongolian law on the country’s nuclear-weapon-free status, which was adopted in 2000. Article 6.4 of that law stipulates that “non-governmental organizations or individuals may, within the mandate provided by the legislation, exercise public oversight of the implementation of the legislation on the nuclear-weapon-free status and submit proposals thereon to the relevant State authority”.

The organization’s policy making body is its governing council that consists of seven members, including a former head of state, a professor, two human rights activists, one student, one former ambassador and one research worker. Two of the members are females with vast experience in the non-governmental sector.

Blue Banner’s international activities
Since its establishment Blue Banner has undertaken a number of studies on the best ways to raise awareness of still hidden nuclear dangers and promote Mongolia’s initiative at the national and international levels. To this effect, a number of promotional materials and studies aimed have been published in the Mongolian, English and Japanese languages for free circulation. At the international level it organized a number of meetings to address the issues of ensuring national security by political and legal means, promoting the concept of establishment of single-state NWFZs and of a North-East Asian NWFZ. Thus in May and June 2007 Blue Banner, together with other national and international NGOs, organized two regional meetings in Ulaanbaatar. The first was GPPAC Northeast Asia’s meeting focusing on issues of civil society support for the Six-Party Talks for a regional peace mechanism, and promoting North-East Asian and single-state NWFZs.

The second meeting (IPPNW/North Asia) focused on promoting the establishment of a Northeast Asian NWFZ. For that purpose experts on and authors of various draft treaties on the issue were invited to participate. The two regional meetings adopted sets of recommendations that raise awareness of civil society organizations on the need to support more vigorously the Six-Party Talks, and on taking practical steps to invigorate the process of establishing additional NWFZs in the world, especially in Northeast Asia and supporting Mongolia’s efforts to institutionalize its single-state NWFZ status.

Cooperation with the government
Especially the second set of recommendations was meant to provide support for and encouragement of the efforts of the government of Mongolia in...
institutionalizing its single-state NWFZ status. Since the establishment of Blue Banner, a number of regional meetings have adopted statements in support of the Mongolian government’s efforts to institutionalize its status. These independent and yet practical efforts of Blue Banner have been duly noted and appreciated by the Mongolian government.

In the spring of 2006 Blue Banner officially proposed to the Mongolian government (to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to jointly undertake a study on the implementation of the law and, if needed, make recommendations on concrete additional measures that would help fully implement the law. Mindful of Blue Banner’s constructive approach to the issue of Mongolia’s single-state NWFZ, the Ministry agreed to the suggestion.

Based on the above agreement in principle, Blue Banner proposed to the Foreign Ministry to set up an inter-agency working group and review implementation of the major provisions of the law. It also proposed a concrete methodology of assessing the implementation. Agreeing to such a suggestion, the minister of Foreign Affairs established an inter-agency working group and invited a representative of Blue Banner to join the group as an equal partner. Blue Banner agreed and participated actively in the working group’s work, including by making suggestions of a procedural and substantive nature connected with the review of the implementation of the law. It took an active part in every stage of the review process, including preparing the inter-agency working group’s assessment and its draft report.

In recognition, the foreign minister’s report on implementation of the law mentioned Blue Banner by name. The 7 point recommendation of the minister’s report includes a suggestion to undertake such monitoring on a regular basis. It was decided that the next report, to be undertaken in 1-2 years, should identify the most effective methodology of monitoring implementation of the law and present the recommendations thereon to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Standing Committee of the State Great Hural (parliament) for their guidance and follow-up action. It was agreed that Blue Banner would, as before, take an active part in identifying the most effective methodology and in monitoring the implementation of the law.

Reasons for government cooperation
The Mongolian government has many unresolved issues that it must address without delay. Though institutionalizing Mongolia’s single-state NWFZ status is considered as a priority issue, the government cannot address it fully, due to other ‘urgent’ issues of the day, including foreign policy issues. That is why it feels that its objective could be met to some extent by the support and cooperation of CSOs. Hence the government is inclined to work with such organizations. A gesture of good will on the part of CSOs, in this case on the part of Blue Banner, created the necessary climate of trust and cooperation.

Blue Banner believes that a good, open working relationship, and not unfounded hostility or subservience to government authorities, have established the basis for a mature and fruitful relationship with government authorities. In this case the government’s foreign policy goal as set in its national security concept and government priorities coincided with the goal of Blue Banner. This provided a good objective basis for useful and practical cooperation against the background of the climate of trust and mutual need. Furthermore, Blue Banner’s expertise and the experience of its members (i.e. added value) were useful for the government to tap into and thus promote the initiative at the national and international level. So, when the Foreign Ministry prepared a draft trilateral treaty (between Mongolia, China and Russia) on providing security assurances to Mongolia in connection with its nuclear-weapon-free status, Blue Banner played an important role.

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Blue Banner’s contribution to promoting the foreign policy agenda of Mongolia is being duly appreciated by the government. This can be seen by the fact that when the Ulaanbaatar focal point of GPPAC/NEA held its regional meeting in May 2006 in Mongolia, Blue Banner, one of the members of UB focal point, received political and other forms of support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies. This support was evident from the fact that the state secretary for Foreign Affairs personally attended the opening of the regional meeting and addressed the participants, while the vice-minister met with representatives of the GPPAC/NEA and exchanged views on issues of interest to the participants of the meeting. Practical support by the government was expressed in its agreement for the regional meeting and the reception to be held at the premises of the Foreign Ministry for a very reasonable fee. Though it is a minor detail, but for an NGO that does not receive government funds such gestures acquire special meaning. The ministry also helped Blue Banner by providing a simplified procedure for foreign participants in acquiring Mongolian visa upon arrival.

Challenges to cooperation with government

However, such cooperation with the government does not mean that it would always be smooth. Even if the ultimate goals are in general identical, on such issues as ways and means of attaining the goals, the exact nature of the single-state zone, the form of security assurances that need to be obtained from the immediate neighbours and from other nuclear-weapon States, issues of nuclear waste, etc., there will surely be differences. The CSOs would most probably aim higher in the goals than the government, while the latter would surely try to play safe and lower expectations, or use some of its leverage for other immediate foreign policy purposes or tasks. That is natural. In any case what would be needed are mutual understanding, mutual trust and respect, and spirit of cooperation.
4.1 Introduction

*Catherine Barnes*

People based in a society are often best placed to understand what is going on and to identify specific actions that can be taken to address conflict issues and dynamics. Their insights can support the development of subtle and highly targeted strategies that do not necessarily require extensive resources or coercive measures, especially when addressed at an early point in a conflict cycle. Civil society players – including women’s groups, those working with minorities, indigenous peoples and youth, and religious organizations and leaders – are often particularly well suited to provide information and analysis and to suggest appropriate responses. Their insight should be maximized when exploring response options, which may require collaboration from key partners elsewhere in the global system.

Yet it can be difficult for local actors to mobilize support from outsiders unless there are trustworthy channels to convey this information and analysis to those who can effectively act upon it. This indicates the advantage of an integrated system – or at least a well developed structure of networks, interfaces and entry points – between local, national and international CSOs concerned with conflict and for their engagement with concerned governments and IGOs.

Civil society can serve as an alternative entry point in states and regions in crisis. The donor community and IGOs can support the mobilization of these social resources at all levels, including through political accompaniment and financial support at the local and national level and through working constructively with Diaspora communities at the international level. Community and national CSOs can also take a range of actions to address conflicts in their midst and mitigate against outbreaks of violence, actions that are done sometimes with the implicit or explicit support of the government and under their censure.

Information and analysis about conflict is sometimes a highly sensitive issue. As it can affect national security, governments may consider it to be a matter exclusively in their realm. Perceptions of unscrupulous intelligence gathering and security service activities may further make it sensitive amongst the wider population, as allegations of ‘spying’ and interference may abound. Yet it is possible for CSOs and relevant officials to cooperate on early warning and early response systems. The system can involve key stakeholders and others with special expertise into a process to share information, strengthen joint analysis, identify options and opportunities, and provide necessary forms of support for implementation.

Inter-governmental and international actors can play a key role in facilitating and creating space for constructive dialogue and productive engagement between governments and civil society representatives. For this to work, however, their mandates and operational practices need to give priority to enabling this dialogue (and, consequently, mission staff will need to develop the necessary skills and capacities to do so effectively).

The following case illustrates one possible way in which CSOs and governments can cooperate in developing a system for responding to conflict, principally for addressing conflicts abroad.

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* Catherine Barnes, Conciliation Resources (see note 1).
Government and civil society collaboration for peacebuilding

Charles Dambach

Government and non-government actors have different perceptions on the same issue, also within their own circles. A serious exercise brought these differences clearly to light, and it provided a useful grooming for the actual fieldwork.

Civil society organizations devoted to building a more peaceful world began to proliferate a quarter century ago. A few peace advocacy organizations precede this period, but most are less than two decades old. Even more recently, many organizations traditionally devoted to international relief and development have incorporated conflict resolution into their missions and programs. Mercy Corps, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Oxfam, and others recognize the importance of peaceful, secure, and stable environments as prerequisites for successful social and economic development. Furthermore, dozens of academic institutions have created institutes and centers within their structures to not only study peace and conflict resolution, but also to serve as expert consultants and trainers. As a result thousands of citizen-based organizations are now devoted, in one way or another, to conflict prevention and resolution.

Government gets involved

During this same period, government agencies have recognized the unique and special discipline and practice of conflict prevention and resolution. Building a more secure, stable and peaceful world requires more than armed defense capacity and traditional diplomacy. It requires active application of peacebuilding concepts – establishing trust and normal relationships at the grassroots levels as well as among officials, and alleviating injustices, human rights abuses and poverty that can drive societies to use violence to achieve their objectives. Human security requires active measures to prevent violence from occurring, and sustained peace following armed conflict requires extensive reconstruction and reconciliation. The US government first became directly engaged in the concept of peacebuilding in 1981 with the creation of the US Institute of Peace (USIP). In the 1990s, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) created an Office of Transition Initiatives to help “local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis.” A decade later the office on Conflict Mediation and Mitigation was added to the USAID structure. Its mission is “to change the way aid is planned and implemented” by taking the impact of instability and violence into account on aid decisions.

At about the same time, the Department of State entered the field with the creation of the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). “The Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”

On top of these State Department and USAID bureaus, the Joint Forces Command within the Department of Defense has established a Unified Action program to link the military with the peacebuilding community and develop joint programs to help prevent and mitigate violent conflicts. None of these government initiatives are large, by typical government agency standards, but they reflect a growing awareness within the US government that alternatives to the use of military force are essential.

Divisions in the conflict prevention field

The emergence and proliferation of all of these nongovernmental and governmental peacebuilding organizations and agencies is, of course, welcome, but it also created a Tower of Babel and some jealousy and conflict within the conflict prevention field. This has
been particularly prevalent among the government agencies. Some questioned the motives and strategies of others. Others feared of duplication of services and programs. Everyone feared that the limited resources for peacebuilding may be spread over so many agencies and organizations that none would have the capacity – financial, staff and credibility – to achieve adequate results. Even the terminology and language used by various participants in the field caused some division and dissent. Furthermore, until recently, there had been little or no dialogue among them. Fortunately, most of these issues have now been resolved.

**Alliance building**

US-based civil society organizations began to meet in 1999, and they formed the precursor organization to the current Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP). From the beginning, the primary purpose of this network was to facilitate dialogue, learning, and collaboration among its members (more recently, AfP has welcomed organizations from all over the world to join, and it has become more proactive as an initiator of collaborative action programs and as an advocate for appropriate policies and programs). The emergence of the Global Partnership to Prevent Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and its large conference at the United Nations in the summer of 2005 helped connect peacebuilding organizations worldwide. GPPAC’s regional network continues to facilitate dialogue and collaboration.

In the fall of 2005, with leadership of the State Department’s S-CRS, representatives from all of the US-based peacebuilding communities convened for the simple purpose of learning about one another. Leaders in peacebuilding from the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, USIP, InterAction (the network of relief and development organizations) and AfP shared information, ideas, concerns and aspirations. It was the first time all of these people and the organizations they represent had ever come together, and everyone left with a new sense of community and collective purpose.

**A testing exercise**

In 2006, representatives from these same organizations began to meet regularly, and they agreed to create an exercise to test the concept of collaboration. A steering committee was formed, and the group agreed to select a country or region for a collaborative conflict assessment and scenario-based planning process. The purpose was to test the premise that sharing information, ideas, and perspectives could lead to strategies for collaboration. The driving concept was that coordination of resources and collaboration on strategies and tactics should produce better results than individual, separate, and fractured action.

The group selected the Ferghana Valley (covering parts of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) for the exercise, and arranged for a two-step process. The first was a two-day session to develop a collaborative assessment of the multiple drivers of conflict in the region. Mark Schneider, Vice President of The International Crisis Group (ICG) presented a detailed analysis of the conflict environment, followed by specific analysis from the perspective of each of the participating organizations and agencies.

The ICG analysis examined structural issues that create the grounds for conflict such as water, Islamic fundamentalist movement in the region, poverty and exclusion, and unemployed youth. They also noted serious proximate issues such as corruption, flawed electoral processes, and several specific events. Ethnic clashes are prevalent in all three countries, and drugs have become a problem. In Tajikistan, there are increases in arrests, and in complaints that those arrested are not a threat to the government. One critical issue is access to markets. Border restrictions affect trade where cross border markets are economic essentials. Geography adds to the challenges. There are 7 provinces in Ferghana Valley, and all are far away from the capitals of the three countries. With this analysis, the complexity of the conflict environment came into focus.

Following the ICG overview, each of the participating groups presented the assessment tools they use to understand conflict environments and then added their perspectives on the Ferghana Valley. The government agencies displayed sophisticated and often complex models. The NGOs tended to operate more on the basis
of reports from their people in the field and news reports. Much of the US government perspective is based on the presence or absence of implications for the war on terrorism. NGOs, on the other hand, focus on humanitarian concerns regardless of the impact on US foreign policy and the threat of terrorism.

When it came to assessing the conflict environment in the Ferghana Valley, each one provided an analysis of the environment that reflected its own perspective and expertise. The Department of State saw a diplomatic problem. The Department of Defense saw a military problem. Relief and development agencies focused on social and economic issues. And, the peacebuilding community saw a lack of trust and inability of adversaries to communicate with each other.

Each was probably right in their assessments, but none came to the session with the full picture. By listening to the others and understanding their perspectives, everyone developed a more comprehensive view. The process produced a much better perspective on the full dynamics of the conflict for all of the participants, and it clearly demonstrated the value of collaboration.

The second session was designed to explore potential strategies for collaborative action. The National Defense University produced a ‘peacegame’ exercise to provide participants an opportunity to test the way they would react and take action if current conditions changed. The scenario included a hypothetical massive flood that caused enormous hardship. The immediate impact of the disaster could trigger violent disputes over the equitability of the allocation of scarce food, shelter and safe water. Longer term, it could cause permanent displacement of segments of the population and produce dramatic changes in the political climate. On the other hand, if managed properly, such a tragedy could become a unifying, peacebuilding opportunity.

The participants from government agencies and CSOs grappled with the roles each could and should play in this charged environment. They discovered ways some could address particular challenges better than others, and tried to develop systems and mechanisms to facilitate coordination in a way that would minimize confusion and conflict.

The two-day session did not allow adequate time to resolve all of the issues, but it did illustrate how bringing everyone together in one room at one time in a spirit of cooperation could significantly enhance the prospects of a positive outcome.

The obvious limitation in this exercise was that it was just that, an exercise. It did not have any impact on a real situation – the all too real potential for violence in the Ferghana Valley. Even worse, no organizations from the Ferghana Valley participated. That would not, or at least should not, be acceptable in a real scenario. This exercise was carried out quietly because it was an experiment, and there was concern that it could have adverse consequences if it was conducted with local participation, and it did not work well.

**From exercise to the real world**

Following this exercise, however, the Alliance for Peacebuilding took the initiative to seek to apply the concept to the real world – in the Ferghana Valley. With a modest grant from the Ploughshares Fund, AfP developed a conceptual framework for a collaborative violence prevention initiative, with Michael Lund as the chief advisor. Building on the Ferghana Valley experiment, AfP felt it would be most appropriate to explore the possibility of implementing a project in partnership with the Foundation for Tolerance International in Kyrgyzstan. The initial meeting took place at the GPPAC meeting in The Hague in the fall of 2006, and there was a follow up at the 2007 GPPAC meeting in Soesterberg. Additional planning meetings took place in Washington at the end of October with participants from government agencies and NGOs.

Early in 2008, FTI and AfP will co-sponsor a series of meetings with key civil society leaders and government officials in Kyrgyzstan. A joint team from FTI and AfP will meet individually with high level government officials, former officials, and Kyrgyzstan civil society organizations. The team will also meet with ambassadors to Kyrgyzstan from other countries, World
Bank officials, UN representatives, and NGOs from the international community such as Mercy Corps, IRI, NDI, etc.

Following the individual meetings, the sponsors will host a meeting of representatives of all of these organizations and institutions. The format will be much like that used in the Ferghana Valley exercise. It will begin with a collaborative assessment of the drivers of conflict in Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the assessment is to encourage all participants to listen to others in order to broaden their understanding of and appreciation for the multiple issues that require attention. The assessment phase will be followed by an analysis of strategic initiatives that can be implemented by each of the participants, working in cooperation with the others, to alleviate the stresses that could drive the country into violence.

Follow up initiatives will depend on the outcome of the sessions. If agreement can be reached on strategic approaches, and if there is a commitment to collaborate and coordinate, the team will seek to develop and generate support for a mechanism to coordinate long term implementation of the strategies. If agreement cannot be reached in the first set of meetings, the AfP and FTI team will seek to follow up with the participants to build the capacity to establish an appropriate strategy.

Collaboration as described above would seem to be a logical and necessary part of peacebuilding in any environment, yet it rarely happens. AfP and FTI view this initiative as a pilot program that will produce positive results and serve as a model for application worldwide.
4.3 EU: The EU-NGO relationship in peacebuilding – The role of civil society process

Philippe Bartholmé

In many important policy documents, the EU has formally recognised the importance of NGOs. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts adopted in Göteborg in 2001, recognises the need for cooperative approaches to conflict prevention, in order to address the root causes of violent conflicts and states that “exchange of information, dialogue and practical co-operation with humanitarian actors such as the ICRC, relevant non-governmental and academic organisations should also be strengthened”. Several other policy documents and statements provide a strong basis for consultation and cooperation with NGOs in all aspects of peacebuilding, including crisis management and development cooperation.

The EU made important and welcome steps in conceptualising this cooperation but concrete and operational mechanisms to utilise NGOs’ expertise and to develop a real policy dialogue are still missing. In 2006, the Finnish Presidency of the European Union, recognising that greater efforts were needed to address these gaps, launched the first phase of a process now known as ‘RoCS’, the Role of Civil Society.

During this first phase, the Finnish Presidency developed a project together with the KATU Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). The overall objective of the project has been to promote increased understanding and awareness among EU member states and relevant EU decision makers on the impact that civil society can have on crisis management and peacebuilding. In this framework, Catriona Gourlay developed a report entitled Partners Apart: Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Framework of ESDP. This report, based on extensive consultations with relevant NGOs and EU Member States and institutions people, identified specific NGO assets, including their deep in-country knowledge, analytical capacity, ability to train personnel, and capacity to represent an independent view, and presented recommendations on how to shape a real cooperation between the EU and NGOs in civilian crisis management. The report was the basis of a conference in Helsinki in September 2006, bringing together representatives from Member States, EU institutions and NGO to discuss these recommendations. An important outcome of this project was the CIVCOM Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention, endorsed later by the Political and Security Committee.

This project focused deliberately on the narrow issue of interactions between European peacebuilding NGOs and the EU civilian crisis management structures. From a peacebuilding point of view, and as recognised by the EU Göteborg Programme, short term crisis response cannot be dissociated from long term conflict prevention. These two parts of the response to violent conflicts are internally divided inside the EU between Community and ESDP instruments.

With the new Instrument for Stability, the EU has new means and tools for increased coherence and for

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27 Philippe Bartholmé is Policy Officer at the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. EPLO is the platform of peacebuilding and conflict prevention NGOs, networks, and think tanks in Europe. Philippe joined EPLO in 2005 and is mainly working on the EU financial instruments as well as on the work with EU Presidencies.


cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental actors, particularly with the creation of a Peace-Building Partnership.

In this context, the RoCS process was continued with a new focus. The question of cooperation and coordination in the field as well as of the coherence between conflict prevention and crisis management were central in the follow-up project developed by the German Presidency, together with EPLO, CMI and the Bertelsmann Foundation. This new project continued the conceptual development of the cooperation but started to move towards more practical steps. Two case-studies focused on the cooperation and consultation in the field (Somalia and DRC). Another important step was the start of a now ongoing process of briefings by NGOs in CIVCOM. Since the German Presidency, NGOs are invited to address this advisory committee for civilian crisis management on specific issues. This experience has been continued under the Portuguese Presidency of the EU and should continue with incoming Presidencies. So far, NGO experts with field experience discussed with European diplomats ongoing or planned missions in, among others, Afghanistan, Kosovo, DRC Palestinian Territories or Guinea Bissau.

The practical aspects of the RoCS process will be developed further under the Slovene Presidency of the EU, which is committed to continuing the CIVCOM consultations and wants to work jointly on a specific thematic issue. The Slovene Presidency will also have the responsibility to revise the recommendations on EU-NGO cooperation.

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33 See the final report of the project. See also Partners in Conflict Prevention & Crisis Management: EU and NGO Cooperation, Crisis Management Initiative, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Bertelsmann Stiftung and German Presidency of the European Union, August 2007.
Sustainable prevention requires effective systems, processes and institutions for managing disputes, addressing grievances and responding to conflict. This need was recognized by the UN Secretary-General in the July 2006 Progress Report, when urged Member States “to consider creating elements of a national infrastructure for peace…. and to make use of available external support, including from the United Nations, in that regard”\(^1\). Democratic governance and participatory decision-making processes strengthen the foundations for these capacities.

A country’s capacity to prevent and resolve violent conflict at home and abroad may be strengthened by creating national conflict prevention mechanisms and joint platforms that enable dialogue among all stakeholders. Although the exact modalities require further discussion amongst the relevant actors in specific countries, they should be based on the principle of strong CSO participation and influence.

5.1 Government structures

*Catherine Barnes*

Institutionalizing prevention at a national level may require a thorough review of government policies and practices, its institutional arrangements and capacities, and the allocation of budgetary resources to ensure that they are consistent with a prevention ethos.

1. In many cases, a ministry or department for peace may be appropriate. Governments can organize interministerial councils and units for conflict prevention and peacebuilding within or across relevant government agencies. To facilitate engagement with the public, these units could include civil society liaison officers.

2. Develop formal institutional arrangements for cooperation between governments and CSOs in the field of prevention, peace and security through policy dialogue, research, and the development and implementation of specific programs. Governments and CSOs can examine innovative mechanisms that already exist in some countries and seek to build on good practice.

3. Strengthen other channels for policy dialogue on a range of topics that interconnect with the structural causes of conflict at home and abroad.

4. Develop conflict prevention policies that oblige governments to commit to civil society partnerships. Ensure that monitoring mechanisms are incorporated into these policies, as well as arrangements for funding the partnership and for planning exercises.

5. If the country is active in international peace operations, develop civilian rosters/pools of available personnel or develop civilian peace services.

Each of the cases described in this chapter do one or more of the above. Nepal has been enriched with a Ministry of Peace following a government-CSO approach of the conflict with Maoist insurgents. Kenya has set up an elaborate system of inclusive policy consultations in response to the country’s various violent crises; Germany has done the same in preparation of possible international response and it also has operationalised the new approach by setting up a funding program, called \textit{zivik}. Finally, Kyrgyzstan’s very own brand of on-the-spot consultation prevented an explosive situation to spin out of control and can arguably boast of its very own “velvet revolution” as a result. Two of these countries (Kyrgyzstan and Kenya) saw their newfound consultation models being tested in December 2007, when both countries held national parliamentary elections.
5.2 Kenya: Towards the national policy on peace building and conflict management

George Kut

Kenya is beset by a multitude of local conflicts that can escalate at any moment, as a result of a resource crisis or because of political machinations. High time, therefore, to draft an integrated national policy on conflict management – with civil society input. Here is how it was done.

Violent conflicts in Kenya predate colonialism through to the struggle for independence. The conflicts have focused on the resistance to colonization, resistance to the building of the Kenya – Uganda railway and later the liberation movements. Although the struggle for independence united the Kenyan communities against one common enemy (the colonial administration), it cannot go without mentioning the fact that there existed other levels of group conflicts amongst Kenyans themselves. Post-independent Kenya has continued to experience intermittent conflicts of different nature, magnitude and intensity depending on special circumstances underpinning the conflicts and the environment in which they evolve. The nature, dynamics and root causes of these conflicts seem to be determined by the varying geographical features and inherent social, economic, cultural patterns obtaining in different parts of Kenya, and governance systems, which manifest certain conflict environments and trends of violence.

5.2.1 Factors contributing to violent conflicts today

Aggravated by poor infrastructure, weak institutions and political isolation of some segments of the country’s population, they include the following:

Natural resource use conflicts

It is evident that scarce natural resources, worsening environmental conditions and increased populations have resulted in stiffer competition for land, pasture and water. Pastoral communities have continued to experience devastating hardships, resulting in competitions for scarce water and pasture resources, which often degenerate into violent clashes among the communities, within the country and across national borders in the western, northeastern and northern part of the country.

Politically instigated ethnic clashes

First experienced in the advent of multiparty democratic elections in 1991, politically instigated ethnic violence remains the most infamous source of violent conflicts in Kenya. Attributed to political incitement, the politicians have used militia youth groups to carry out violent attacks on communities perceived to be opposing certain political agenda.

Cattle rustling/raids

Traditionally, pastoral communities raided each other for livestock to replenish herds depleted by severe droughts, disease or other calamities. In the past, elders often sanctioned such raids, blessing the raiders before they set off. However, in recent times, inter-communal rustling has become more frequent and severe, degenerating into a militarized activity with no precedence in the history of the cattle rustling. Today’s incidents of cattle rustling are driven by hatred, political instigations, unscrupulous commercial activities, general crime, and availability of firearms. These raids have overwhelmed the security operations, eroded traditional conflict management mechanisms and adversely impacted pastoral mobility and environmental resources.

Land conflicts

Inadequacies in provisions on ownership, control and usage of land within the constitution and other Acts of Parliament have precipitated conflicts. In addition, lack of grassroots understanding and acceptance of rights of citizens to own and settle permanently in their ancestral places of origin have heightened tensions that have resulted in personal and community insecurity in Kenya.

35 George Kut was the civil society organizations/practitioners consultant in a team of three consultants hired by the government of Kenya to lead the process of developing the policy peacebuilding and conflict management policy. The other consultants were Philip Mionwa - government policy development expert and Elizabeth Muli - legal and gender expert. George Kut is working for NPI-Africa, which is the GPPAC Regional Initiator for East and Central Africa.
Following from these reasons, land ownership has been an emotive issue in the country and has been a sensitive issue of politics during general elections.

**Human/wildlife conflicts**
Most of the communities severely hit by insecurity due to human/wildlife conflicts surround national parks and game reserves. Over the years since colonial government, population growth has caused immense pressure on the land available for affected communities. For example 62% of the Taita Taveta district’s 1,965,600 hectares was shoved off for the national parks, from which the people claim they derive no benefits. In the meantime, agricultural production in the district has continued to shrink over the last 10 years mainly due to destruction of crops by wildlife, literally killing all forms of agriculture in much of the district. Often the displaced and affected people are inadequately compensated for losses caused by wildlife destruction.

**Industrial and institutional disputes**
Since the pre-independence era, Kenyan labour relations have been prone to conflict. During colonialism, trade unions engaged in industrial action to improve workers rights and call for the release of detainees who championed the struggle for political freedom. Today, strike actions still take place and have often escalated to outbreaks of violence between law enforcement agencies and the striking workers. These have resulted in the destruction of property and in severe cases the loss of life and the rape of female strikers.

**Urban crime**
Urban communities in Kenya should be able to function in an environment free of public security threats. This hinges on personal security. Sustained crime and violence systematically creates fear and reduces trust between community members. Fear increases urban fragmentation resulting in fortification of neighbourhoods where the poor and the marginalized are excluded. The causes of violent conflicts in the slums are linked to these exclusions and the institutional weaknesses in the public and private sectors such as the police and courts.

**Public security deterioration**
The resultant low morale in the police force, low professionalism, inadequate allocation of required resources, and endemic corruption has resulted in public security deterioration. The PRSP36 report indicates that Kenya’s public security system has deteriorated in the last two decades to the point where the government was unable to guarantee its citizens personal security, and that of their property. The failure of the sector to deal effectively with the pervasive governance issues, the existence of unacceptably high level of crime and personal insecurity as well as delays in determination of cases in court have all served to increase mistrust and accounts for the violence meted by people taking law into their hands.

5.2.2 Policy options for peacebuilding
There is no comprehensive legislation in Kenya that addresses conflict management despite the fact that conflict is a social justice and human development issue. The option for developing a National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management is a step in the direction will helping Kenyans reflect on the values enshrined in their Constitution and provide a single comprehensive policy on the management of conflict in Kenya. The policy when finally done will call for the review of existing legislation and enactment of new law to strengthen existing conflict resolution mechanisms. It will facilitate the harmonization of national legislation on issues of conflict Management and peacebuilding. The Office of the President through NSC embarked on the process towards the development of a national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management in 2004, when an initial framework was developed. The NSC desires to formulate a policy framework on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management for Kenya.

The rationale for the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
Kenya has to improve on its current capacity to undertake in-depth analyses of conflicts that could provide it with a basis for informed decisions on intervention. One of the critical gaps in the work of the

government in this regard is the lack of proactive conflict analysis and response. There are also budgetary constraints to conflict management. For instance, the administrative districts security budget is not available for conflict prevention. Funds available for security work in the districts are designated only for conflict suppression. There are additional requirements in terms of the ability and capacity of the state to foster reconciliation in post ethnic violent conflict situations to prevent the possibility of relapse into conflict. These gaps have however, received wide attention from the civil society and non governmental organizations whose interventions have also not been smooth due to limited resources and more so in area of proactive peacebuilding.

Overcoming these gaps and challenges in peacebuilding would require commitment from both the government and civil society. The government should continue to make better use of the wealth of resources, in terms of expertise, talent/experience and data that some CSOs and NGOs working in the grassroots level possess. In turn, CSOs have to make a conscious effort to take advantage of the opportunities and challenges of the framework of engagement offered by the government at the NSC. They must do so with a sense of duty and commitment that goes beyond self-interest and opportunism.

The national policy formulation
National Policy Formulation is one of the most critical state interventions, which need clearly articulated policy prescriptions supported by appropriate institutional framework, legal instruments and enforcement mechanisms to address the evolving challenges arising from changing socio-political, technological, economic, environmental and globalisation aspects. Public policy formulation and implementation in Kenya is the sovereign right and responsibility of the state. It is carried out on the basis of specific national needs and objectives in tandem with aspirations and expectations of the society with broad based participatory framework.

5.2.4 The draft NPPCM development process
The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management provided a paper profiling conflict in the country including the problem statements and what the country needed to address in terms of values, beliefs and behaviour. The paper provided the basis for a concept note by the CSOs consultant who engaged in literature review, country wide stake holders analysis, consultations with government departments, private sector, CSOs, peace committees, the police, the judiciary, cross border security committees and cross border regional NGOs etc. The formulation and development of a draft national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management was multi sectoral and multidisciplinary driven through broad based participatory and bottom up process with the government providing the lead and involving a cross section of interest groups. In this regard, the government established the national steering committee on peacebuilding and conflict management with a secretariat from where the coordination of the policy process is done.

5.2.5 The added value of civil society organizations
Kenyan civil society organizations are active in two broad areas of conflict resolution, namely conflict analysis and peace building activities.

Conflict analysis
A number of Kenyan CSOs are active in the areas of conflict analysis and designing community based response mechanisms, with a huge potential to contribute in the conceptualization and designing of a national conflict transformation and peacebuilding framework for the country. Their analyses of conflicts and attendant intervention strategies deriving from indigenous conflict response mechanisms have been

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37 The National Steering Committee (NSC) for Peace building and Conflict Management initiatives was established in 2001. It was the result of an attempt by the government and CSOs to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management initiatives in the country. NSC became fully operational in 2003 when authority to establish the Secretariat was given by the Government. It brings together government officials and representatives from civil society organizations. Its Secretariat also services the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP); and, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) which are also the result of CSOs - government collaboration.
valuable tools for in-depth stakeholders’ analysis of various conflicts in different regions in the country and the development of appropriate national response mechanisms. They have continuously alerted the community level government administrative and security personnel of incipient conflicts, the factors that encourage their escalation and the trigger mechanisms that provoke the deterioration into violence.

Active collaboration with such CSOs has assisted in the process of profiling and database. Several CSOs, NGOs and CBOs have built considerable capacity in the area of community-based peacebuilding. These groups were mobilized and involved in conflict analysis and stakeholders’ analysis and on behalf of communities that have been experiencing violent conflicts and those in potential conflict spots in the country. Importantly also, they have helped to complement the work of the government among key constituencies through their community development work and other awareness creation activities.

**Peace building**
A number of Kenyan civil society organizations, particularly those working at the grassroots, continue to play important roles in community development and peace building. Among the warring pastoral communities in northern Kenya, civil society groups have spearheaded some of the most significant advances towards peace, in particular at the local level. In other parts of the country where politically instigated land clashes ravage the lives of the poor, CSOs have also played an important role in the peace process including peace education, training manuals development, early warning and early response, delivery of relief, and disarmament activities among the armed pastoralists’ communities.

**5.2.6 Methodology applied**
The consultants applied a combination of the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and Conflict Transformation Strategy as the background from which the tools used during Stakeholders Analysis were crafted. The emphasis on Human Rights was mainly because HRs not only defines the subject but also translates people’s needs into rights, and identifies the duties and obligations of those against whom a claim can be brought to ensure that needs are met. HRBA also has a causality analysis in which identification of levels of action and specific results are to be achieved is discussed, i.e. individual, community, policy, institutional, national and international. Conflict Transformation as a strategy has underlying values and principles that relate to. These are that; one cannot resolve conflict and thus make peace unless the root cause of the conflicts are identified and dealt with; one cannot resolve conflict and thus make peace unless attention is given to justice and fairness of the process as well as the outcome of the settlement. HRBA provides the precedent to facilitate the search for justice; People’s deeper needs are not totally incompatible. Interdependence is inevitable for peaceful coexistence and that Conflict resolution involves restructuring of relationships.

**Drafting process sequence**
During the draft policy development process the three consultants hired by the government, identified and assessed the role of CSOs and the private sector among other stakeholders and suggested possible CSO/GoK/private sector partnerships in peace building. The project officially began on June 13th, 2005 with the signing of contracts with the team of consultants. Literature review took between June 13th and August 27th 2005. Selected conflict spots in all the eight provinces were visited in 35 administrative districts. Activities that followed included further literature review on reports and information gathered in the field, Conflict Analysis and Stakeholders Analysis, interviews with Government Ministries, Members of Parliament (Amani Forum) and other stakeholders in Nairobi, national consultation workshop with CSOs. Aug 29th to October 15th, 2005 saw the period for the identification of possible Strategies and options for conflict management and peace building. This was followed by drafting using field experiences, reports and documentations, existing relevant policies and legislations. Peer review on the first draft took place in January and March 2006 and by provincial national consultations begun immediately after.
5.2.7 Findings: policy draft highlights
During the stakeholders analysis we found that nearly all the existing conflict management and peacebuilding approaches in Kenya were initiated as a result of prolonged massive violence that affected large ethnic populations. As a result, many of such interventions exist primarily in those parts of the country that are referred to as conflict prone areas.

**State responses**
The reaction of the government in the face of conflict has been that of violence suppression using armed police intervention to stop clashes during ethnic skirmishes or demonstrations and prosecuting perpetrators of violence in the criminal courts. Such interventions however, have not been popular with Kenyan communities where parties involved in conflict prefer to avoid the courts and instead resort to informal traditional peace processes that are flexible enough to their needs including their cultural values and the need for fast and cost effective justice. Lately, the state interventions on violence have, however, moved a step further to initiate mechanisms for conflict management and peacebuilding. The initiatives have seen the formation of public commissions/enquiries to investigate causes of violent conflict in the country, establishment of structures and institutions to promote security and prevention of violence.

**Civil society responses**
Civil society interventions have focused on reconciliation and building new relationships amongst the warring communities. Such activities include dialogue, negotiations, and problem solving workshops, information, education and communication. These have set precedence to the coexistence in places where violence was the norm. Several initiatives including conflict early warning have played a central role in facilitating a negotiated end to violent conflict. In all the cases, the civil society has involved as many conflict actors as presented by each context and included the government, elders, professional elites, women, religious leaders and the youth. Through constant advocacy by the civil society, the government security machinery and the provincial administration in particular, now recognizes the involvement of community institutions in security matters previously considered the sole preserve of the state. As a result, ad hoc government and community committees, civil society networks and like-minded stakeholders’ forums have emerged in the conflict prone areas in the country where peace work has been active.

**Private sector response**
The private sector has played a vital role in enabling conflict management interventions to take off. Business communities in violent conflict-prone Districts fund some of the activities of District security operations. Local businessmen responding to requests from volunteer community elites and women, contributed money to transport elders to mediate on conflicts and also to hold inter-clan meetings. The private sector is however, largely missing in the many existing ad hoc conflict management institutions including peace committees at all levels. This is so in spite the fact that they are elaborate stakeholders in peacebuilding.

**CSOs and government collaborative responses**
The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
The NSC has been instrumental in addressing issues related to peace work in Kenya. The Committee comprises government departments, CSOs, NGOs and development partners. It was established after a realization that effective management of conflict can only be realized through joint efforts. In particular, the peace committee model has been strengthened and the problem of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons is being addressed through this inter-agency structure.

**District Peace Committee Model**
DPCs bring together stakeholders who have interest and work on peace and security issues in given administrative districts. Their roles included facilitating resolution of intra-district conflicts, responding to insecurity incidents, deploying rapid response teams, addressing inter-district conflicts, responding to conflicts over natural resources use, promoting peaceful
elections, weapons collection and addressing broader peace building issues.

Community-based policing
Meant to promote mutual trust and cooperation between people and police it has not born positive results although it was meant to empower neighbourhoods in danger of being overwhelmed by crime, drugs as well as the poisonous mix of apathy and despair, which undermine peaceful coexistence.

The CEWARN Mechanism
The IGAD38 States have undertaken, among other things, to establish national conflict early warning and response units (CEWERUs) to be guided by national conflict steering committees that include representatives of government. Governments are responsible for establishing a “focal point” for coordination of the CEWERU, and for coordinating input from representatives of civil society, including religious and academic/research institutions in the Great Horn of Africa.

5.2.8 Gaps for peace policy interventions
Based on lessons learned and best practices in peace building and conflict management, the National Policy of Peace building and Conflict Management must articulate innovative strategies and methodologies to overcome gaps in current approaches, and guide peace building and conflict management initiatives in coming years so as to achieve durable human security in Kenya. The following gaps in current approaches need to be addressed; Limited Education for Peace; Inadequate mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in development planning; Inadequate mechanisms for responding to conflict; Limited Networking for Peace; Inadequate capacity building for peace; Ineffective government response mechanisms; Lack of legal framework for traditional conflict handling mechanisms; Inadequate Inter-Faith dialogue; Inadequate Gender mainstreaming; limited research and analysis of conflict; Weak reconciliation and healing initiatives; Absence of a code of conduct; Inadequate resource mobilization; Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and ineffective mechanisms to address cross border conflicts.

The above are in addition to the current challenges and constraints of institutions working on peace building and conflict management in Kenya that include uncoordinated operations and reactive framework; narrow scope of operation – found only in violent prone districts; lack of harmonized approach; weak structures and capacity; lack of institutionalized strategies; weak linkages at the regional level; no direct role of government ministries and sector operations.

5.2.9 Main policy elements in the draft
National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management policy focuses on the general principles and approaches which will govern the activities undertaken by different actors; government, civil society organizations, private sector, families and individuals, in undertaking any activity which may affect the human security and sustainable human development. It is particularly important to recognize that although the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management is presented as a distinct national policy, its aspects will be integrated into other national development frameworks because virtually all the national development plans require peaceful environment to be realized. The policy underscores the need for providing a foundation for conflict sensitive planning and programming in the all levels of national development and strategic undertakings. It has also incorporated the objectives of the sub-regional, regional and global agreements and protocols that Kenya is party to. The policy objectives and principles are to be realized by concrete actions in different areas relating to key challenges to conflict management and peacebuilding. These include an institutional framework, preparedness, prevention, response, recovery and stabilization.

Proposed institutional and administrative framework
The Policy seeks to establish the National Peace

38 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development - IGAD38 States - Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Uganda - have formalized an understanding in a key document, the “Protocol on the Establishment of Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) and Response Mechanism” (referred to as the “CEWARN Protocol”, signed at Khartoum in January 2002)
Commission through the enactment of statute that will provide for the functions, role and mandate of the Commission. The National Peace Commission will have a secretariat headed by the Executive secretary to oversee the day to day running of the Commission. A National Peace Forum will provide a regular platform for consultation, collaboration, cooperation and coordination of representatives of the Regional Clusters Forums, GoK agencies, United Nations agencies, private sector, Civil Society Organization’s and Development partners through the National Peace Forum. The National Peace Forum will be an advisory body to the National Peace Commission and will have responsibility for resource mobilization, creating public awareness and promoting collaboration between actors at national and regional levels. The policy will establish District Peace Commissions (DPC) at each of the country’s administrative districts. The critical work of peace building in the country will be vested within the operations of the DPCs and headed by District Peace Commission Coordinator (DPCC) designated by the National Peace Commission.

**Resource mobilization**

The policy proposes that the government of Kenya will commit financial resources through the Exchequer and budgetary resources to develop basic infrastructure and capabilities of NPC and its secretariat. GOK will seek to develop partnerships with development partners, NGOs and the private sector in mobilizing funds for the institutional reforms, capacity building and facilitation of the national Peace Commission activities.

**What remains to be done to finalize the policy**

In addition to the broad-based consultative processes at the policy formulation and development levels, active involvement of other stakeholders at the policy implementation and management levels is also critical towards attainment of the policy objectives. In particular, the multi sectoral nature and complexity of national activities calls for technical expertise and resources from various specialized institutions, organizations and individuals in the public and private sectors: including civil society and targeted communities for effective broad based consultations.

After the current national stakeholders’ consultations on the draft policy, the following prescriptive procedural steps will be taken after preparation of the final national policy paper for approval by the government;

- Preparation of a sessional paper
- Cabinet endorsement of the sessional paper
- Parliamentary discussions of the sessional paper
- Draft bill prepared by the attorney general’s office based on the sessional paper
- Formal approval by the cabinet of the draft bill
- Consideration by parliament, which may review and/or change the content of the bill or accept its enactment
- Presidential assent to the bill and thereafter drafted into the legal statute books to become part of the laws

**5.2.10 Challenges in the process so far: from a consultant’s point of view**

There have been many challenges in the policy development process. For example:

- It took so long to roll out the grassroots consultation in the stakeholders and situation analysis. This was because the decision making at the NSC was delayed by government bureaucracies at the Office of the President that had to give a node for some activities involving civil servants
- Varying funding procedures by different donors supporting the process sometimes made the process to halt due to donor demands
- Existing political environment forced the provincial consultations on the first draft scheduled for November 2005 to be postponed as the country was charged with constitutional debate and campaigns for referendum
- Funding period by leading donor urgencies expired and accounted for consequent lull in activities in 2006
- Emerging overwhelming interests generated during provincial consultations forced the provincial and national consultation period to be extended to cover for unanticipated groups listed for the consultations
- Political realignment following the no vote on the national constitution referendum. At one time in January 2006, Kenya experienced two weeks without cabinet. The government was realigning itself and not much in a policy process could ensue in the
environment. The immediate period after was followed by unpredictable political atmosphere, government also seemingly lost faith in existing legislated national commissions due to their human rights demands. CSOs slowed down the push for the final policy wondering whether much attention would be paid to the proposed national peace commission in the policy draft.

- Again political campaigns begin in earnest in 2007. Most of the parliamentary debates on policy proposals to do with HIV/AIDS, gender violence, the Children’s Rights bill etc became politicized due to constitutional reforms related political polarization. It naturally followed that no much advocacy with the cabinet or MPs would be spared the polarization. CSOs apparently suffered cold feet in pushing the peace policy process through with the current government.

- The fact that NSC peace policy process depended entirely on external funding also came with some dynamics with interesting episodes. NSC is comprised of Donor agencies and national NGOs. These donor agencies also fund the NGOs they sit with at the NSC. This relationship portends power imbalances at the NSC that continually affect independent decisions.
The reason for Ghana’s current stability can be found in the initiatives for responding to violent conflicts and sustaining peace. Recently the UN has put effort to support intra communal peacebuilding initiatives and more significantly, found the need to partner with civil society organisations who have been active in peacebuilding. The implementation of a peace architecture has many challenges in its implementation within the context of the tripartite partnership and the political will to complete the architecture and render it fully operational and functional.

In October 2007, Oxfam International together with the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Saferworld published a report on the cost of conflicts in Africa. With a caption Africa’s Missing Billions, the report underscores the enormity of the cost of armed violence and the associated human tragedy estimated at 18 billion dollars per year.

Among the countries cited in the report is Ghana. Apart from the direct cost in monetary terms, the Oxfam report is so relevant to the context of Ghana. There are about 300 conflicts dotted across the country with a concentration of these conflicts in the three northern regions of the country. Between 1980 and October 2002, not less than 23 violent conflicts took place in the northern part of Ghana. The consequence of these conflicts was considerable loss to life and property. It is estimated that up to 5,000 people died as a result of the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict in 1994 and in 1994. Fourteen out of the 23 conflicts occurred between 1990 and 2002. Of the 23 conflicts that took place between 1980 and 2002, twenty of them were inter-ethnic in nature often involving different coalitions or alliances.

Five of the seventeen ethnic groups in the northern region, namely the Dagomba, Gonja, Konkomba, Nanumba and Nawuri have been primary active combatant groups in the different permutations of the fourteen out of the seventeen conflicts that have occurred in the region. These regions and the areas of high conflict volatility are also the poorest in Ghana as intra communal armed violence has been devastating, impeding development and creating a deep sense of resentment and hatred amongst contending ethnic groups and communities. The sustained presence of mutual suspicion and distrust impacts negatively on social and political activity. In an environment of competitive multi-party politics, polarisation as a result of communal violent conflicts is often exacerbated by political competition. Either politicians exploit the social fissures and fault lines of the conflicts to gain political advantage over their opponents or it is the communities who form coalitions along political lines and perceive political power in the hands of an opposing political party which has the support of their adversaries to be a threat to their interests and well being. Such a volatile environment often produces violent escalation of conflicts with little warning.

There are growing concerns about the impacts of these conflicts on both sub-regional and regional stability as well as security, the implications of which are adverse on economic growth, environment and development. The impacts of these conflicts have been severest on the vulnerable groups such as the aged, women and children reversing many development efforts in the conflict zones. These conflicts have also resulted in a profound reduction in foreign investor confidence and regional
productive labour leading to the intensification of poverty and under-development.

The structural or underlying causes of these conflicts have often been left unaddressed in responding to violent conflicts in Ghana. Each violent escalation in the past left behind a historical legacy and the burden of the vanquished against the victors. With little effort at intra and inter communal reconciliation, the wounds of armed violence lingers on only to recur with the least provocation between the groups in conflict. Since the beginning of Ghana’s post independence years, the use of military and coercive strategies to enforce peace often increased the suspicion of communities against governments. The leverage of governments overtime became eroded making it impossible to be seen as intermediaries in communal violent conflicts. Political leaders often operated under the assumption that once violence was suppressed, the conflict was dealt with or that at least it will gradually fizzle out and a return to peace will ensue. In many instances, a committee of inquiry was formed to investigate the circumstances that perpetuated violence and make recommendations to the government for appropriate intervention.

These approaches have been fundamentally flawed both in their assumptions and practice. First of all, most commissions of inquiry will determine perpetrators in the conflicts and try to recommend the set of sanctions the government should implement to deter the particular group from repeating their actions in the future. Within the context of the protracted issues underlying violence, it was always difficult for any group to concede that they were perpetrators in violence. Governments also could not have a political will to impose any recommended sanctions as that will mean losing votes in the next elections on which the sanctions will be imposed. The work of the commissions of inquiry for these reasons was often never implemented nor was any step taken beyond peace enforcement through the military to build and sustain peace.

Redefining peacebuilding through civil society initiatives
Following the outbreak of armed violence in 1994 and 1995 involving the Konkomba with their allies the Bassare, Nchumuru, and Nawuri against the Nanumba with their ally ethnic groups, the Dagombas and Gonja, a different approach initiated by Civil Society through Non-Governmental Organisations re-defined the approach to peacebuilding in Ghana. During the 1994 war, much of the development infrastructure that had been put in place prior to the conflict was damaged or destroyed. Continuous conflict made new development work impossible and many organizations abandoned their development programs. In Bimbilla for example, the German Development Organisation GTZ pulled out of the district abandoning ongoing projects. NGOS were turning into relief rather than development organisations, while some of them were caught in the ‘rumour mill’ suggesting they were sympathetic to some ethnic groups over others.

The entry into peacebuilding work was as a result of a re-thinking and an appreciation that peacebuilding and development work ought to be integrated. This would ensure that once communities owned the process of finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems that divide them, development programs could become sustainable without continuous outside help. In addition, the nature of protracted conflicts in Ghana required peacebuilding interventions that went beyond the search for short-term solutions to immediate crisis. Peacebuilding must be designed to challenge values and attitudes as well as beliefs to ensure conflict transformation at personal, relational, cultural, and structural levels.

NGOs formed a working group called the Inter-NGO Consortium. They organised and facilitated a series of peace and reconciliation consultations and workshops among the warring ethnic groups. Follow-up and planning committees were formed from the different ethnic groups in the region to work with the

43 The most recent Commission of Inquiry was appointed on 25th April 2002 by His Excellency President John Agyekum Kufour, through Constitutional Instrument, 2002 (C.I.36). The President appointed this Commission of Inquiry chaired by Justice I.N.K. Wuaku, to investigate the Yendi disturbance of 25th to 27th March, 2002, identify the perpetrators, and make appropriate recommendations to the President.
Consortium. Between May 1995 and April 1996 five meetings and consultations were organized in Kumasi as well as numerous others in Bimbilla, Gushegu/Karaga, Saboba, Salaga, Yendi, and Zabzugu/Tatale aimed at creating consensus on the need for peace and reconciliation, building confidence among the warring ethnic communities, as well as searching for solutions to the outstanding issues of conflict underlying the wars.

At the fourth Kumasi meeting, 48 delegates from seven ethnic groups constituting chiefs, members of a government mediation team, opinion and youth leaders were invited to work towards the search for durable resolution to the conflicts. The Consortium facilitated a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed at identifying the issues clearly and finding solutions that are acceptable to all the parties involved. On February 29, 1996, the delegates severally and jointly agreed to a draft document which outlined the agreements reached on the contentious issues presented in the negotiations. The draft agreement was then taken by the delegates to their respective communities for extensive consultation, discussion and feed-back with all segments of their community. After four weeks, the delegates returned to Kumasi to report on the outcome of their consultation processes, to incorporate into the draft agreement the feedback and amendments generated by the consultations, as well as, when necessary, to renegotiate the draft agreement. After these processes, on March 28th, 1996, the delegates signed a document which was called the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation between the Various Ethnic Groups in the Northern Region of Ghana.

UN support for peace architecture in Ghana

For the first time, adversary communities in Ghana were successfully brought together to jointly search for mutual solutions to underlying issues that erupted into violence. The Ghana example was appreciated within the peacebuilding community and by many governments. When in 2002 another eruption of violence within the Dagombas led to the slaying of the King of Dagbon and many of his elders and close advisors, the precedent from the response to the Konkomba-Nanamba conflict informed a new approach.

The UN for the first time was involved through the Resident Coordinator at the invitation of Civil Society. In March 2003, the Government of Ghana declared a state of emergency in the Dagbon Traditional Area. This was due to the escalation of armed violence as result of a long and simmering intra-Dagbon conflict which degenerated into deeper crisis. The issues of contention revolve around the kingship of Dagbon in which the two royal families, the Abudu and Andani claim legitimacy to the throne. Following the eruption in violence, high level government delegations including Ministers of State, a Parliamentary delegation and heads of security agencies visited the conflict area. A UN team from New York visited as well on an assessment mission.

The Government also set up the Wuaku Commission of inquiry to determine the facts leading to the escalation in violence and to identify the perpetrators. After the Commission completed its work, the Government accepted its report and issued a white paper relating to its implementation. The President also set up a Committee of three eminent chiefs under the chairmanship of the Asantehene, to look primarily at the traditional issues relating to the conflict. The committee of eminent chiefs have worked with the two royal families to produce a road map that will lead to the restoration of peace. Its implementation has been challenging revealing further the protracted nature of such intra-communal conflict.

First Round Table Consultations at Akosombo

Against the background of the declaration of a state of emergency in March 2003, the Government of Ghana reviewed the security situation in the region and reported to parliament in order for the state of emergency to be maintained. The challenge to Government was that it could not continue such emergency security management arrangements through parliament without tangible progress report on the state of building peace in the region. The presence of the

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44 The Abudu and Andani are families are known more as ‘gates’ resulting from the rotational system of ascending the throne. The concept of gate resonates with the conduit through which an Abudu or Andani can become King.
Ghana Armed Forces on the ground was not enough except to ensure that lives and property was protected while law and order was maintained. In this regard, the acting Minister of the Interior who was also the Minister for Defence Dr. Addo Kuffour, sought support from Civil Society to provide facilitated dialogue amongst the key stakeholders in the conflict. The Minister contacted directly the Konrad Adenauer Foundation office in Accra to coordinate and support such effort.

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German Development Organisation in turn sought the expertise of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) to facilitate the dialogue process. At the time of the request, WANEP was following-up on important mediation work between the Mamprusis and Kusasis in the Bawku municipality which produced tangible results for inter communal reconciliation and peace. The preliminary assessment to bring together the Abudus and Andanis, the main stakeholders in the conflict suggested that the Andanis from which clan the King came from were unwilling to participate in such dialogue. WANEP then redesigned a strategy in which Akosombo will take the form of a general consultation with various actors including members of Government. Once the Abudus were represented in this meeting, a second meeting could then be organised in Tamale separately for Andanis. In the planning, WANEP and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation further sought the moderating role of the UN resident coordinator. Such a role will increase the leverage of the dialogue and provide more confidence amongst the participants about a transparent and professional facilitation process in which the international community through the resident coordinator was a witness.

For the first time, the UNDP in Ghana was engaged directly through a resident coordinator in an intra-communal conflict. The UN hitherto had limited itself to research and assessment reports of flash points of conflicts in Ghana. With particular reference to the conflict amongst the Abudus and Andanis, a UN team visited the Northern Region on an assessment mission. This was however misunderstood amongst the communities as a UN intervention in the conflict. The role of the UNDP after this initial engagement was to change with the appointment of a Peace and Governance Advisor.

Coming from a Civil Society peacebuilding background, the UNDP Peace and Conflict Advisor in Ghana immediately engaged with Civil Society organisations through various meetings and consultations to develop a framework for peace architecture in Ghana. In the meantime, the Ministry of the Interior gave prominence to peacebuilding as a strategic focus of the ministry considering the difficulties on hand in the Dagbon traditional area. The Minister for the Interior set up a Peacebuilding Support Unit in the Ministry. The substantive Minister Hon. Hackman Owusu Agyeman also set up an Advisory Committee on the Dagbon crisis which he chaired personally. The circumstances in Ghana around the Dagbon protracted conflict created the conditions to rethink the responses to armed conflicts at community level in Ghana. All the efforts including the work of a committee of inquiry, the efforts of the committee of eminent chiefs and peacekeeping by the armed forces pointed clearly to the daunting challenges of managing intra communal violence in Ghana. The concept of a peace architecture was therefore timely as it was welcomed by Government and Civil Society.

The peace architecture
Peacebuilding efforts must be understood as a collective effort in which government and civil society work collaboratively to enhance human security. The peace architecture in Ghana was a product of such consultation with government and civil society.
coordinated by the UNDP. In its opening paragraph, the framework recognises the collaborative approach to building peace. It states, “The national architecture for peace brings civil society groups, community organisations, professional bodies and faith based organisations together with governance structures and security agencies, into a national framework for anticipating and responding to signs of conflict”. The framework elaborates on the importance of establishing architecture with the capacity to respond to the signs of conflicts, acknowledging that whereas Ghana is a stable country, it experiences myriads of conflicts at community levels. The background to the development of the architecture for peace draws on the UN support for peace in the Northern Region as discussed in the preceding pages of this paper. Whereas not much emphasis was put on the role of civil society peacebuilding practice in informing the development of the architecture, it is instructive that there is a strong partnership between Government, the UNDP and Civil Society in the implementation of the architecture. Apart from inputting into the draft of the framework, WANEP has always been available in providing expertise and technical support in the implementation of the architecture. WANEP co-facilitated the training for members of the National Peace Council (NPC).

The National Peace Council (NPC) was constituted following consultations with all stakeholders including political associations. Considering that at the political level, many issues are often polarised along the political divide, it was important that members of the NPC carry leverage and high moral standing and respect amongst the citizenry. The membership is currently made up of very renowned and respected Ghanaians of distinction including Roman Catholic Cardinal Peter Turkson; Maulvi Wahab Adam, Ameer of the Ahmadiyya Movement; the National Chief Imam, Sheik Sharabutu; Bishop Francis Lodou of the Catholic Diocese of Ho; Pastor Mensah Otabil; Professor Irene Odotei, among others. The calibre of these individuals and the integrity they bring both individually and collectively to the NPC makes it a non-partisan body providing a national platform for consensus building on potentially divisive issues, as well as promoting national reconciliation. Below the NPC is the Regional Peace Council (RPC). In consultation with the UNDP and the Ministry of the Interior, WANEP designed the content and outline of training for members of the RPCs. Each of the training sessions was preceded by the official launch of the RPC in each region. Government ministers at the regional level often presided and launched the RPC after which WANEP staff conducted intensive training for members of the council. In some regions, the Regional Ministers sat through the trainings and contributed impressively to discussions in regards sustaining peace and responding to violent conflicts in their region. Out of the ten regions, RPC trainings have taken place in six regions.

The importance of the RPC in conflict prevention has to be understood in the context of the national security arrangements for Ghana. At the national level, the National Security Council is chaired by the President while at the regional level; the Regional Security Councils are chaired by the Regional Ministers. This security apparatus is primarily concerned with the security of the state and disturbances that disrupt law and order. They have been reactive to violent conflicts rather than responding to signs of the conflicts. The Security Councils make the decisions regarding most the enforcement of peace through measures such as imposing state of emergencies and deploying the police and military to suppress violence. With the establishment of the RPC, it is anticipated that there will be a good compliment that acts proactively to prevent violence by creating spaces for dialogue and more importantly, engage on addressing deep rooted issues that have often been left unaddressed for decades providing ground for inter and intra communal feuding and bloodletting.

Under the Regional Peace Councils should be the District Peace Councils (DPCs). This level of the architecture has not yet been implemented. The establishment of the DPC will complete the decentralisation of the mechanism for conflict prevention which Ghana needs urgently to sustain its image as a peaceful and stable country. Here again, the role of civil society in advocating for a full implementation of the peace architecture becomes
important although recognition has to be made that in Ghana, the first steps have been taken to put in place a sustainable mechanism for peacebuilding. The role of civil society should also be understood in how they complement one another at various levels from national to regional and international. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is the worldwide civil society organisation making meaningful linkages and engagement with Governments, the UN and Regional Organisations. GPPAC is structured in fifteen regions with WANEP being the regional secretariat for West Africa. Each of these regions produced a regional action agenda that fed into a Global Action Agenda. This agenda was launched and presented to the UN Secretary General at the GPPAC global conference at UN headquarters in July 2005. The impact of GPPAC as a global network has provided leverage for civil society partnerships on peace and human security at national levels with the UN and Governments.

Although the peace architecture in Ghana is yet to reach its optimum potential, it has attracted a lot of interest from many countries. Earlier in the year a Team of Provincial Commissioners\(^{47}\) from Kenya came to Ghana on a working visit to understudy the Ghanaian initiative of establishing peace architecture. During their tour of Ghana, they held meetings with various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the peace architecture. At WANEP, there was an interesting conversation regarding the inter-exchange of African experiences and lessons from peacebuilding efforts. Kenya presents an interesting comparative analysis for managing inter-communal violence. Just as the northern region of Ghana experiences frequent outbreaks of inter and intra communal violence, the Rift Valley of Kenya is riddled with similar conflicts. The peace architecture in Ghana should be an interesting framework that should inform similar work in Kenya and elsewhere.

### Challenges and lessons learned

Normally when we think of peacebuilding we tend to think of a localized activity that primarily relies, and is dependent upon, the efforts of local communities with selective outsider assistance to facilitate peace processes. It is critical that outsider agency roles and support is limited to providing the framework for good facilitated processes. It is the communities and the people directly and indirectly afflicted by the conflict who should find the enabling space in the good facilitated processes provided to mutually engage one another in the substantive issues and the underlying assumptions and perceptions around inter and intra communal relationships.\(^{48}\) In this regard, the peace architecture should be decentralised so that ownership of peacebuilding processes is in the hands of communities while outsider assistance could facilitate processes. The weakness of the peace architecture in Ghana is the absence of a political will to fully enable the peace architecture to function fully from the District Peace Councils to the Regional and the National Peace Council. The DPCs have not been formed. Not all the regions have RPCs. Budgetary support is absent making the councils ineffective as relevant infrastructure for peace.

Another observation discusses the question of mandate. In order to sustain the architecture through various governments and ensure that it operates always above partisan political divide, it is important that there is statutory legislation passed in parliament to provide a legal mandate to the National Peace Council as well as the Regional and yet to be established District Peace Councils. A good argument for such a legal backing is that the work of the various councils in the peace architecture will have the necessary leverage that makes its visible in all communities as a state institution. In this regard, it will facilitate the work of the councils whenever they invited various stakeholders to participate in peacebuilding activities. Whereas the credentials and good standing of members of the Peace Council provides the type of leverage required to build sustainable peace in Ghana, there is another dimension in which one of the lingering legacies from the colonial

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47 Provincial Commissioners in Kenya is equivalent to Regional Ministers in Ghana.

era is the overwhelming presence and authority of the state in social organisation and the lives of people. All peacebuilding initiatives and third party mediation that make progress often require from the communities, an endorsement or sort of blessing from the state and the Government in power before it is complete. It is therefore to inspire confidence in communities to respond to the invitation of the National Peace Council that makes a legal instrument necessary.

The broad policy objective for the framework of the peace architecture is to enable and facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among all the relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding in Ghana. The policy direction also outlines promoting cooperative problem solving to conflicts to produce outcomes that lead to conflict transformation, social, political and religious reconciliation and transformative dialogues. The specific objectives under the broad policy objective have to be translated into an effective mechanism that is practical and concrete within the context of existing security arrangements available for management of security. It is not clear what type of coordination and relationship will exist between the Regional Peace Council and the Regional Security Committees (RESEC).

It has been the case in several violent escalations of conflicts in Ghana that the early warning signs and analysis of conflicts pointed to the threat to security or imminent escalation of violence. From the district to regional security committees, the preoccupation was often to rely on intelligence gathering and try to apprehend would be ‘trouble makers’. Considering the protracted nature of conflicts, arrests of would-be perpetrators of violence often increased tensions and accelerated the outbreak of the violence. The community from which people are arrested interpreted events in which they considered themselves as victims and the Government was therefore only using the security apparatus to help their adversaries in the dispute. In the framework of the Peace Architecture, it is anticipated that the Regional Peace Council will act differently by engaging the adversary communities and helping them talk about the problems on hand and working together to arrive at a mutual satisfaction on how to resolve the differences between the communities. It should not be difficult to understand that should the Regional Security Committee act under the understanding of security threat and proceed to arrest people in these communities experiencing conflict; they will make the work of the Regional Peace Council difficult in bringing the communities to talk. A challenge therefore in the framework is the gap in clarifying how the Security Committees and Peace Councils will compliment one another’s work rather than create an impediment in the work of the other. It also means that the framework might be good on paper but a lot more needs to be done in making a shift on how to manage intra and inter communal conflicts.

From the preceding discussion, security agencies react to the symptoms of conflicts and apprehend actors found breaking or violating the law but they do not consider in most instances; what were unaddressed and underlying issues that led in the first place to an outbreak of violence. In the training provided to the members of the peace councils, much attention is focused on the root causes of conflicts in order to work to transform them. To what extend will security agencies compliment this type of work requires that coordination issues, the roles of RISEC and the Peace Councils, how they should work together is elaborated to facilitate efficient collaboration.

The efforts at consolidating and sustaining peace in Ghana are better placed in a bottom-up approach to

49 Following the Konkomba-Nanumba war in Northern Ghana in 1994 and 1995, the intermediary role of Civil Society Organisations aware of the central role of Government worked diligently to partner with Government and ensure the process had the endorsement. The President participated in a reconciliation ceremony at the end of the peace process providing state approval and also assuring the communities of Government. Read more on Conflicts, Civil Society Organisations and Community Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana by Emmanuel Bombande in Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana. Woeli Publishing Services, Accra. 2007. Edited by Steve Tonah.

Because the deep rooted issues and the historical antecedents of conflicts are found in communities, peacebuilding efforts must emphasise that the ownership of the processes that can lead to peace are placed in the communities. In other words, when peace initiatives are designed from the centre of authority in capital cities and implemented in communities, they are not sustainable. In some cases, such initiatives lead to bad peacebuilding practice with the consequence that communities will no longer be willing to trust outsider actors or want to engage with their adversaries with whom they are in conflict.

Whereas the NPC provides leadership at national level, its work should place emphasis on how the District to Regional Peace Councils can be efficient in practice to place the responsibility of inter and intra communal peacebuilding on the shoulders of community leaders. Once community leaders have leadership in processes designed to respond to communal violence, they will also carry the burden and responsibility to ensure that outcomes or settlements for peace are kept. More importantly, it is these leaders who undertake the types of activities that can lead to reconciliation in communities.

Conclusion
As contained in the peace architecture, Ghana has taken the bold step to design the first official national level programme for peace building in Africa. It is in consonance with the Resolution of African leaders at the First Standing Conference on Stability, Security and Development in Africa, in Durban in 2002, for each country to establish a national framework for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Beyond the setting up of the architecture, it is important that it is operational, functioning efficiently and changing the approach to responding and managing violent conflicts within the country.

For this to happen, the structures of the architecture must continue to be formed and allowed to work in a complete non-partisan political environment. The councils should also be well resourced considering that enormous amounts of money have been used to contain violence which always left communities embittered and distrustful of one another even after violence was suppressed by the military. There should also be the political will to proceed further and provide a legal mandate through a statutory instrument in parliament to provide legal standing, a high leverage and also ensure the structures of the architecture are above partisan political considerations and will therefore continue to function when governments are changed in elections.

It is also instructive to note that other policy considerations and implementation will facilitate the effectiveness of the national peace architecture. Of particular importance is completing the decentralisation process of governance in Ghana. It is essential to underscore that conflict mitigation also requires structural reforms at national level that have a direct bearing on the dynamics of managing conflicts at the local level. One such structural reform is to develop national consensus and find the political will for full decentralisation of local governance. This will require making the necessary constitutional amendment for the people of Ghana to be able to elect their District, Municipal and Metropolitan Chief Executives directly. Such a policy reform will make practical the spirit of the 1992 constitution for decentralisation to be instituted as much as possible. More importantly, electing DCEs will be a proactive measure of preventing conflicts at community level as people will be able to hold leaders at the district level accountable for their stewardship, bringing governance closer to the people, ensuring equity in the distribution of resources while working for unity and peace from the local to national levels.

The bottom-up approach suggested in this paper will be easier in the operationalisation of the architecture with the decentralisation of state institutions working in complementarity with community leaders and elders for ownership of peacebuilding to be driven at local levels. Decentralisation will also mitigate communal violence in Ghana as it will eliminate or at least minimise the patronage system. In the current system of governance, government leaders at local levels are not accountable to the people in the communities but rather to government leaders at national level. This encourages patronage in
which once local political leaders can satisfy central authority at national level, they can maintain their positions at local level regardless of their non-performance and failure to deliver basic services to people. This is further exacerbated when corruption breeds at local political leadership level. The patronage system allows impunity but it also breeds high contempt in addition to protracted and deep rooted issues. It is the mix of all these which perpetuate poverty and underdevelopment providing the fodder for continuous tensions, anxiety and mistrust in communities which escalates into violence. All it takes in many instances is a trigger such as an argument in a market place or an event such as registration of voters for an election for violence to break out.

The work of the National Peace Council in one year has demonstrated it potential to mitigate conflicts in Ghana. The major political parties have been engaged in specially designed workshops to strengthen the capacities of political parties in conflict transformation. In some cases, mediation followed the workshops to resolve internal political conflicts. The peace council also mediated in a dispute over access to University hostels and halls of residence between the leadership of students and the ministry over education as well as university authorities. Ghana could well be the pacesetter in governance initiatives adding the national peace architecture to its recent achievement of being the first country in Africa to be peer-reviewed in the context of the NEPAD Africa Peer Review Mechanism. Much more remains to be done and some of these have been highlighted in this issue paper. It is also important to underscore that the success of the peace architecture will continue to depend on its work and partnership with civil society organisations and other critical stakeholders.

51 The 1994-1995 Konkomba-Nanumba conflict broke out during an argument between two young men from the Konkomba and Nanumba ethnic groups in the village market of Nakpayili over the purchase of a guinea fowl.

52 WANEP provides facilitation and technical support in the work of the National Peace Council.
5.4 Nepal: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction – a foundation for peace

Manish Thapa

A Maoist rebellion and a political crisis threatened to derail this traditionally peaceful country. Government and civil society found each other in time to successfully manage the threats and their aftermath. Nepal has become the second country in the world that has a Ministry of Peace.

Nepal’s decade-long conflict between the government and the Maoist rebels disrupted the relationship between civil society, the state, and the market. Successive governments during the time of the conflict took an authoritarian stance and tried to place restrictions on civil society groups, thereby reducing their room to manoeuvre (Harpviken & Kjellman 2004). While civil society was thought to act as a check on the powers of the state, it was the state that set the parameters for civil society, considering it to be an “evil society.”

In the midst of these challenges, Nepal’s civil society played a crucial role in mediating between the needs of special interests and those of the common good, between political and economic sectors for the welfare of the majority of citizens, who are poor, powerless, deprived, and, due to the decade-old conflict, alienated from the mainstream democratic and development process (Thapa 2005). Thus, Nepalese civil society had to invent a language to communicate the problems people faced, and outline a number of overlapping programs people had to contend with, and exert pressure on all the actors in the conflict to end the conflict. There was a need for the civil society to influence state policy making and to help shape public opinion in order to articulate the collective. This is an essential element for pro-people public policies as well as to trigger the dialectics of social transformation during the transition phase. Though there were restrictions to the right to organize or free political expression, which weakened civil society, particularly during conflict. However, the encroachment of the state does not necessarily mean that there is not an active civil society in Nepal; sometime the totalitarian regimes often sow the seeds for change as civil society organizes against its oppressive policies.

Various organized civil society groups in Nepal were active during the conflict. For example:

• Barta Sarokar Nagarik Samiti (Committee of Concerned Citizens for Peace alks) was formed by a number of intellectuals to facilitate the negotiations between the two sides
• Shantira Bikaskalagi Nagarik Samaj (Civil Society for Peace and Development-CSFD)
• Shanti ra Loktantrakalagi Nagarik Andolan (Civil Movement for Peace and Democracy – CMPD)
• Human Rights and Peace Society (HRPS)
• Professional Alliance for Peace and Development (PAPAD) was formed to put pressure on both sides to find a solution to the conflict.

Realizing that it would not be possible to put adequate pressure on the government by working individually, a broader alliance called Nepal Peace Initiative Alliance (NPIA) was formed later by the coming together of dozens of organizations and NGOs. Marches and other activities were organized by NPIA to lobby for a state-level Ministry/Department of Peace and to exert pressure on all parties to find a negotiated settlement of the ongoing conflict. Around this time, several other civil society forums were also created, including the Civic Forum, Civic Peace Commission, and the eleven-member Talks Facilitation Committee to help with the peace process.

Also during that time, and since 2002, the political parties went into protest mode against the government when the parliament was dissolved and the King scrapped democracy. The political movement had failed to gain much momentum, however, until the 2005 Delhi accord between the rebels and the parties (Thapa 2006). The civil society contributed to convincing the two sides...
to enter into an alliance and later provide the critical spark and energy to the ongoing political movement. It is for this reason that many see the new force of civil society as having made a unique contribution in the final outcome of janaandolan II, as the April 2006 Revolution has come to be called.

Forging partnership for peace and democracy
The critical role played by civil society in making the political movement successful was recognized by party leaders and the media. During a BBC radio commentary on May 20th, for example, explicit credit was given to the civil society of Nepal for infusing the listless two-year-old agitation of the political parties with new vitality and bringing it to a decisive conclusion. In some of the stronger assertions of its role in the regime change, even the party leadership became marginal and irrelevant to the centrality of the civil society grassroots. After the king surrendered executive powers on April 24, 2006, the prime minister and the leader of the seven party alliances, Girija Prasad Koirala, thanked the civil society of Nepal by name for its outstanding contribution.

Civil society has remained a powerful voice in the public debates and policy issues in the immediate aftermath of the regime change. It has had a significant influence on major decisions of the new government, such as declaring Nepal a secular country, stripping the monarchy of all powers, transferring the command of the army from the king to the cabinet, and forging a peace settlement with the Maoist rebels. Another important decision of this period was a new law that would grant Nepali citizenship to four million foreign residents and migrants, in a total national population of 26 million.54

As a clear indication of civil society’s political clout and moral authority, the government and the Maoists on June 15, 2006, nominated a 31-member committee comprised mostly of civil society actors to monitor the truce between their forces. Concurrently, a five-member committee comprised of top civil society leaders was formed to observe the ongoing peace talks between the rebels and the government. Similarly, a high-level commission comprised of civil society activists and political leaders was formed to investigate the human rights abuses of the royal government, including those of the king and the security forces, during the democratic movement. Furthermore, the government appointed yet another committee comprised of prominent civil society representatives to draft an interim constitution during this period.

Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction and CSOs: working together for sustainable peace
Perhaps most importantly, the government decided in March 2007 to create a Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction, which was one of the pressing demands of civil society as part of the peace process.

The establishment of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction makes Nepal the second nation in the world to have such a ministry (after the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace in the Solomon Islands), placing Nepal at the forefront of the rapidly growing global movement for ministries of peace in countries around the world. So far, civil society activists and government officials from over 30 countries, including Nepal, participate in the Global Alliance for Ministries and Departments of Peace55, all

54 Most of these landmark decisions were contained in the declaration issued from the parliament on May 18th, 2006.
55 For more information on Global Alliance for Ministries & Department of Peace, see www.mfp-dop.org.
calling for such government ministries or departments in their countries. These agencies will be different depending on the particular cultural and historical context of each country, but all aim to employ proven peacebuilding approaches to resolve conflicts before they escalate to violence and to otherwise prevent violence of all kinds, within and between nations, and thus create the conditions for sustainable peace.

It has widely been perceived that the Comprehensive Peace Accord concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) on November 21, 2006 and subsequent political developments have brought about a decade-long armed conflict to a formal end and opened new avenues for the establishment of sustainable peace and socio-political transformation of the nation. Peace agreements signed by political leaders are often inadequate. Without a major effort for reconciliation at the grass roots, the destructive causes of conflict cannot be addressed or transformed into sustainable, ‘positive’ peace. In order to avoid the unfavourable situations and to mitigate the adverse impacts on social, economic and political life of the nation caused by the violent conflict, it is vitally necessary to timely address its root causes and takes appropriate measures for its resolution. Only by combining politicians and CSOs, we can mobilize the ‘social capital’ that brings reconciliation and sustainable peace.

Realizing these facts, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) has envisioned that civil society can play an important role in encouraging the cessation of armed conflict, and constitutes a vital force in post-conflict recovery as it has that potential to promote reconciliation, serve as a corrective to political and military elites, as well as enhance local ownership and foster democracy. According to the Government of Nepal (Allocation of Business) Rules, 2007\(^56\); published in the Nepal Gazette of May 7, 2007; the functions and duties of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction are as follows:

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\(^56\) For more information, see [www.peace.gov.np](http://www.peace.gov.np).
THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS OF PEACE

What is the Global Alliance?
The Global Alliance for Ministries and Departments of Peace, at www.mfp-dop.org, is a worldwide community comprised of a broad spectrum of people and organisations from civil society, government, and business:
• Are calling and working for the establishment of ministries and departments of peace in governments around the world; and
• Subscribe to principles of non-violence in their personal behaviour with one another and the world and in the resolution by peaceful means of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts.

The purpose of the Global Alliance is to enable and facilitate the capacity of its network to share and provide resources, encouragement, and support for existing and new national campaigns for Ministries and Departments of Peace that reflect and support the emergence of a global culture of peace and non-violence. The Global Alliance also seeks to increase global understanding of the need for ministries and departments of peace around the world. Two countries already have such ministries – the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in Nepal and the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace in the Solomon Islands.

A principle activity of the Global Alliance in support of its community is sponsorship of the annual Global Summit for Ministries and Departments of Peace. The principal purposes of the Global Summit are to build relationships; share and learn from one another’s experiences; expand, through trainings offered, the bank of knowledge and skills of the community; and inform their respective governments and the world about the need and role for and practicality of ministries and departments of peace.

The Global Alliance began in October 2005 in the United Kingdom at the First Global Summit for Ministries and Departments of Peace, which was attended by people from a dozen countries. The Second Global Summit, held in June 2006 in Canada, was attended by people from 18 countries. The Third Global Summit took place in Japan in September 2007 with delegates attending from 21 countries. An associated global youth movement was launched

- Formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of immediate and long-term policies, strategies, plans and programs for the establishment of peace, conflict management and reconstruction of physical infrastructures damaged due to conflict
- Policies, strategies and programs of social and economic development of conflict-affected regions
- Implementation, monitoring and evaluation of such other agreements, understandings and decisions including Comprehensive Peace Accord
- Institutional, procedural and technical matters necessary for maintaining sustainable peace
- Study, analysis and exchange of experiences pertaining to establishment of peace and conflict management
- Relief and rehabilitation for those who are victimized and displaced due to conflict
- Study and research on conflict sensitivity approach
- Matters of performing tasks as depository centre and documentation centre of information, study materials and study reports relating to peace establishment and conflict management and also as a technical resource centre of peace and conflict management
- Local Peace Committees
- Transitional management of peace process and conflict

5 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
5 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR RESPONDING TO CONFLICT

at the Victoria Summit. Further, delegates from Africa to the Japan Summit formed the African Alliance for Peace to extend and coordinate the movement for ministries of peace throughout Africa. The Fourth Global Summit will take place in Sydney, Australia, in 2008.

The Global Alliance is committed to partnership and cooperation with governments and civil society organizations working to change the manner in which conflict is dealt with so as to meet the fundamental needs of all humanity for security, mutual respect, justice, and a sustainable Earth.

Why a Ministry or Department of Peace within national governments?

- To create peace as a primary organising principle in society, both domestically and globally;
- To direct government policy towards non-violent resolution of conflict prior to escalation to violence and to seek peace by peaceful means in all conflict areas;
- To promote justice and democratic principles to expand human rights and the security of persons and their communities, consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other related UN treaties and conventions, and the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (1999);
- To promote disarmament and develop and strengthen non-military options of peacemaking and peacebuilding;
- To develop new approaches to non-violent intervention, and utilize constructive dialogue, mediation, and the peaceful resolution of conflict at home and abroad;
- To encourage the involvement in local, national, and global peacebuilding of local communities, faith groups, NGOs, and other civil society and business organisations, including the formation of civilian non-violent peace forces;
- To facilitate the development of peace and reconciliation summits to promote non-violent communication and mutually beneficial solutions;
- To act as a resource for the creation and the gathering of best practices documents, lessons learned, and peace impact assessments;
- To provide for the training of all military and civilian personnel who administer post-war reconstruction and demobilization in war-torn societies; and
- To fund the development of peace education curriculum materials for use at all educational levels and to support university-level peace studies.

- Consultation committees on peace and rehabilitation
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- High-level Monitoring Committee on Peace Process
- Formulation, implementation and coordination with sectoral bodies of plans of reconstruction and rehabilitation of physical infrastructures damaged as a result of conflict
- Operation and monitoring of plans and programs to be operated from the Peace Fund
- Management of cantonments of combatants of rebel-side
- Focal point of governmental, non-governmental and international institutions/organizations pertaining to peace establishment and conflict management.

These scopes of the functions and the duties of the Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction have opened up several avenues for further cooperation with civil society organizations. Civil society organizations (CSO) are partners of choice for collecting hidden small arms and light weapons (SALW); for creating public awareness and building confidence in the peace process; for helping security services to enforce weapon bans; and for successful implementation of every step in DDRRR: disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. The involvement of NGOs in the reconstruction process and furthermore in the creation and strengthening of a pluralistic society.
based on democratic principles is even more needed as guarantor of lasting peace. They know better the needs of the peoples they represent and thereby can help to address and overcome the deeper causes of conflict.

Civil society and government cooperation: achievements and obstacles

Thus several initiatives are now underway in cooperation between civil society organizations and Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction in Nepal. One of such initiative is formation of Local Peace Committees (LPC) in various parts of Nepal which allows the local CSOs to create an inclusive multi-party dialogue to address all stakeholders’ concerns, and institutionalize government peace structures. Due to LPC, there is a space for the traditional authorities (elders, religious leaders), women’s organizations, youths, local institutions and professional associations to enhance their role in the promotion of grassroots peacebuilding activities through means of street plays, round table forums, implementation of peace education in local schools etc to bring people together to address ways to overcome significant obstacles to peace, and allow exchange across ethnic and geographic lines.

Similarly, NGOs are becoming more prevalent in peacebuilding activities as the result of the vacuum left by the absence of local authorities. NGOs are working with bilateral and multilateral international organizations & donors in various aspects of conflict transformation activities bridging gap between the state and local communities. The NGOs are also working together with the Election Commission in educating the people regarding Constituent Assembly Election57 which is considered as the foundation step for democratic consolidation for the formation of New Nepal. There is no doubt that civil society has the potential to promote reconciliation, serve as corrective to political and military elites, as well as enhance local ownership and foster democracy. But CSOs face major challenges in establishing legitimacy as partners with governments in post settlement consolidation process.

CSOs face obstacles due to consistence absence of sustainable funding for its activities in peacebuilding as most of the funds in Nepal are directed to Government initiated Peace Fund or UN’s Peace Trust Fund leaving little share for CSOs activities.

Similarly, most of CSOs initiatives are often ignored by policy makers thus CSOs activities are given less importance. Recently Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction drafted a bill for the formation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) without broad consultation with civil society. Later on when the bills was out for the public scrutiny, government had to withhold the endorsement of bill due to the criticisms received from every sectors of society including United Nations Office of High Commission of Human Rights in Nepal (UNOHCHR).

At the same time CSOs are also posing challenges and obstacles to GOs activities. In Nepal, there has been a mushrooming growth of NGOs helping to establish a different political culture and a potential to support as well as control central state structures which leads to the commercialization of peace work. Although assisting their activities represents a valuable form of intervention, but increasing the number of NGOs could actually impede institutional development by absorbing skills and manpower which are needed in the government sector. There is also a risk of increasing the divide, or confrontation, between state-building and civil-society building, two processes which should be seen on the contrary as intermeshed and mutually-reinforcing.

It is no doubt that CSOs and GOs partnership is playing an important and critical role in peacebuilding in Nepal. As outlined above, civil society does not and should not operate in a vacuum. It needs to interact with the state and business in order to influence the two. Government cannot govern alone. It needs CSOs, and CSOs cannot be the alternative to government – they need the state. Both must work together for sustainable peace in Nepal.

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57 The 21 November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) placed constitutional change at the heart of peacebuilding and efforts to tackle deep-seated economic and social inequalities through constituent assembly (CA). The CA election has been postponed for second time after a political deadlock between the Six Party Alliance and Maoists. It is hoped that the CA election will be held within April/May 2008.
5.5 Kyrgyzstan: Creating a space for dialogue and cooperation between the state and civil society – Violent conflict prevention, 2004-2005

Heloise Heyer

In Kyrgyzstan, civil society became an important player in the quest to channel civic protest in a peaceful fashion – in 2004 and 2005, amidst intensifying public protests, election turmoil and a Revolution, fears that the small Central Asian republic would be engulfed into widespread violence never materialized.

On 17 March 2002, in the Southern Kyrgyzstan district of Aksy, demonstrations against the central government were held to protest against the imprisonment of the Parliamentary Deputy Azimbek Beknazarov. This popular politician from the region had become increasingly opposition-oriented and particularly critical of a recent border treaty with China. On that day, during a peaceful demonstration, five people were shot dead by the police.

This event led to several months of protests and deeply affected a country that had been considered for most of the 1990’s as the “Island of Democracy” of Central Asia, due to the faster pace of its economic reforms and much more liberal environment than its neighbours. President Askar Akayev however, who had been in power since the independence of Kyrgyzstan in 1991, had gradually moved in a more authoritarian direction, particularly after his controversial 2000 re-election. Akayev’s unpopularity was particularly noticeable in rural areas and in the South of the country, but he had also started to lose the backing of key national and regional elites, irritated by Akayev’s family control over the economy and disenchanted in the face of rising corruption. Eventually, President Akayev would be ousted from power on 24 March 2005, in a relatively peaceful popular revolt referred to as the “Tulip Revolution”.

A local initiative for conflict prevention in a politically tense climate
The Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), a Kyrgyz non-governmental organization, was created in 1998 to prevent violent conflict and build peace and justice in Central Asia. In January 2004, FTI started a project for “Cooperation among Civil Society, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Other Bodies of State Authority to Realize Citizens’ Constitutional Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly”.

The political situation at the time was very tense. Local elections were to be held in the autumn of 2004. Parliamentary elections were to follow in February 2005 and a new president was to be elected in the autumn of that same year. While many people were hoping for changes and an improvement of the general social, economic and political situation, they had also become increasingly disillusioned; they felt as if they had become participants in a mere ‘spectacle’ of democracy in their country. The public protests were a manifestation of that unease.

For Kyrgyzstan, a country of the former Soviet Union, expressing dissent in such ways was a new phenomenon. The authorities had little capacity in dealing with civil protest and used old Soviet methods to suppress conflict and to prevent people from publicly expressing their grievances. FTI determined that the escalation of tensions that led to bloodshed during the March 2002 demonstrations in Aksy had been mainly due to a lack of professional skills on the part of the police and local authorities in dealing with civil unrest. It also recognized that demonstrators themselves had little awareness of their rights and responsibilities as active players in civil protest events. Another aspect that seemed very worrying to FTI was the complete lack of communication and understanding between the state and civil society. After Aksy events, tensions between civil society and state bodies heightened, and the police were discredited in the eyes of the general population. All these factors meant

58 Heloise Heyer holds a BA from the Strasbourg Institute of Political Studies and an MA from the prestigious European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation. She is currently Programs Director at the Foundation for Tolerance International, one of the most prominent Central Asian NGOs focusing on peace and conflict issues in the region. FTI is the Regional Initiator for Central Asia of GPPAC.
that any tensions and localized conflicts had a strong potential to escalate into violence and to spill over to the national, and even regional, levels.

Creating a space for constructive dialogue and enhancing capacity in peaceful conflict resolution

FTI therefore decided to design a project that would combine specific sets of activities in order to address all these inter-related issues. The overarching goal was simultaneously to enable citizens to exert their right to freedom of peaceful assembly while preventing any escalation of tensions that could lead to the outbreak of nation-wide violence. This was to be done by establishing structures allowing constructive interaction between civil society, law enforcement agencies, and other bodies of state authority in order to prevent the use of violence by either side during civil protest events. Started in January 2004, the project would last until December 2005 and be adjusted and expanded in order to adapt to a changing environment, affected notably by the outbreak of a Revolution in the middle of project implementation. Initially funded by one main donor, the Swiss government, very soon the project would expand thanks to the support of additional partners and donors – the Danish Refugee Council, UNDP and OSCE Bishkek.

Two primary objectives were set up:
1. To promote a culture of dialogue and establish communication channels and peaceful conflict intervention mechanisms through enhanced cooperation among representatives of civil society, law enforcement agencies, and central and local state administration.
2. To build the capacity of all participants to the project with regard to conflict analysis and peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as negotiation and mediation.

Getting to know each other I: meetings, workshops, talks

To encourage cooperation between civil society and state authorities, FTI organized various meetings, workshops and trainings throughout 2004 and 2005, gathering representatives from civil society, law enforcement agencies and government authorities, both at the national and regional levels. While most of the activities were facilitated by FTI staff, the decision was made to hire external consultants from the former Yugoslavia to hold the trainings. Initially, participants displayed a high level of distrust and prejudice towards each other but soon they developed higher levels of communication and mutual understanding, and even established innovative structures of cross-sector cooperation for the prevention of violent conflict and peaceful crisis intervention.

The first event organized within the project took the form of a common training for participants from three different sectors and institutions: civil society, National Security Service (NSS) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The training consisted in identifying conflict issues in the current context of Kyrgyzstan, transforming negative statements into positive ones and developing a structure and plan of activities for future development of the collaborative project. Strikingly, on the first day, when asked to explain what terms they would associate with each of these entities, strong prejudices were revealed through each group’s answers. The NSS and MIA in particular, were associated by civil society participants with very negative terms such as ‘fear’, ‘beatings’, ‘torture’ and ‘shooting at people’59. After the three-day training however, participants had learnt to

know each other and to listen to their respective points of views, and all recognized the usefulness of such a process and the necessity to develop it further. Together with the other initial project meetings, the training allowed members of civil society and state and law enforcement bodies to establish first contacts, and built the capacity of all participants in communication and basic principles of peaceful conflict resolution.

In addition to meetings at the national level, five regional round tables were held in spring and autumn 2004 in Bishkek and in the Southern regions of Kyrgyzstan – in Jalalabad, Aksy, Osh and Batken. During each of these round tables, the project background and goals were explained, information on the Kyrgyz legislation on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly was provided, factors of conflicts and destabilization were analyzed, and a regional working group was established to engage regularly in dialogue and cooperation over conflict issues.

**Obstacles along the way**

Many obstacles had to be overcome however, in order for these initial project activities to achieve their objectives. In Aksy in particular, the first round table held on 23 March 2004 was marked by significant difficulties in organizing the event and gathering relevant representatives from civil society and different local authority and law enforcement structures. Strong efforts were required to find a neutral place for the meeting to take place (in a holiday resort where pressures from the regional capital could not be felt so strongly). As the FTI facilitator explained, ‘it was difficult to facilitate the seminar at the very beginning because of all the tension in the room and because these people had never participated in such an event before. Some people from the villages were very aggressive towards the law enforcement officials. In the afternoon however, normal conditions were established and people realized the aim of the seminar and the benefits of talking to each other.’

After the seminar, many positive opinions were expressed. The Head of the Local Parliament saw this seminar ‘as a proof that people and state representatives are ready to engage in constructive dialogue. This is a fundamental, even historical, step for Kyrgyzstan.’

The facilitator, who was himself from Aksy, was very touched by a question from one of the participants: “Where were you before Aksy tragedy happened? You could have prevented the death of our sons.”

**Getting to know each other II: building understanding**

The project represented the first opportunity for most of the project participants to meet with representatives from ‘conflicting’ sides, providing people who never had a chance to talk together with a space to discuss sensitive issues in a non-violent and inclusive way, and to overcome their prejudices and gradually build trust. Civil society members, who tended to fear and had little respect for law enforcement bodies, discovered ‘that people of the NSS and MIA were human beings like them, that they also wanted to prevent violence and that they had their own difficulties.’ State and law enforcement representatives, who were inclined to consider any form of public protest as a direct threat against the stability of the state, were able to learn about the importance of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in a democratic state and to listen to the motivations of civil society representatives for organizing civic events. Points of view were shared on the sources and triggers of conflicts in Kyrgyzstan and on possible strategies for violence prevention. Despite all the difficulties and the mutual reproaches and blames, the parties agreed on an acute need for cooperation. They discovered that despite their differences, they all shared one mutual goal: preventing the escalation of crises and the outbreak of violence in Kyrgyzstan.

**Preventing violence: a joint effort**

A further series of meetings of the different regional and national working groups were held in December 2004, in order to analyze the most recent developments of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan. It was also intended to design a precise schedule of activities and strategy for

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61 Toktomat Itibaev, ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Anara Egynalieva, FTI Project Manager, interview, November 2007.
cooperation in the upcoming crucial election period. Unique structures were established in early 2005: Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs) in three regions of the South of Kyrgyzstan and one National Coordination Council (NCC) based in Bishkek, all of whom had as a main goal the regular monitoring of conflict situations, development of possible preventive measures and intervention to defuse potentially violent crisis situations. RCC and NCC members also had the responsibility of raising awareness among their respective institutions of the goals and activities of the project. Each Coordination Council comprised between five and eleven members, consisting of civil society and media representatives, human rights defenders, representatives of law enforcement agencies and state bodies. While RCCs included local authorities, the NCC state representatives came from the National Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Presidential Administration.

The real test: election turmoil...
January 2005 saw increasing turmoil taking place in relation to the Parliamentary election campaign. More and more demonstrations and protests were organized to oppose dubious judicial decisions on various candidates’ deregistration, gathering thousands of people around local executive buildings and courthouses in the regions. Tens of lawsuits were initiated against organizers and participants of opposition demonstrations, most of whom were former middle or high-level state officials. The first round of the election, on 27 February 2005, passed peacefully. Protests began quickly however, mostly in the South, where large crowds organized demonstrations and blocked roads to protest against alleged malpractice and dubious disqualifications of candidates. Opposition forces began to develop parallel structures in some regions. Because of the higher stakes involved, the second round of the elections, on 13 March, involved even more malpractice than the first. At that time however, attention had turned much more on the growing protests all over the country than on the actual results.

...and a revolution
While initially the protests were mostly conducted by supporters of individual candidates on local issues, gradually the wider opposition joined in and the agenda broadened to national issues, most importantly the request for the resignation of President Akayev. The capital remained relatively calm until 23 March 2005, when police broke up an opposition rally organized in the centre of Bishkek by the youth group KelKel. Opposition leaders agreed to hold a major demonstration on the following day, gathering supporters from the regions. On March 24, some groups of protestors, involving mostly young people, marched straight to the White House and a fight ensued with the police. As the International Crisis Group describes:

‘The police managed to force the protestors back twice, but having been given an order not to use arms, they realized they could not keep control, and they fled. Within minutes, the protestors were inside the White House compound, and soon within the White House itself, throwing papers and chairs out windows. A battalion of about 30 young soldiers was led away, protected by KelKel members among others.’

Akayev and others had departed the White House and fled to Russia, while other presidential administration members were held up and beaten by the crowd. Looting took place but after a few days and the release of Kulov, a former vice-President who had been imprisoned since 2001, the security situation returned to normal. In the end, the Akayev regime had been overthrown much more rapidly than anyone had ever expected. As the International Crisis Group put it, the regime was simply so weak that “in some ways it was less a revolution than a process of state collapse”.

Control of the state was then taken by a collection of opposition activists and former government officials. The leader of anti-Akayev opposition, Kurmanbek Bakiev, became acting President until he got formally elected in July 2005.

64 Central Administrative Building in Bishkek.
66 Ibid.
Success: serious escalation prevented
Before, during and after the Revolution, the National and Regional Coordination Councils proved instrumental in preventing the violent escalation of a number of acute crisis situations, particularly in the weeks preceding the Revolution, when tensions were threatening to break out into violence at any time. Members of the NCC and representatives of the media flew to the Southern city of Jalalabat on 7 March 2005, after opposition forces had seized control of the regional administration building. The police surrounded the building while on the nearby square, thousands of protesters asking for Akayev’s resignation were assembled. Special law enforcement forces had been sent in and rumours were running higher day by day that the authorities were willing to undertake violent measures against the protesters and the occupiers of the building. Members of the NCC and the Jalalabat RCC held a number of separate meetings with representatives of the police and the demonstrators. Both sides agreed to participate in negotiations. Those were to be facilitated by NCC chairwoman and FTI director Raya Kadyrova and another NCC member, Aziza Abdirasulova, a Human Rights activist. The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs personally chose the group of five state representatives that would participate in the negotiations. It was agreed at the very beginning that the political demands of the opposition, namely the resignation of President Akayev, would not be discussed. Instead, the sole aim of the negotiations was to ensure that violence would not break out in Jalalabat. After a few hours of heated discussion, an agreement was signed stipulating the terms of the demonstrations and that neither side would use weapons or hostages or any kind of violence in the conflict. The administration building remained occupied for almost two weeks after the agreement was reached, but no violence broke out, even though large stocks of weapons were held by both sides.

In another particularly difficult case, it was an RCC member from the law enforcement sector that managed to peacefully resolve a tense conflict situation. On 6 March 2005, protesters angry at what they considered falsified election results had captured the district administration building of Uzgen, in the South of Kyrgyzstan. One of the options considered for clearing the building was to send in armed Special Forces units. Ravshan Abdukarimov, Deputy Head of the Regional Police Department and active RCC coordinator, opened negotiations between leaders of the protesters, influential elders, local authorities, the police and National Security Service. As a result of his intervention and mediation efforts, the building was emptied by the protesters on 11 March 2005 without any violence and the situation in Uzgen stabilized.

More success: the Revolution happened – and hardly a shot was fired
In the opinion of both organizers and participants, the project for Cooperation among Civil Society, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Other Bodies of State Authority played an important role in ensuring that so little armed violence was used during the March Revolution, especially as weapons were held by all sides67. High level officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs had taken part in a number of the trainings and proved influential in the decisions made not to use any weapons in response to public protests. Civil society representatives had on their part realized the difficulties faced by law enforcement officers, who often found themselves in a precarious position. Since the beginning of 2005, they had been increasingly called in to act as mediators in localized conflicts, without the support of conspicuously absent state administrators. In an unexpected turn of the project, on several occasions civil society and human rights activists took responsibility for protecting police officers. As one of the meetings of the NCC and RCCs concluded in April 2005, among the achievements of the project was the fact that ‘sincere friendly relationships between the police and human rights activists were established and that they assisted each other during crisis situations68. After the revolution, one of the new adjusted objectives of the project would be to improve the public image of

67 Interviews of different stakeholders in project implementation held during program evaluation in spring and summer 2005 by the external consultant Mladen Majetic, Report finalized on 11 December 2005; interview with Anara Egynalieva, FTI Project Manager, November 2007.
68 Minutes of the joint meeting of members of the National Coordination Council and Regional Coordination Councils, city of Bishkek, 21 April 2005.
law enforcement agencies and restore trust of the general population into them.

**Post-revolution fears**
While the ousting of Akayev had been greeted with excitement and high hopes, concerns developed afterwards about chaos and instability resulting from a perceived power vacuum and about whether the new government represented a true break with the past. The nature of the demonstrations and public protests held after March 2005 changed significantly, with less easily identifiable leaders, vaguer demands and increasing concerns about the manipulation of the population by criminal groups. In this context, the initiators of the project decided to expand its reach by developing a new infrastructure for the prevention of violence in Kyrgyzstan: the Early Warning for Violence Prevention project (EWVP), which started in June 2005, just before the Presidential Elections to be held in July. While monitoring had been a part of the NCC and RCC work since January 2005, the Early Warning component was designed to focus exclusively on the monitoring of public protests and conflict situations all over the territory of Kyrgyzstan, and included systematic analysis and elaboration of specific targeted recommendations, to be distributed among all interested parties. The second component, Early Intervention, was to be implemented mostly through the RCCs and NCC, and the decision was taken to establish four additional RCCs in the North of Kyrgyzstan, to replicate the success of their Southern counterparts.

**Conclusion**
It is very important to underline that the project remained neutral throughout all the events that took place. Its goal was not to impact on any of the processes that led to or followed the Revolution, but to ensure that rights would be respected and that violence would not be used.
There were numerous difficulties and challenges during project implementation. In addition to logistical issues, such as difficult transport and communication in mountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan, other more substantial issues had to be dealt with. Overcoming distrust and establishing genuine and lasting cooperation took time and a great deal of effort on the part of the Kyrgyz facilitators and Croatian trainers. The training sessions turned out to be particularly successful due to the very concrete angle adopted by the trainers, who extensively used their own experience in the former Yugoslavia as part of their modules. One of the main challenges faced by the project was to develop its benefits beyond the representatives taking part in the activities. Going beyond personality and reaching the broader institutions and societal structures was not easy and often did not go as far as the objectives had outlined. However, it appeared over time that many project participants had effectively promoted the rationale of the project to their colleagues, and in some cases taken the initiative in developing trainings in their own institutions. Though media representatives were involved in project activities, their presence often appeared as a dilemma for the organizers, as some participants preferred to keep their participation in the project confidential, at least for some time. At the same time, it was often mentioned that more effort should be put in public relations and in highlighting the benefits of the project to the broader population.

One of the main achievements of the project is that the structures it established still exist today. The EWVP program, born out of the project for “Cooperation among Civil Society, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Other Bodies of State Authority to Realize Citizens’ Constitutional Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly”, was further developed and will start its Phase III in early 2008. NCC and RCCs continue to function and will be the object of a specific program aimed at consolidating and enhancing their capacity, and attempts are being made to replicate the experience in other Central Asian countries. The relationships and communication channels established during the project still help former participants in their work today and in their efforts at peacefully resolving conflict situations. Also, many civil society participants say the project helped them to become more confident and aware of their capabilities and responsibilities, and that today they have a feeling that they are able to play a meaningful role with respect to security, stability and justice in Kyrgyzstan.

69 Such as Ravshan Abdukarimov within the police and MIA structures.
5.6 Germany: The German government Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention – CR and Post conflict PB & interface between state and non state actors

**Ute Hegener**

The German government’s Action Plan for civilian intervention during, after and hopefully also before conflicts has been put into place, with important contributions from German civil society.

Violent conflicts threaten lives and the means of life in many regions of the world. Local and regional, national and international civil society organisations (CSOs) make an important contribution in the field of civil conflict resolution by helping to ensure that crises are recognised and addressed early on, that the underlying conflicts are resolved, and that once peace has been achieved, it is consolidated. But how do we build just peace and when do we start getting involved to transform the root causes of structural, personal or cultural violence? Very often there is not a lack of early warning but of pro-active civilian early respond.

The Global Conflict Panorama stated out that in 2006, “there were 278 political conflicts. Compared to 2005 the number of conflicts carried out on the highest intensity level increased significantly from two to six wars. Altogether, 118 conflicts were carried out violently. With 45, Europe all in all had the third-most conflicts, as in previous years, but only one of these was fought out on the level of a highly violent conflict.”

Bearing in mind these worrying facts the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management discussed the success and failure of state and non-state actors in the field of peace making and peace building. Dedicated to its Charta the Platform aims to strengthen peaceful conflict resolution as a cross-section topic. Therefore, the Platform was active and engaged in the national discussion and exchange with Federal Government in regard of the development of a comprehensive approach for conflict resolution, civilian crisis prevention and post-conflict peace-building.

**Setting the Agenda**

How do we respond to all these violent conflicts, riots and violations? What has the national and international community learned in recent years? What kind of culture of communication, co-operation or partnership will be possible and feasible between governments and civilian actors? How can a national action plan improve co-operation between different Ministries and civil society members only by restructuring dialogue without institutionalised partnership? Last but not least – will there be enough political will to ensure that more resources will be further anchored? The following article will roughly introduce some chapters of the German national Action Plan, especially the development of a national infrastructure for civilian crisis prevention. This newly established structure of dialogue and interaction between state and non-state actors is from a network perspective the most important focal point and a touchstone for this innovative policy.

German Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building

In May 2004 the German Federal Government adopted the Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post conflict Peacebuilding. Through this Action Plan, the German government has agreed to an inter-ministerial strategy that refers to its broad understanding of security and prevention. The term “civilian crisis prevention” is not; therefore, to be regarded as excluding military crisis prevention, as it does in fact include it.
The Action Plan indicates that crisis prevention should be pursued primarily by civil means; the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts is a task that can only be performed effectively if and when all actors and policy fields are pulling in the same direction; an effective approach must incorporate all levels, including the German inputs to the UN, the OSCE, the EU and the Breton Woods institutions; civil society – both in Germany and in its cooperation countries – has an important role to play in crisis prevention.” 74 The Action Plan identifies and evaluates the various activities and groups them into fields of action. In total the plan identifies 161 activities designed to run over a period of five to ten years. The complex causes of violent conflicts call for a comprehensive approach guided by the aims set out and implemented by means of concrete initiatives:

- Establishing stable state structures;
- Creating the capacities within civil society, the media, culture and education;
- Safeguarding opportunities through economic and environmental measures;
- Strengthening the global and regional level - (United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
- Supporting Africa – regional and (sub-)regional organizations;
- Developing a national infrastructure for civilian crisis prevention.

Developing a national infrastructure for civilian crisis prevention – institution building and beacon projects
Civil society plays an important role before, during and after a conflict and their valuable contributions are out of question for creating a just and sustainable peace. The role of third parties in post-conflict peace-building measures and their culture of dealing with conflicts in partnership with local authorities and local civilian structures are as important as the culture of partnership or culture of communication in their own countries. Due to the importance of NGO-engagement clear structures of communication with entry point in ministries and in missions have to be established.

To improve the exchange and interaction between governmental and civilian actors and to ensure the coherence and coordination of the Federal Governments crisis prevention activities three new bodies or elements were created:

- an Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis prevention
- a Commissioner for Civilian Crisis Prevention and
- an Advisory Board with members of Non-Governmental-Organisations, business and academia.

Moreover, the Action Plan stressed the willingness to enhance and broaden its cooperation with the already existing Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt). Programmes like zivik of the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, ifa) and Peace Funds will be “further anchored and coordinated with one another” (see also next chapter).

Advisory Board of Civilian Crisis Prevention
One year after adopting the Action Plan the Federal Government established in May 2005 an Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, composed of 19 representatives from academia, security policy and policy advice, human rights and humanitarian issues, churches and political foundations. The participation of Members of Parliament is possible but optional. The Advisory Board – a very heterogeneous panel with a great variety of interests and aims – responds only “on demand” and doesn’t have a pro-active function, e.g. in case of early warning. Its members will work in specific topics, but they don’t have a financial budget or a co-ordination office. They meet twice a year for special sessions and advice the ISG on special matters. In the first two-year implementation period the Advisory Board focused on different beacon projects:

1) decision on the details of a possible law (Entsendegesetz) aimed at providing civilians for international peace missions;
2) pooling financial resources;
3) a whole-of-government team for specific countries (Nigeria in 2006 /Sudan started in autumn 2007);

74 The German Governments 12th Development Policy Report, p. 106
The aim of this exercise was to develop a new format in order to improve communication among different ministries on crisis issues in a special country (improving country strategy papers). These pilot projects illustrated the importance of a culture of communication between different parties on different levels. “By sharing the group’s findings with the relevant European institutions the Federal Government is also aiming to increase the exchange of information and experiences in the area of civilian crisis prevention between EU member states and European institutions.”

Networking and lobbying for peaceful conflict transformation
The Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management founded in 1998 is a German network of associates, aiming to promote peaceful conflict transformation. It is designed as an open network. Today the network connects more than 130 individuals and nearly 60 organisations, institutions and groups from the fields of peace work, conflict resolution / mediation, human rights work, humanitarian aid, development cooperation and research (peace and conflict studies). For about 10 years the Platform aims to render the different discourses on the topic more accessible by providing a bibliography of articles published in relevant magazines and anthologies.

In 2003 the Platform for Civilian Conflict Management carried out its first survey on conflict resolution by social organizations and institutions in Germany. The aim was to determine the scope, emphasis, and social potential of civilian conflict resolution, but also to identify deficits and obstacles in order to decide on the action required to overcome them. As outcome the brochure *Peace needs Society* was published and serves as a stocktaking of non-governmental approaches and recommendations for action in peaceful conflict resolution. Questioning those involved and evaluating the results in the light of complementary experiences from member organisations and participants of the network has shown, that conflict resolution has become firmly established as a pan-political force on governmental and societal level. Nevertheless civilian conflict resolution concepts failed to influence ‘German Realpolitik’ and therefore, the Platform made several recommendations for action directed at the state and at civil society organisations. Therefore, the Platform started a political dialogue with ministries, administration and political parties. In close cooperation and fruitful discussions with the Federal Foreign Office the Platform and other stakeholders contributed to the further development of the first national Action Plan on Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution. Civil society organizations and think tanks broadly welcomed this new instrument, which doesn’t see conflict transformation as an exclusive issue of foreign policy. The overall aim of civilian organizations was the development of a holistic peace-oriented concept for civilian, non-violent conflict resolution as a consistent principle guiding German and European politics, which referred to foreign and development policy, security issues and internal affairs. For about two years four out of twelve members of the board of the Platform are members of the Advisory Board and facilitate the beacon projects as convenor and/or spokesperson.

Conclusions
In May 2006 the Federal Government adopted the first report on the implementation of the Action Plan. It is undoubted that the Action Plan is a corner stone of the German civilian crisis prevention policy, but some of the goals or measures set are likely to prove unrealistic when it comes to practical implementation. For the next period the ISG is, therefore, called to identify realistic topics on which the Federal Government or the Steering Group will concentrate particularly during the period leading up to the next report in 2008.

On one hand the talks between Federal Government and German or European NGOs revealed openness towards the idea of improved networking and enhancing
partnerships in the field of civilian crisis management, on the other hand some practitioners from the development community, peace movement and a group of peace researchers argued that the Action Plan itself is more an inventory than a self-commitment for a comprehensive civilian foreign policy and a new culture of prevention. In their view the German Federal Government assumes that a growing acceptance exists for its very broad security concept and that the increasing “securitization” of politics the Action Plan refers to is an ideal precondition to a spatial extension and functional diversification of military operations. Therefore, it would be very important to ask how a broader security concept could be a suitable rationale for a peace-oriented policy. Furthermore, and not only to their view, there is still a massive imbalance between military and civilian spending. In order to remain credible and to prevent that their motives are questioned, the Federal Government should make a shift from reaction to prevention, from military to civilian missions. Essential is, therefore, the increase and anchoring of financial resources and institutionalisation of the informal cooperation and communication with CSOs. On the long run a commitment for pro-active prevention and for early response by civilian approaches is indispensable to build peace.

Finally, the Action Plan is the German document concerning Foreign Relations that emphasises the importance of civil society actors and their competences and abilities in conflict resolution and peace making. The second report on the impacts and outcomes of the AP will be launched in summer 2008.

77 The idea of security centre on the state has given way in recent years to an entirely new concept - the concept of human security. But human security is a multidimensional approach on a policy level, has some attraction for policymakers because it therefore can easily be tailored to fit a government's foreign policy mandate or a development organization’s area of expertise (see: Security Dialogue, Volume 35, No. 3, September 2004, Burgess & Owen: Security Dialogue International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway, p. 345)
5.7 Germany: Funding civilian conflict resolution

Peter Mares

The German government’s Action Plan made operational: portrait of a program that funds civil society interventions for conflict management, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding are integral components of German foreign policy. Besides providing support for UN peacekeeping missions and training staff for civil peace operations, the Federal Foreign Office also assists German and international civil society organizations in their work in international and regional peace processes as well as in individual civil society conflict resolution projects. This includes recognizing the role of the civil society by incorporating them in networks and anchoring them in an international context. The financial support which is granted in addition to this political backing – formalized in a published funding concept and related eligibility criteria in the case of the Federal Foreign Office – acknowledges the significance of the civil society and the role of their work as an opportunity to promote sustainable peace.

zivik

The promotion of conflict resolution projects with means of the German Federal Foreign Office for “peacekeeping measures”, subsequently, was entrusted to the zivik program of the institute for foreign cultural relations (ifa). zivik provides advice on project ideas, selects and assesses projects and grants funding in its role as intermediary between the Federal Foreign Office and civil society organizations. Further, zivik evaluates and documents these projects. The measures earmarked to receive funds are chosen in close collaboration with the Federal Foreign Office and thus fit into the overall program of German measures for a specific partner country or crisis region. From 2001 (establishment of zivik program) to 2007, zivik has helped to fund more than 400 projects in approximately 50 countries around the globe with a total amount involved of more than 26 million euro. The funds were approved by the Federal Foreign Office.

Besides advising and supporting CSOs on applying for funding and clearing project accounts, zivik program also aims to develop further conceptual inputs for civil conflict resolution. Project evaluations are designed and implemented, “lessons learned” compiled and processed, and examples of “good practice” documented and presented online on zivik’s homepage in order to motivate experts and practitioners to become acquainted with successful project strategies and to gain insights into a variety of project contexts. The websites of the featured organizations provide additional information on their work as well as their contact details.

In its role as intermediary between state and non-state actors, IFA and its zivik program have made key contributions to expanding the field of civil conflict resolution. The zivik program also serves to put into practice the Federal Government’s Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building. Most of the projects funded by zivik can be divided into three main fields of work: political leadership, peace education and post-war peacebuilding.

Political leadership

Many conflicts are marked by political deadlock and violent escalation. CSO-led crisis intervention is therefore of high value. Consequently, the importance of projects that aim at improving access to or (re-)open channels of communication between political (and religious) leaders are among those funded by the zivik program. They seek to bridge gaps, to promote mutual understanding and tolerance, reduce stereotypes, and foster positive inter-group attitudes.

CSOs have the comparative advantage that they can act more flexible than politicians who face serious
restrictions and control. Concerning conflicts dealing with minority issues it is a key step to involve political leaders in a dialogue process in order to restore trust and to explore avenues for future rapprochement and reconciliation.

**Peace education**

These projects are quite different in terms of their target groups, time frames and activities and are often based on a rather long-term dialogue processes. Their activities are neither covered by media reports nor by publications. Some have an in-built monitoring and evaluation mechanism (M&E) that gives regular feedback to the project team. Providing the participants with the opportunity to meet under very difficult circumstances, it serves not only as an example for peaceful coexistence but has also a psychological function (supporting people who feel isolated and want to do something to promote peace, showing the extremists that they cannot win, etc.). In the long run, the participants of such programs could function as ‘ambassadors of peace’ in their communities. At the same time, one should probably not overestimate the potential impact of this kind of dialogue projects in times of violent conflict. Mutual negative perceptions characterize all parties entangled in a conflict. In order to change the perceptions of the ‘others’, it seems to be necessary to combine dialogue workshops with a full range of other (follow-up) activities. Given that it is very difficult to maintain the results of short-term coexistence projects without the necessary political framework, peace activities on the ground should be accompanied by efforts to influence political leaders on both sides of the conflict.

**Post-war peacebuilding**

Post-war peacebuilding measures should deal with the immediate consequences of war by activities like physical reconstruction (of infrastructure, houses, services, and agriculture) and social reconstruction like rebuilding trust and confidence, forgiveness and reconciliation, dealing with the past and dealing with trauma. Post-war peacebuilding should aim at a change of conditions, as well as a change of behaviour. The projects funded by the zivik program are dealing with aspects of peacebuilding, which are most relevant for conflict transformation.

Dealing with the past requires the creation of a safe environment, ‘safe spaces’ where victims are allowed to talk about their experience, if they wish and discover their space in society again. Dealing with the past also includes the search for the truth, and the development of dialogues between the different groups of society in one or the other way involved in the conflict. Dealing with the past is part of healing, but also drawing lessons from what has happened so that the society can learn what it has to do in order to prevent the repetition of the experience in present and future. Possible approaches may be the production of poster series, school books and the engagement of the story telling in the communities. ‘Dealing with the past’ can also be achieved by community based trauma counselling. As follow-up, people who have undergone such a counselling period may be able to apply what was learnt to others in their communities.

‘Transitional justice’ is aiming at the restoration of trust and confidence by restoring a rule of law. Monitoring of Special Courts, Anti Corruption Commissions and the national courts are contributions to transitional justice and thus to post-war peacebuilding. Other projects aim at making people understand the judicial system, empowering them to claim their rights and enabling courts to do their work in a better way.

Most tangible effects may also be achieved by measures trying to bring about a change in behaviour by non-violent conflict resolution. They are dealing with peace education through the establishment of peer mediation networks, concentrating often on young people – mainly in secondary schools – or rural communities. The approach used in schools is similar, teaching mediation skills to teachers, who then work with the students, preparing them for peer mediation. Addressing the youth is definitely relevant, especially in countries where they represent the majority of the population. It is in the end this youth who will decide, whether the country stabilizes peace or goes back to violence as a means of solving conflicts.
The concept of Human Security is increasingly recognized as the leading policy framework for responding to the security-development-human rights nexus and for ensuring an effective policy of structural and systemic prevention by the international community. From an early stage, the UN, like-minded governments and regional organization worked closely with CSOs to develop the concept. This allows embarking on the next logical step of fostering effective UN/governments/CSO partnerships in order to operationalise the concept.

In 1994, UNDP articulated the concept in its Human Development Report as a fundamental conceptual shift in thinking about security. It heralded a change from “an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”. The concept was promoted by a group of states from all regions with a leading role played by Canada and Switzerland establishing the Human Security Network (Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2004). In a second initiative, Japan, with UN backing, set up the independent Commission on Human Security. The UN established an Advisory Board on Human Security within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations OCHA 2006). Japan also initiated the establishment of a UN Trust Fund on Human Security. In its comprehensive report Human Security Now issued in May 2003, the Commission defined the concept as a new security paradigm that aims to achieve both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” by the protection of individuals and communities and seeking ways to empower them to act for themselves (Commission on Human Security 2003).

The Human Security discourse has led to new initiatives in civil society to support corrective policy and action on urgent issues of human security. As an example, the Crisis Management Initiative set up by former President Ahtisaari, in its Paper entitled Empowering People at Risk: Human Security Priorities for the 21st Century (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005) rightly perceived human security as a call to cooperative action, inviting multiple constituencies into new partnerships to activate the synergies between the human rights, human safety and human development agendas. The human security discourse also induces new approaches to arms control and disarmament which are more inclusive and open to the involvement of civil society by shifting from the traditional framing of issues in terms of threats to states to those being more concerned with the security and well-being of people living within states.

A breakthrough is the first-time mentioning of the concept of Human Security in a world summit document (UN General Assembly Summit Outcome Document 2005) committing all Member States to develop the notion of “human security” and linking it to individual security and development in recognizing that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want (para. 143).

The recognition of the “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” represents a breakthrough in the long-standing efforts at the international level to advance the concept. On 20 September 2005, the Security Council, in its first-time thematic debate on the role of civil society in conflict prevention and the pacific settlement of disputes, for the first time referred explicitly to the so-called “Arria-formula” expressing its intention to strengthen its relationship with civil society (United Nations Security Council 2005).

6.1 The context of UN/Government/CSO cooperation in the area of human security

The UN has entered the new millennium expressly recognizing the growing need and opportunities for
close cooperation with civil society. The Millennium Summit itself was preceded by an NGO Forum at UN Headquarters, which played a crucial role in shaping the Millennium Development Goals. Effective international prevention and human security strategies need to adapt to new multi-actor governance structures and include new actors as partners for prevention and development. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared in 2004: “partnership with non-governmental organizations is no longer an option, it is a necessity”. Prevention and human security strategies must be open to ‘new forms of government’, in particular ‘soft’ forms of cooperation, regulation and provision of public services.

A large number of conflicts originate in the community. Without the community, its representatives and locally based NGOs, those causes could not be addressed. Multi-track diplomacy offers a response to the problems faced in traditional approaches to the prevention and resolution of conflict, namely the sidelining of those who are most intimately involved. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a special Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations. Its recommendations cover a wide range of measures to strengthen the inclusion of civil society in international governance, and specific steps to create effective multi-stakeholder partnerships. Some key proposals are to develop an innovative transnational policy with horizontal and thematic-specific multi-stakeholder networks and partnerships on clearly defined topics and activities.

To make progress in forging effective UN partnerships with civil society in specific bodies and/or on central global issues, in particular on human security, the UN can draw on the experience of what former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called a “new breed of peace and security-focused international NGOs” (Evans 2005, p. 121). The new nature of violent conflict and intra-state wars victimizing civilians on an unprecedented scale has placed CSOs in a unique position to assume different roles in prevention, de-escalation, resolution, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. CSOs are indispensable to create and cultivate a culture of prevention in the international community that helps to engrain human security as a policy concept buttressed by the necessary multi-stakeholder capacities (Barnes 2005; Barnes 2006).

6.2 The Global Partnership

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) represents a network of nearly 1000 peace and prevention-oriented NGOs. It is playing a key role in the formation of a human security and a knowledge-based regime of prevention and peacebuilding. With global CSO participation, GPPAC is becoming a driving force for effective UN/government/CSO partnerships in the promotion of human security. As GPPAC emphasized in its 2005 Global Action Agenda (GPPAC 2005a; GPPAC 2005b), CSOs can contribute to making UN, government and state structures more responsive to human security and to strengthening international capacities for effective conflict prevention, in particular through participation in the UN processes, policy dialogue, monitoring and advocacy.

The Group of like-minded States on Conflict Prevention was set up on the initiative of Germany and Switzerland in December 2004 with the aim to emphasize conflict prevention and human security as a central priority of UN reform, to engage Member States in a dialogue with civil society and GPPAC prior to the September Summit and to advance this agenda in a systematic follow-up. Member States and the UN Secretariat made extensive comments on the GPPAC documents, thus contributing to a genuine multi-stakeholder contribution on conflict prevention in the Summit preparations. The Group prepared a specific Input paper in preparation of the Summit with the first explicit endorsement of the concepts of the Responsibility to Protect as an emerging norm and of Human Security by such a wide group of representatives from all regions (Wolter 2007, p. 292).

6.3 The challenges of operationalising human security through effective UN/ Government/ CSO Partnerships

To give specific guidance to promote human security and effective conflict prevention, the 2006 Progress Report of the UN Secretary-General on the prevention
of armed conflict (United Nations 2006), underlining the partnership approach, was prepared after broad consultations with a wide range of actors working on prevention of armed conflict. It contains a set of recommendations to operationalise the culture of prevention and the responsibility to protect and to fill the gaps in effective system-wide cooperation for prevention and in financial commitments of Member States. The report wholly endorses a specific “Responsibility to Prevent” as part of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, and calls on the entire international community to more explicitly embrace and implement it. It invites Member States to develop a “national infrastructure for peace” and welcomes the progress made by the international community to act “as a concert of national and international actors” in addressing sources of tensions and strengthening the infrastructure of peace.

Regarding collaboration with civil society, the report calls on new and existing organs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, to explore more systematic engagement with civil society (para. 71 and 107), and it explicitly applauds the close cooperation of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict with the United Nations.

To make human security a coherent policy framework, the international community has to move from political declarations to formal commitments and concrete action. The Global Action Agenda of GPPAC, the GPPAC Midterm assessment and the post-summit paper (GPPAC 2005c) contain specific recommendations and priorities for change, directed at the United Nations. The UN should:

- establish regular contact points between UN Resident Coordinators/Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and relevant local, regional and international actors to develop complementary strategies, including through regular consultation with CSOs
- fully utilize the potential of civilian peacebuilding missions and the potential of community-based peace monitors and mediators, and cooperate with local and international civil peace groups
- create interlocking systems of peacekeeping capacities so the UN can partner with relevant regional organizations and civil peace services to increase rapid response capacity and protective accompaniment of vulnerable groups.

In a truly multi-stakeholder process, the international community should now engage in prioritizing a practical human security agenda for concrete political action to enhance physical security of peoples supported by an efficient implementation repertoire that is both inclusive and open to full participation of civil society, local communities and recipients.

6.4 The way forward: frames and structures for consultation and cooperation on human security

Kofi Annan invited “Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue with civil society, for example by inviting civil society representatives to provide regular briefings to pertinent bodies” (United Nations 2006, p. 29). Some steps towards this objective could include the following.

1. The Security Council should continue its thematic debates on conflict prevention and the role of civil society. In addition, it should initiate similar debates on the concept of Human Security and its operationalisation, inviting CSOs to participate and present specific options for cooperation with the Council.

2. The General Assembly, as mandated by the 2005 Summit, should develop the notion of human security linking it to individual security and development. As the overall responsible body of the organization it should take a more active and forward-looking role in advancing human security, i.e. by establishing an open-ended Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding as suggested by the Secretary-General (United Nations 2006).

3. The Peacebuilding Commission, as part of its thematic discussions on advancing a peace
infrastructure to help post-conflict societies on their path towards lasting peace, should include regular debates on the relationship between human security, structural prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. In addition, in its deliberations on country and regional level the Commission should include a review of the fulfilment of human security conditions. CSOs should have the right to make substantial policy proposals.

4. The UN Secretariat, given the horizontal and generic character and wide-ranging policy implications of the Human Security concept, should upgrade the Human Security Unit currently based in OCHA to a full-fledged inter-departmental and agency-coordinating unit, possibly with inter-agency focal points and consultation mechanisms with civil society and regional organizations.

Peace agreements brokered by the UN should promote human security by addressing issues of good governance and equitable development within a participatory framework (GPPAC 2005a, p. 12).

5. All UN bodies should strengthen both formal and informal cooperation with CSOs in the field of security and peace (GPPAC 2006) with the aim to develop effective policies and the toolboxes of operational, structural and systemic prevention and lasting peacebuilding processes and of effective indicators and means of assessing and making visible the successes of peace work and the prevention of violent conflict.

6.5 Final remarks: shaping the UN/CSO Partnership

Effective UN/CSO partnerships will help to enhance civilian crisis response and peacebuilding and strengthen existing and developing new frameworks for human security centred, integrated policies of the international community as a multi-stakeholder exercise in order to operationalise, implement and monitor the pursuit of effective prevention and peacebuilding. The United Nations, building on the 2005 Summit and the progress made by the relevant UN bodies in promoting human security, should convene a special summit meeting to adopt the measures listed below as a comprehensive Global Action Plan on Conflict Prevention and Human Security.

6.6 List of measures to be taken

1. Mainstream conflict sensitive and preventive approaches into country assistance strategies.
2. Make capacity building for prevention and peaceful conflict resolution a top priority for all actors: (a) enhance coordination of the UN system with IFI’s in conflict prevention capacity building (b) consolidate and widen the Joint UNDP/DPA Program on Building National Capacity for Conflict Prevention; (c) support the proposal for a 10 year Action Plan for Capacity Building of the African Union on Prevention and Peacekeeping; (d) create civil society-initiated regional centres and robust partnerships to monitor potential conflicts and respond in time through preventive diplomacy and cross-border initiatives; (e) strengthen local capacities and culturally appropriate strategies for conflict prevention and resolution through autonomous and self-directed local, national and sub-regional networks.
3. Strengthen early-warning capacities of the UN, and of regional and sub-regional organizations.
4. Create focal points for prevention and peacebuilding in UN Country teams and establish advisory councils involving local civil society.
5. Develop multifunctional integrated peace operations with priority for the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups; create a Standing UN Peace Force comprising both civilian police and troop units recruited on a voluntary basis.
6. Establish human security as a guiding principle for domestic and foreign policy with an integrated approach and pooling of resources for prevention and peace-building, with consultation mechanisms with civil society and regional organizations.
7. Develop a timetabled plan to reduce military budgets and direct more resources to address the causes of conflict and to promote human security; promote peace planning and respective resource allocation on a global level.
8. Implement with local communities integrated programs of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation; prioritize security sector reform and Weapons for Development programs.

9. Negotiate a comprehensive arms trade treaty for conventional weapons.

10. Provide coherent financing of operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding: review progress of the Peacebuilding Commission and its fund for peacebuilding and, if necessary, redirect focus on conflict prevention; and mandate a special donor meeting on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The suggested integrated strategy for fostering effective UN/governments/CSO partnerships to promote human security would constitute an important building block for establishing an international peace infrastructure with the necessary multi-stakeholder capacities for effective structural prevention and ensuring human security. Such a strategy would permit the international community to work towards 'constructive pacifism' to fulfil the responsibility to protect and to prepare for peace: *si vis pace, para pacem* by creating sustainable conditions for human security (Senghaas 1995).
The contributions of civil society organizations to the advancement of international peace and security have been growing in prominence, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Systematic collaboration between governments and civil society organizations has been the hallmark of a series of campaigns designed to aid in the prevention and resolution of violence conflict, and to reduce their human costs. The incorporation of civil society voices in virtually all dimensions of these processes is a central feature in what has been labelled a ‘new diplomacy’. This essay explores the respective roles among governments, international organizations and civil society organizations in global public policy development. These thematic cross-cutting efforts contribute to what has become known as systemic prevention or “measures to address global risk of conflict that transcend particular states.” Lessons will be drawn from six prominent campaigns: the banning of landmines, child soldiers, and conflict diamonds, the creation of the International Criminal Court, international action on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the promotion of an international ‘responsibility to protect’.

The objective here is not to assess the broad range of factors that contribute to a successful campaign. Rather it is to explore the respective roles and contributions of governments and civil society organizations, with a particular emphasis on patterns of collaboration between the two. A comparative analysis of these six initiatives suggests that there are four main sites for potential government, civil society collaboration: formulating the campaign message, mobilizing political will, negotiating international agreements and monitoring implementation.

7.1 Campaign messaging

Among the most important choices made by campaigners are the discourse within which they choose to ‘frame’ their issue, and the nature of the policy remedies that they choose to advocate. These decisions are normally made in the very early stages of a new campaign, long before formal inter-governmental negotiations begin. And in many ways these choices determine both the scale of the campaigns potential impact as well as the prospects for success. Evidence from recent campaigns points to the powerful combination of framing issues within a humanitarian discourse (enhancing physical safety for people and their communities) and proposing stringent new standards, even where they are certain to be opposed by at least a small number of states.

Role of the humanitarian discourse

While each of the six campaigns examined here focused on a humanitarian objective—reducing the human costs of war—a humanitarian discourse has not always dominated, or even been widely accepted. Only the international effort to halt the use of child soldiers was, from the outset, couched exclusively and explicitly humanitarian terms. In the case of conflict diamonds, the frame of reference has remained fairly stable following two mutually reinforcing tracks, one with an emphasis on the human consequences of diamond-fuelled civil wars and another on the ongoing economic viability of both the diamond industry and the countries and employees who depend on it.

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80 Don Hubert is Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. For nearly a decade, Hubert led policy development on Canada’s human security agenda at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs. His publications include The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy; The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty with Thomas Weiss; and Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, with Rob McRae.


83 For detail analyses of these factors, see Don Hubert, The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, Occasional Paper #42, The Humanitarianism and War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, 2001; and Don Hubert, Lessons from Campaigns: Innovations in Humanitarian Advocacy, in Paul van Tongeren et al. (eds.), People Building Peace II (Lynne Rienner, 2005) p.558-566.
In the other four cases, competition between different framing ‘discourses’ has been a central component of the campaigning process. The crucial turning point for the campaign to ban landmines was shifting the discourse from disarmament (focused on the weapon, concerned with military utility, dominated by conservative governmental negotiators) to humanitarianism (focused on victims, concerned with the human impact, and engaging human rights and humanitarian experts). Similarly, the ICC was first promoted in the early 1990s as a response to narco-traffickers ultimately succeeded by focusing on the gravest violations of international humanitarian and human rights law: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Issue framing has been central to work on the proliferation of small arms beginning with a focus on crime control, moving towards a arms control agenda and now finally becoming more explicitly oriented towards the human costs of the availability and misuse of these weapons. Similarly, the essence of the “responsibility to protect” was a shift in discourse away from an emphasis on the right of outside powers to intervene and towards the responsibilities of both states and the broader international community to protect civilians facing atrocities.

Clear objectives
A second common element among successful campaigns is the early articulation of clear, far-reaching policy objectives. Such objectives are often dismissed in the first instance as unachievable. To be sure, their formulation is a clear rejection of traditional, lowest-common-denominator approaches, as they highly unlikely to be adopted by consensus among all states. Although bold policy proscriptions may lack universal acceptance, they often generate political momentum by inspiring people to believe that something can actually be done in addressing seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

The first two of the cases examined here – a comprehensive ban on the manufacture, transfer and use of mines, and the creation of an International Criminal Court with potential jurisdiction over heads of state – are obvious examples of this approach. Comparable, far-reaching objectives characterized three other campaigns: a complete ban on the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers under the age of eighteen; a global scheme requiring country-of-origin certification for the global trade in rough diamonds; and establishing a political and legal framework for international intervention, including the potential use of military force, to halt genocide and crimes against humanity.

The exception among the six campaigns analyzed here is the international effort to address the proliferation and misuse of small arms. In this case, conscious decisions were taken to adopt a multi-dimensional strategy that sought to achieve incremental progress across a broader range of priorities. Only in recent years, nearly a decade after the issue of small arms proliferation was placed on the international agenda, has attention begun to coalesced around a prominent bold objective: the prohibition on the transfer of weapons to be used in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.

International campaigns: parallels and differences
Strong parallels then exist across these six campaigns in both issue framing and policy proscription. In each case, both civil society organizations and governments have played important roles in establishing core campaign messages. There are, however, important differences in the relative contributions between these two sets of actors. Conventional wisdom would suggest that civil society organizations, being closer to the human costs and less constrained by political pressures, would take a leading role in establishing core campaign messages. And this is clearly the case in three of the campaigns examined here: landmines, child soldiers, and conflict diamonds.

In two cases, the International Criminal Court and the small arms, the role of civil society organizations was less prominent in the early stages. On the ICC, a like-minded group of governments made an early

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commitment to hold international negotiations on the creation of an international court. The extraordinary contribution of the NGO coalition was in pressuring this group of states to adopt substantive principles to ensure an “independent and effective” court. On small arms, early choices on frames of reference and policy objectives were made by governments with little input from civil society groups85. More recently, a distinct civil society role can be seen in reframing this debate around the need for an Arms Trade Treaty.

The leading role of governments, and other independent actors, in framing issues and articulating new policy agendas is particularly clearer in the case of the responsibility to protect. Here, the essential idea emerged from a Canadian-sponsored international commission. While the hand of civil society is clear in many of the raw materials drawn on by the Commission – prioritizing human rights in conflict situations and moving from a culture of reaction to prevention – the contribution of these organizations to the specific process through which the debate was reframed was minimal86.

The framing of issues at the articulation of policy agendas depend ultimately on the generation of ideas. While it is possible to trace back the respective roles of both civil society organizations and governments in this process, it is worth noting as well the prominent role of individuals as well. The foundational concept underlying the responsibility to protect – the notion of sovereignty as responsibility – came from Francis Deng, UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. The seminal framing for international efforts on children and armed conflict came in a landmark study in 1996 by Graça Machel, an expert appointed by Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali. And the early articulation of the conflict diamond problem came not only from NGO reports but also from a UN process led by Robert Fowler, Chair of the Angola Sanctions Panel at the Security Council.

7.2 Mobilizing political will

A review of these six cases suggests that effective civil society advocacy is a necessary but not sufficient condition of effective international campaigns. In the wake of high profile initiatives, success is often attributed to NGO efforts, as was the case with the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Jody Williams and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In many of these cases, the significance of NGO advocacy is undeniable. At their best, these coalitions heighten issue awareness by exploiting extensive existing networks, sensitize policy makers through national level lobbying, and promote a coherent international policy agenda. The role of these coalitions was particularly prominent in the campaigns on landmines, the International Criminal Court, child soldiers and conflict diamonds87.

Nevertheless there are three important dimensions to the mobilization of political will that are often overlooked: the gains in credibility that come from formal endorsement through international organizations; the political momentum derived from progress in particular situations or by individual states; and the importance of coalitions of like-minded governments in translating abstract policy objectives into effective policy development processes.

Credibility

A major challenge for many campaigns is to demonstrate continued momentum after the campaign message has been articulated but before formal intergovernmental negotiations begin. The issue here is largely one of demonstrating legitimacy. However solid the claims made by civil society organizations, there will always be those within government who will seek to dismiss them. During this phase, important

85 Regional and global conventions to address the criminal trafficking of firearms were negotiated with minimal NGO involvement, while parameters for arms control efforts were initially established by diplomats in a report to the UN General Assembly in 1997See Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298 of 27 August 1997.
86 Here, longstanding concerns over the use of military force in the belief that it inevitably does more harm than good and diverts attention away from under-resourced preventive measures significantly limited civil society’s influence.
87 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and a looser coalition of conflict diamonds including Global Witness, Partnership African Canada, Amnesty International, and a European network know as Fatal Transactions.
contributions come from two very different sources: clear endorsement from international organizations and practical application by states in limited contexts.

**Endorsement**
Whether fair or not, there is no doubt that governments are more likely to respond to evidence and policy proscription emanating from international organizations than from NGOs. The message may be the same, the evidence may even be the same, but official ‘letter head’ matters to governments. A range of United Nations agencies and in many cases the Secretary General himself, lent substantial, early credibility to international campaigns on landmines, the ICC and child soldiers. On Responsibility to Protect, Kofi Annan was one of the very few early proponents. In several of these cases a distinct contribution was also made by the International Committee of the Red Cross. In spite of their preference for behind-the-scenes diplomacy, public advocacy by the Red Cross provided an important bridge between NGO demands and acceptance by progressive states on banning landmines and child soldiers and for creating the International Criminal Court.

Another source of momentum is the practical application of the proposed standards in specific contexts. On landmines, important momentum was gained when the United States unilaterally banned exports beginning in 1993 and again later when Belgium banned all anti-personnel mines in 1995. An important stepping stone on the ICC was the creation of ad hoc tribunals for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda which further demonstrated the need for a permanent international court. In other cases, early governmental action focused on advancing diplomatic processes as was the case with France calling for an initial review conference on landmines, Sweden providing leadership in promoting negotiations on optional protocol on child soldiers, and Canada promoting the findings of the ‘responsibility to protect’ report.

**Coalitions**
A final and often decisive step in mobilizing political will revolves around the formation of like-minded coalitions of governments. However, good the campaign, success or failure in the final stages of the process depends on the ability of progressive governments to coordinate the process leading to the final negotiations. On the landmines and the ICC, strong like-minded groups effectively managed the diplomatic process to the degree that the substantive outcomes of the agreements were in many ways predetermined. The intergovernmental spark on conflict diamonds came from African diamond producing countries, though a lack of clarity on the essential elements of the proposed certification scheme resulted in cumbersome negotiations.

In two other cases, the lack of a committed group of like minded countries was a significant barrier to diplomatic progress. The campaign for a complete ban on the recruitment and use of child soldiers under the age of eighteen failed to achieve its full objectives largely due to a lack of a committed governmental coalition. Similarly, in spite of efforts by Norway in the late 1990s, progressive governments have yet to coalesce around a clear agenda to address the proliferation and misuse of small arms.

**7.3 Negotiating agreements**

**Direct civil society contributions**
With the initiation of formal intergovernmental negotiations, the relative contributions of civil society and governments change again. Obviously governments have the lead role during this stage of the process. Nevertheless, the level of access for non-governmental organizations remains a key ingredient of negotiations that result in strong agreements with broad support.

One measure of the contribution of civil society organizations is their direct involvement in the negotiating process. Civil society organizations were active participants during the negotiations in at least two of the cases examined here: the ICBL was a formal observer with the right to intervene during the Oslo negotiations on the mine-ban treaty, and Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada both participated in the negotiating sessions leading to the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.
In other cases, where NGOs are formally excluded from the negotiating sessions, their representatives often participate as members of national delegations. For example, civil society representatives are commonly included in the delegations of progressive governments during UN negotiations on small arms. This form of participation was particularly significant in the Rome Statute negotiations to create the International Criminal Court. With outside support from progressive governments and independent foundations, legal experts from the NGO community were provided to key developing world delegations including Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Trinidad and Tobago. These representatives had substantial influence on the positions of the specific national delegation during the negotiations. On the basis of their substantive legal expertise, they also made important contributions to the substance of the Rome Statute itself.

Even where not directly involved in the negotiations, civil society organizations frequently have a direct bearing on the text through developing proposals to address unresolved issues and even through drafting new text that gets fed into the negotiation process by friendly delegations. Again the Rome Statute negotiations provide an excellent illustration as two specific provisions – the listing of “forced pregnancy” alongside rape and sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, and the rights of victims including their right to participate in court proceedings, provision for the payment of reparations, and the creation of a victims trust fund – are widely acknowledged to have been included only through substantive contributions and relentless pressure from civil society organizations.

Indirect civil society contributions
While numerous examples can be found of direct civil society impact on intergovernmental negotiations, the more common and generally more important contribution during negotiations are indirect – lobbying governments to forestall backtracking on previous commitments, exposing major compromises proposed behind closed doors, and pressing for substantive improvements to the text under discussion. Among the various techniques employed by NGOs, simply enhancing transparency during the negotiations is among the most effective. During final negotiations on landmines and the International Criminal Court, NGO coalitions published daily up-dates on the state of the negotiations highlighting outstanding issues as well as the positions of prominent states. This approach is sometimes taken one step further by systematically tracking and publishing the full slate of stated government positions on controversial elements. In the case of the ICC, the coalition produced two documents in the final days of the negotiations – The Numbers and The Virtual Vote – demonstrating that more than three-quarters of states supported progressive positions on issues such as jurisdiction for war crimes in internal armed conflicts and the creation of a powerful independent prosecutor.88 Similarly, during the World Summit negotiations in 2005, an NGO network systematically tracked government positions on core elements of the responsibility to protect. Publishing their findings shortly in advance of the final negotiations, they demonstrated growing support for the endorsement of this doctrine in the outcome document89.

7.4 Monitoring implementation
The international agreements examined in this essay do not have intrusive compliance and verification measures. In most cases, the formal requirements are limited to annual submission by states documenting national steps taken in implementation. Examples here would include the mine ban treaty, the small arms Program of Action, and the Optional Protocol on child soldiers. While providing a basis for comparative assessment, these state-generated reports are of very uneven quality and are obviously not independent.

Civil society monitoring compliance: the Mine Ban Treaty
At the other extreme, NGOs are frequently engaged in

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89 See State by State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect at www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements/294
independent monitoring. By far the most systematic of these efforts is Landmine Monitor. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines agreed in 1998 to create an NGO monitoring mechanism to report on implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The reports, published annually since 1999, are released in advance of the annual meeting of state’s parties to the mine ban treaty. The Monitor now contains information on 126 countries and areas based on reports from 71 researchers in 62 countries. The report, more than 1000 pages of dense text, provides a country-by-country assessment (states parties and non-signatories) on landmine ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, mine action funding, mine clearance, mine risk education, landmine casualties, and survivor assistance. While the monitoring effort has no official status, it appears to have considerable influence among governments. Although states have contested particular allegations, the Monitor is well-regarded due to its high standard of research. In their own words, “For the first time in history, non-governmental organizations have come together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.”

Parallel monitoring by civil society: child soldiers and small arms

Although not produced on an annual basis, parallel monitoring efforts exist in two other cases. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldier published a Global Report on child recruitment policies and practices in 2001 and strives to provide updates on a three-year cycle. The 2004 edition reviewed trends and developments related to the use of child soldiers in 196 countries and territories. Publication of the next edition is planned for early 2008. In addition, a network of UK-based NGOs collaborating under the banner of Biting the Bullet, has produced three issues of the so-called Red Book, a systematic effort to track implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms. Versions have been produced in advance of the biennial small arms meetings in 2003 and 2005 and the Review Conference in 2006. In the latest edition, more than one hundred researchers provided data from 180 states to provide a thematic and regional overview of the state of implementation.

Joint monitoring by governments and civil society: conflict diamonds and children and armed conflict

While independent NGO monitoring has made important contributions to promoting compliance with new international standards, there are always questions about their effectiveness in changing state behaviour. Where a high level of confidence exists between governments and the civil society mechanism, as is the case with Landmine Monitor, allegations of non-compliance are taken seriously. But as noted above in the section on mobilizing political will, the more credible the source of the allegations, the more likely states are to respond. It is often preferable therefore to establish formal links between NGO and intergovernmental monitoring processes. Among the cases examined here, two monitoring mechanisms stand out for the collaborative efforts between civil society and formal intergovernmental processes: the Kimberley Process peer review mechanism and the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict.

On diamonds, a peer review mechanism was created within the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in late 2003. It provides for voluntary inspections of the national level implementation of all members, as well as dedicated mission in cases where there are indications of non-compliance. Consistent with the tripartite structure of the Kimberley Process including governments, industry and civil society, inspection teams are led by government and include members from all three groups. Initial NGO concerns about the

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90 Michael Crowley and Andreas Persbo, The role of non-governmental organizations in the monitoring and verification of international arms control and disarmament negotiations, in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds.), Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, UNIDIR, 2006.
94 Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action, Biting the Bullet, 2006 (similar reports also produced in 2003 and 2005).
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“voluntary” nature of the scheme have largely been allayed. In the three years since the creation of the mechanism, inspection teams have gone to all but one of the participants, and a second round of visits is now underway. Furthermore, there is broad agreement that these monitoring efforts have resulted in improvements in national level implementation. In one specific case, the Republic of Congo, the review team report provided the empirical basis for expulsion from the scheme on the grounds of non-compliance.

On children and armed conflict, there is a close and fruitful interplay between civil society and intergovernmental monitoring: parallel NGO monitoring minimizes self-censorship in UN reporting and civil society perspectives are increasingly being integrated into formal UN reports. Formal monitoring on children and armed conflict began in 2001 when the UN Security Council requested the Secretary General to include in his regular reports a list of warring factions recruiting or using child soldiers. Initially, the Secretary General listed 23 groups in five countries, a list limited only to those conflicts which were already on the Security Council’s agenda. In response to the initial report, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers issued a ‘recommended’ list of 20 countries including prominent cases not on the Council’s agenda such as Uganda, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Burma. Subsequent reports from the UN have included these countries, and others, in a second annex focused on conflicts not on the agenda of the Security Council.

NGO monitoring also resulted in increased pressure to broaden the Security Council’s focus beyond child soldiers to include other grave violations such as killings, abductions and sexual violence. The Watchlist network of NGOs was founded to promote monitoring and reporting on a broader range of violations against children during armed conflict. Through the preparation of a series of detailed country reports, Watchlist demonstrated the interconnected nature of violations against children. Together with like-minded governments, they pressured the Security Council to create a more comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism. Under this new mechanism, reports covering six especially egregious violations against children are prepared by United Nations agencies. Explicit provision is made in the SC Resolution for collaboration with civil society. While there has been some reluctance within UN agencies to work closely with grass-roots groups in-country, recent cases suggest that viable models for cooperation in data collection are being developed.

7.5 Collaboration – Different phases, different modalities

The objective of this essay has been to explore patterns of cooperation between civil society and governments in promoting international initiatives to prevent, and reduce the human costs, of violent conflict. The relative value-added of these two sets of actors varies considerably among the four phases examined above. There are clear opportunities for, and genuine benefits to, collaboration within each of them.

In general, a broad division of labour exists across the four phases examined here. Civil society organizations commonly play a more prominent role in framing the issue and identifying core campaign objectives, while governments obviously have a central role in formal negotiations. Both sets of actors play important roles in mobilizing political will and in monitoring implementation, with the best outcomes emerging where collaboration between the two is close.

Decisions made in the very early stages relating to issue framing and core policy objectives are often decisive. Here, early collaboration with governments is risky, as they invariably bring a narrow interpretation of the art of the possible. This suggests that close collaboration between civil society organizations and even progressive governments in the campaign design stage may be counter-productive. Here, an emphasis on people rather than organizations is probably warranted. In many cases,

95 Press release: Now it’s time to come up with solutions, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 16 December 2002.
96 See SC Resolution 1612.
leadership in international campaigns is limited to a few dozen committed individuals. While these people are likely to come from the ranks of civil society, organizational affiliation is not particularly significant during this early phase.

The importance of the initial framing, and the establishment of macro policy objectives, continues throughout the process. In fact, collaboration in all subsequent phases should be conditional on governmental support on key ‘non-negotiable’ principles. As a result, although ‘partnership’ is a term frequently invoked when discussing cooperation between governments and civil society, ‘strategic collaboration’ is a more accurate characterization of the relationship.

Finally, while the centrality of government action is obvious during multilateral negotiations, the cases reviewed here demonstrate the credibility that flows from early engagement with international organizations, the decisive impact of like-minded groups of governments in structuring the negotiations, and the value of formal intergovernmental monitoring mechanisms. There can be no doubt that civil society organizations have become key participants in the development of global public policies to prevent and mitigate the effects of violent conflict. Where they can encourage the formation of effective governmental counterparts, the results can be truly impressive.

Paul van Tongeren

The current international setup is inadequate to deal with global issues of today: treaties, global conferences or hierarchical world governance do not work efficient enough to solve key global issues. Different stakeholders have to cooperate globally in a network structure to set norms, draft solutions and make mechanisms for implementation. The last decade many multi-stakeholder partnerships have been established on different global issues. However on peacebuilding such a structure is still missing although cooperation between the different stakeholders as governments, UN agencies, scholars and CSOs at the global and regional level is urgent. We propose to establish a Forum on Peacebuilding where different stakeholders will meet annually and discuss key issues in the field of peacebuilding and search for solutions.

The other chapters of this Issue Paper focus on the relationship between governments and civil society in the field of peacebuilding. They mainly have a national focus. This chapter describes a rather recent phenomenon of Global Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships or Global Action Networks (GANs). They operate in different fields, among others development, health and water. We can learn a lot from the development and the motivation of governments, UN agencies and/or donors to establish those GANs when we consider establishing a GAN on peacebuilding. We should use the examples from other fields or sectors, to observe and learn how a similar entity for our field could be established in the future. The cases described in this Issue Paper give examples of cooperation between governments and CSOs at a national level. We clearly see a development that governments at the national level acknowledge a complementary role of CSOs which gives added value to what is needed in the peacebuilding field. The same reasons for such a cooperation can be applied on the global level.

8.1 Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships and Global Action Networks

In the last few decades, we have been faced with the urgency to deal with a diversity of global issues (Millennium Development Goals, climate change, biodiversity, rain forests, public health and so on). These issues cannot be solved at the national level but at the global level adequate structures are usually not in place to take the necessary decisions and implement them.

J. F. Rischard, Vice-President of the World Bank for Europe, described convincingly in his book *High Noon, Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them*, how the current international setup is inadequate to solve the key global problems. Drafting treaties takes far too much time; intergovernmental conferences have often no good follow-up mechanisms and the UN agencies are not able to handle IGIs alone, in the cases that such agencies exist on the specific global

Source: J.F. Rischard, *High noon, Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them*, p.159

99 Paul van Tongeren is the Secretary General of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). This Partnership was established in response to the call of the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report *Prevention of Armed Conflict*. GPPAC is the world-wide civil society-led network to build a new international consensus on peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. In 2005 Paul edited *People Building Peace II. Successful stories of civil society*. In 1997 he established the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, that initiated GPPAC.

100 Rischard, J.F., New York 2002
issue, what often is not the case.

If we compare the EU with the United Nations, we can see how difficult it is to deal with many issues at an intergovernmental level of dozens of governments even when they have a lot in common. It is evident that what is already extremely difficult at the EU level, is nearly impossible at the level of the UN, in the near future.

Rischard proposes networked governance versus hierarchical government. He proposes to minimise complexity and hierarchy, and cooperation between different stakeholders as governments, business, scholars and CSOs by establishing Global Issue Networks (GIN). His analysis of the current international governance system makes sense. His proposal for GIN, happened to be a fast development of GANs.

We are witnessing various processes in which different stakeholders (UN, governments, donors, CSOs) have decided to join their efforts to tackle global problems in so-called Global Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships or Global Action Networks (GANs). There are many reasons why GANs have been established: the main reason is to bring different stakeholders together to discuss key priorities of the specific field and get these higher on the political agenda. There is a growing acknowledgement that different stakeholders have different knowledge/functions/resources and powers, and all are needed for global solutions. Stakeholders with complementary roles have to cooperate.

In some occasions different leading institutions agreed that they should establish a multi-stakeholder partnership, like the World Commission on Dams or the Stopping TB campaign, realizing no actor could do it alone. In other cases the conclusion of a large global UN conference was that the best follow-up mechanism was to establish a GAN. In different instances big donors as World Bank took the initiative.

The growth of GAN started especially after the end of the Cold War. Examples of earlier GANs are the Red Cross, ILO and IUCN. The Red Cross was founded in 1863. Legally it was an NGO but it was an inter-organizational network created with intimate government involvement, known today as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In 1919, the government-labour-employer-constituted International Labour Organisation was established. In 1948, the World Conservation Union (IUCN) brought together governments, scientific communities and environmental NGOs.
GANs aspire to develop five core traits:

• A public good imperative that is realized by aligning collective values and divergent private interests.

• A worldwide and multi-level framework for action that crosses nations and cultures, and connects global to local.

• A systemic change agent role that engages an array of stakeholders across sectors from government, business and civil society to create profound and broad societal learning and change.

• A dynamic inter-organizational network structure that fosters sustained and generative links among diverse groups and projects.

• A boundary-crossing action strategy that builds bridges across various divides such as North/South, rich/poor, practitioners and researchers.

Following the definition of Steve Waddell and Sanjeev Khagram in *Multi-stakeholder global networks: emerging systems for the global common good*[^102^], GAN’s activities can be differentiated in five different types: global system organizing (by creating meetings and information networks and growing cooperation), learning/knowledge generation; shared visioning (focused on collective planning, dialogue and their role as change agent); reporting and measuring; and financing.

To mention some examples: the Global Water Partnership[^103^], established after the Rio conference of 1992, is a working partnership among all those involved in water management to support countries in the sustainable management of their water resources. The Global Knowledge Partnership[^104^] promotes innovation and advancement in knowledge, information and communication technologies for development. The GKP has a broad diversity of networks and growing cooperation.

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[^102^]: Ibid.

[^103^]: www.gwpforum.org (Global Water Partnership)

[^104^]: www.gwpforum.org (Global Water Partnership)
members as international organisations (the European Commission, Asian Development Bank, FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, World Bank), public institutions (the Swedish International Development Cooperation, SIDA, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation), commercial institutions as Microsoft and Civil Society Organisations. The Global Reporting Initiative\textsuperscript{105} is a multi-stakeholder process and independent institution whose mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. The Stop TB partnership\textsuperscript{106}, established by the WHO in 2000, is a network of more than 500 donors, national and international organisations, governments, NGOs and academics working together to reduce the toll of TB worldwide and ultimately achieve a world free of TB.

The Provention Consortium\textsuperscript{107} is a global coalition of international organisations, governments, private sector, CSOs and academic institutions dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and to reducing the impacts of disasters in developing countries. It provides a forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue on disaster risk reduction and a framework for collective action. It aims to advance disaster risk management police and practice in developing countries by:

- forging partnerships and linkages;
- advocating amongst policy decision makers;
- developing innovative approaches to the practice of disaster risk management;
- sharing knowledge and resources for organisations and practitioners active in disaster reduction.

### 8.2 Phases, governance and impacts of GAN

GANs develop in different ways. Some start at a global level from where they can develop a more regional focus or even a national approach. The Global Water Partnership experienced all these phases and the Education for All is organised at all three levels. The IUCN-World Conservation Union, has representatives from each of the eight regions. Another difference in the development of GANs is that some are established as multi-stakeholder partnerships from the beginning, while others are becoming a network ‘by evolution’.

Many partnerships have representatives from different stakeholders in their governing structure. Some have a similar number of representatives for each stakeholder; in other networks this differentiates. The Ethical Trading Initiative for instance, has a board with three representatives from the corporate sector, three from NGOs/civil society and three from trade unions. The Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation has a 13-member Board of Directors, comprised of four representatives each from the public sector, the private sector and civil society and an independent chairperson. The Fair Labour Association has a Board of Directors with six industry representatives, six labour/NGO representatives, three university representatives and a chair. The Global Knowledge Partnership has an Executive Committee of nine members, elected by the members, while encouraged to take in account regional and multi-stakeholder partnership.

Another difference is the structure of the network. Some have a formalized structure, others are more informal. Their main aim is to bring different stakeholders together and set the agenda for the field. They do not have a formal decision-making body. An example of this structure is the Provention Consortium.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), that won the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2007 together with Al Gore, is another interesting example of a Multi-Stakeholder Partnership and shows how many governance structures and modalities of cooperation there are. The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988. The Panel’s role is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the best available scientific, technical and socio-economic information on climate change from around the world. It is an intergovernmental body that is open to all member countries of UNEP and WMO. The Panel meets in plenary sessions about once a

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\textsuperscript{104} \url{www.globalknowledge.org} (Global Knowledge Partnership)

\textsuperscript{105} \url{www.globalreporting.org} (Global Reporting initiative)

\textsuperscript{106} \url{www.stoptb.org} (Stop TB partnership)

\textsuperscript{107} \url{www.proventionconsortium.org} (ProVentium Consortium)
year and its meetings are attended by hundreds of representatives from governments and participating organisations. The IPCC has three working groups and a Task Force. Within this framework, and especially in the working groups, some 3,000 researchers and NGOs from all over the world cooperate. IPCC reports are written by teams of authors, which are nominated by governments and international organisations and selected for a specific task according to their expertise. They come from universities, research centres, business and environmental associations and other organisations from more than 100 countries. Several hundred experts from all over the world are normally involved in drafting IPCC reports. In addition, several hundred experts participate in the review process.

Many GANs can mention considerable results, for instance in terms of the number of countries they have implemented programmes. The Global Water Partnership, has introduced international water resource management to over 100 countries. One of the results of the Global Reporting Initiative is that 800 multinational corporations are using the developed universal standards. The Microcredit Summit Campaign has reached millions of families. For all GANs, putting and keeping their issue high on the global agenda is crucial.

8.3 Multi-stakeholder partnership and peacebuilding

There is a global GAN-Net emerging. Called Global Action Network net, it is the umbrella association that provides the communities of practice and action-learning mechanisms to increase their effectiveness. GAN-Net counts about 40 GANs. All are in different stages of development. None of those 40 networks are however cooperating in the field of peacebuilding. Therefore GPPAC is interested to develop a GAN in our field. It therefore participates in GAN-Net meetings. Various GANs are delivering public goods, while others are setting norms that are endorsed, for instance on reporting.

If there is any global issue where all stakeholders have to cooperate, it is on the issue of peacebuilding. Although peacebuilding is quite complex it is crucial that all actors should be involved. The Carnegie Commission clearly stated a decade ago that no one actor can create peace alone. After all, “the prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term, too hard – intellectually, technically, and politically- to be the responsibility of any single institution or government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared, and labour divided among actors.”

At the level of the UN, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it is focusing more on the management of conflicts than on prevention of conflicts. In the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations In Larger Freedom it was recognized that peacebuilding is a gaping hole in the UN system. Although progress has been made with the Peace Building Commission, there is still a gap between the ambitious mandate of the PBC and what it is able to deliver. The international system of peacebuilding is relatively weak and there is a need to generate high level political support for improving peacebuilding mechanisms, programs and resourcing.

8.4 GPPAC and a multi-stakeholder partnership

GPPAC is aiming for a multi-stakeholder partnership. The GPPAC Charter writes in its mission statement: “GPPAC is a multi-stakeholder network of organisations committed to act to prevent the escalation of conflict into destructive violence, at national, regional and global levels. This multi-stakeholder network includes civil society organisations, governments, regional organisations and the United Nations.”

In Chapter 6 of this Issue Paper Detlev Wolter describes the Group of Friends on Conflict Prevention which was chaired by the German and Swiss mission in New York with active participation and support of GPPAC. It involved more than 40 missions. The involvement of so many supportive missions in New York made it possible
that GPPAC could organize the first civil society conference ever held at the UN Headquarters, where the agenda was set by CSOs. The conference was organized in cooperation with the Department of Political Affairs, the department responsible for conflict prevention within the UN and the same department that drafted the 2001 *Prevention of Armed Conflict* report.

The World Bank report on Civil Society and Peacebuilding listed many unique and important roles CSOs can play. See table page 15. It recommended – among others – enhancing donor coordination and considering a joint platform for on-going discussion and sharing of experience on the issue of civil society and peacebuilding. GPPAC was considered being part of such a joint platform. In October 2006 GPPAC organised a Strategy Meeting where common issues between civil society and donors were discussed. It was attended by nine government representatives. Although exchange of information, consultations and ad-hoc cooperation among governments and with the UN has taken place, a more structured cooperation like described in some of the above mentioned Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships would be desirable.

In our view it is more appropriate to keep GPPAC as a global civil society network, but to aim for a Multi-Stakeholder Partnership on Peacebuilding. GPPAC would be one of the main CSO representatives.

### 8.5 A Forum on Peacebuilding

Multi-stakeholder Partnerships are being established on many global issues because the stakeholders see a need to cooperate together since they have complementary roles and can contribute to global issues in different ways. These roles include setting and prioritising the agenda for the field; to exchange experiences and learn from each other; social mobilisation and outreach; to implement specific programs together. But the overriding acknowledgement is that the different stakeholders need to cooperate to achieve common goals.

These lessons count for most global issues, and that includes the peacebuilding field. Some Multi-stakeholder Partnerships have a solid governance structure and a balanced representation for different stakeholders, others have a more informal structure. We propose to make a start by organising in the near future a **Forum on Peacebuilding** where representatives from key constituencies/stakeholders meet informally. Agencies can exchange information and discuss new and controversial ideas. Such social interchange has proven to be very useful in other similar cases and complements other more formal coordination mechanisms or constitutions. Providing a Forum for dialogue and a Framework for collective action, is crucial. There should be a balance between government and non-governmental representatives, between north and south, a gender balance and a balance in backgrounds of governmental background, UN agencies, civil society organisations, academia and research institutes, practitioners and others.

It would be good to organise such a Forum in the near future at the **global level**, but it is a challenge to organise it on the **regional level** as well, perhaps in a later stage. It would be very helpful and encouraging if different stakeholders within a region could discuss common concerns, goals and priorities. It seems the time is ripe for such an initiative. Caux, the Swiss Center of Reconciliation operated by Initiatives of Change, will in the summer of 2008 offer a unique possibility to meet a great diversity of people. Caux is known for its special atmosphere and has since 1946 been active in reconciliation and peacemaking. Mohamed Sahnoun, the new President of Initiatives of Change International, and a senior Algerian diplomat with 30 years of experience in peacebuilding in Africa, has invited some 200 influential personalities from the world of politics, thought, civil society and the media for a Forum on the Root Causes of Human Insecurity, in which I am involved in the preparations. Mohamed Sahnoun visualizes a yearly Forum for Human Security. This can be an important step in the direction of a Forum on Peacebuilding.
These ideas should be discussed with among others, the Core-group of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, UNPBSO, UNDP-BCPR, UNDPA, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, IPRA, Conflict Transformation Collaborative, some new initiatives as the Elders Initiative, the EWI Taskforce on Preventive Diplomacy and others.
This chapter deals with funding in the peacebuilding field, a major area of cooperation between donor governments and peacebuilding CSOs. It explores several important issues that need further research and looks at the discussions between donor governments and CSOs. What are the real costs of conflict? What is the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention? How does spending on conflict prevention and peacebuilding compare with the spending on, for instance, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping? What budget lines are necessary to implement key modalities of conflict prevention such as flexibility, speed, rapid disbursements and long term commitment? Another issue addressed is that peacebuilding CSOs in general, but especially southern CSOs, are rarely able to apply for support with northern donors.

9.1 Costs of conflict and of prevention, spending on related fields

In addition to the focus on funding for projects and CSO-programmes, a broader picture is also urgently needed. Answers to the following questions are particularly important:

- what are the real costs of conflict?
- what are the expenses of related budget-lines such as humanitarian aid; peace keeping; conflict prevention and peacebuilding?
- who are the donors in this field: UN, governments, foundations, INGOs and what are their contributions?
- what is the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention?

Costs

There are a few studies on the costs of conflict and also on the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention. One example is the Bradford study by Malcolm Chalmers, Spending to save. In mid-2008 the Small Arms Survey will also publish a report on the costs of conflict. However, more detailed follow-up research on the Bradford study is needed which also takes into account spending on humanitarian aid, peace keeping and peace building. If more than 20 billion dollars has been spent over the past five years on UN peacekeeping measures, what is the tiny fraction of that sum that has been devoted to conflict prevention and peacebuilding? Who are the key donors for these related fields? It seems that within budgets spent on peace activities, the preference is towards peacekeeping programmes, rather than long-term peacebuilding activities. There is a need for more balance between investment in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

Changes in the geopolitical context, particularly since 9/11 (2001), have resulted in a clear shift in policy from peacebuilding and addressing the root causes of conflict to hard security and the ‘War on Terror’. This is also reflected in funding priorities and in some cases the spending on particular budget lines may even be counterproductive to efforts in other areas.

9.2 Need for resourcing peacebuilding

There is a growing recognition of the importance of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and how this is interconnected with development and human rights issues (World Summit Outcome document, September 2005). It is increasingly understood that there can be no development without peace and no peace without development. Moreover, there is a growing recognition of the unique role that CSOs play in this respect (Civil society and peacebuilding report of the World Bank, June 2006). CSOs aim to contribute substantively to peacebuilding. However, lack of funds is one of the bottlenecks that hampers CSOs in realising their potential. The budget for peacebuilding is small in relation to development budgets. There are virtually no budget lines for peacebuilding within governments, EU, UN and foundations. Foundations rarely have peace and peacebuilding in their mandate, and consequently fundraising for peacebuilding is difficult and occurs only rarely in practice. This is partly because of the attribution problem: it is not easy to link an activity or programme to ‘peace’ as an end result because so many factors can contribute to peace or war. The result is that nearly all

* Paul van Tongeren, GPPAC (see note 99).
NGOs and INGOs are small and dependent on external funding from only a dozen like-minded governments. Therefore the World Bank recommendation put forward in its report to strengthen donor coordination is very valuable: “To enhance donor coordination and harmonization of frameworks, interested donors should consider establishing a joint platform, possibly through or linked to OECD/DAC, for on-going discussion and sharing of experience on the issue of civil society and peacebuilding. Such a working group could become a valuable forum to discuss harmonization, knowledge sharing, link with official peacebuilding processes and interaction with practitioners, regional network, the UN and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.”

It is important to further identify the key programmes and budget lines on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. That this is not an easy task becomes clear on looking at the Inventory of United Nations Peacebuilding Capacity. In 2006, 22 sectors in the field of peacebuilding within the UN were identified. These 22 sectors could provide an initial starting point in quantifying the field. However, even more important would be knowledge of the needs of these sectors in order to estimate the total amount required by the peacebuilding field. In chapter 5.3 the establishment of an Infrastructure for Peace in Ghana has been described as just one example. Although this was very promising, after its establishment, further development and implementation failed due to a lack of funding. If we don’t address what is really needed to build sustainable peace, we will not realise sustainable peace.

9.3 Modalities

Much can be said about the need to change modalities of funding for peacebuilding and also peacebuilding CSOs:

- flexibility is needed, because peace processes change frequently and sometimes activities of an unorthodox character require funding;
- speed is vital in order to respond quickly to pressing problems and rapid disbursements;
- willingness to accept risks is also a prerequisite: there are no guarantees that whatever is financed will prove successful.

- many local NGOs need relatively small amounts, while donors increasingly prefer large amounts because of the bureaucratic burden. Core funding is becoming more of an exception, while the need is ever greater.
- long term commitment is needed, while one year project funding is common practice. Peacebuilding needs long term investments.
- gaps in current funding arrangements exist: it is necessary to bridge the gaps between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation at national and international level.
- transparency and accountability: donors must harmonise their procedures and align with partner country policies and structures in accordance with the Paris Declaration on harmonization and alignment.

9.4 Supporting CSOs on peacebuilding

The important role of CSOs in the field of peacebuilding is becoming clearer and is also reflected in the literature. The World Bank report clearly states the significant role of CSOs in peacebuilding, listing their strengths (see table page 15). In comparison with those of governments. Moreover it recommends donors continue direct support to civil society peacebuilding. The book published by ECCP People Building Peace II, Successful stories of civil society, contains many cases illustrating the role CSOs can play.

It is broadly acknowledged in the literature on for instance Fragile States that the international community should strengthen weak governments. At the same time the international community or donors often have to work through CSOs because some governments are unreliable or too corrupt. However, Northern donors rarely support local (peacebuilding) NGOs. Therefore, if we really want to build capacity for peace and peacebuilding, we have to

EU drops conflict prevention

Recent developments in the EU will make fundraising even more difficult. Conflict prevention is being dropped from all EU financial instruments apart from the short-term Stability Instrument by all Member States. On 19 September 2007, Advocate General Mengozzi delivered his opinion112 on a court case that is critical to the coherence of the EU’s peacebuilding policy. The case in question is between the European Commission and the Council of the European Union (Case C-91/05) and was first brought in 2005. The case brings to a head the long recognised lack of clear demarcation on legal competencies between the European Commission’s development aid and the Council’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In Case C-91/05, the Commission is seeking the annulment of a Council decision to offer financial support and technical assistance to the ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) in its activities on combating the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW). According to the Commission, this measure should not have been made under Title V of the EU Treaty (TEU) – the part of the treaty concerning the CFSP – but as development aid under the EC Treaty (TEC).

The Commission, supported by the Parliament, argued that if there is a legal basis for community action (the Cotonou Agreement), then Council actions on the same issue (strengthening the capacity of ECOWAS to deal with small arms and light weapons) are an infringement on Commission powers and illegal under the EC Treaty. The Council’s counter-position, supported by Spain, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, made a legal case for restricting Commission powers to areas that do not come under the objectives of CFSP. Beyond the legal talk, the bone of contention is the border between security policy on the one hand and development policy on the other113. Whereas the Commission holds the view that the fight against the proliferation of small arms has become an integral part of its development cooperation policy, the Council remains wary of explicitly granting the Commission competence to pursue objectives such as peacebuilding and political stabilization through its external assistance programmes. Given that these are also foreign policy objectives of the Union, some Member States fear that by taking peacebuilding measures into its development programmes, the Commission oversteps its competences.

In his opinion, the Advocate General considers “that the fight against the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons does not, as such, fall outside the Community development cooperation policy but, on the contrary, may fall within it where a measure contributing to that fight has the exclusive or main object of development cooperation by contributing to the social and economic development objectives of that cooperation.”

As SALW, and more broadly conflict prevention, does not fall clearly under the competency of one pillar, the Advocate General argues that it is the final aim of the action that will make the difference. On the basis of this opinion, the Court will finalise this case in 2008.

develop mechanisms that also enhance local peacebuilding capacities. This requires a general broadening of the possibilities for Southern NGOs to apply for donor capacity, but also to issues raised under the modalities listed above such as the availability of small amounts of funding and quick delivery.

Although the World Bank report states that: “Donor engagement with CSOs is often fragmented and short-
9. FUNDING RELATIONSHIPS

sighted\textsuperscript{114}, small steps are being taken. DFID has a Civil Society Challenge Fund, UNDP-BCPR has a small grants programme to strengthen partnerships with civil society organisations in post-conflict countries and some proposals have been developed on micro-financing schemes for small peace projects; the German government (see chapter 5.7), established the ‘zivik’ project that has supported hundreds of CSOs in peacebuilding, in the North and the South. Alongside further research into which funding schemes are available and how their modalities fit with the above-mentioned concerns, we also need a \textit{global zivik}.

\textsuperscript{114} Civil society and peacebuilding: potential, limitations and critical factors (World Bank, June 2006) Report No. 36445-GLB, p. 42
This Issue Paper and particularly the case-studies it contains have given rise to the following reflections.

1. Growing acknowledgement that all stakeholders should cooperate
In tandem with the conclusions from the Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, (see page 9), there is a growing acknowledgement that there should be greater cooperation between all stakeholders in peacebuilding processes. However much analysts and practitioners may agree on this, developing good practices is, and remains, a work in progress.

2. Growing recognition of the role of civil society in peacebuilding
The report of the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anan, The Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001), recommended that the role of NGOs in conflict prevention should be examined. Today we are witnessing a growing recognition of the role of CSOs in peacebuilding. We see a general trend in this respect. As GPPAC we have also contributed to this recognition by drafting a Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict; the GPPAC Conference at the Head Quarter of the UN on the Role of Civil Society in peacebuilding in July 2005; and the publication People Building Peace II: Successful stories of civil society. The Security Council meeting of 20 September 2005 on this issue, gave additional weight to the role of CSOs as did the World Bank Report of December 2006 on Civil Society and Peacebuilding. In the Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict from 2006, the former Secretary-General Kofi Anan “urge[d] Member States to consider innovative means to intensify the dialogue with civil society.”

3. The Peace Building Commission as example
The UN Peace Building Commission (PBC) is an excellent example of growing CSO inclusion. The very first draft of the UN resolution on the PBC did not envisage a role for CSOs. Later versions included paragraphs on consultations with CSOs. This happened in parallel with several meetings of the Group of Friends on Conflict Prevention and the GPPAC conference in New York. Both events helped raise this issue. The final GA resolution recognizes the important contribution of civil society and encourages official structures and institutions to consult with civil society. However, implementing this resolution was not easy. The issue was discussed several times in the PBC, and at the end of the first year of the PBC, the provisional agreement was that the commission would invite representatives of CSOs that are actively engaged in peacebuilding activities to make statements and provide information. At the country level, CSOs have been represented on each of the countries’ joint steering committees. These have been ad hoc arrangements, however, and no provisions for future CSO engagement at country level with current or future countries have been arranged. Nothing has as yet been agreed about consultations in selected countries such as Burundi and Sierra Leone, which is crucial. This example shows how progress is made and that there is still a long way to go.

4. Learning to cooperate
The absence of cooperation between governments and CSOs can have many causes. These may include the fact that governments insufficiently recognize the role of CSOs or even mistrust them. Other reasons are mutual misperceptions and a lack of practical experience. Many cases illustrate how different stakeholders came together to overcome violence, to build a structure for peacebuilding or to see what they could learn from each other.

None of this diminishes the fact that different actors can contribute to a more complete picture of the problem, as the case studies from the US and Kyrgyzstan illustrate. If governments perceive NGOs not as non-governmental organizations, but as anti-governmental organizations (as in the Japanese case) or even as evil societies (as in the Nepalese case), it will take time to change these perceptions. One of the things that will be needed is confidence building. It is only after several meetings that participants can be expected to begin to trust each other and value input ‘from the other side’.

* Paul van Tongeren, GPPAC (see note 99).
The cases used in this issue paper – and indeed many others – demonstrate that if individual governments, or indeed the EU and the UN, recognize the value of cooperation and initiate a process of cooperation on a specific activity or programme, they discover how complementary roles give more weight to the effort and the cooperation will be valued differently.

5. Complementary roles
Catherine Barnes’ article and the case studies identify many complementary roles CSOs can play. These can include conflict analysis, Early Warning and Early Response, awareness raising, lobbying and political mobilization, implementing concrete programmes (e.g. collecting hidden small arms), and many more. A World Bank study compared CSO Strengths and Weaknesses and found that CSOs can have the following advantages over governments:
• CSOs can work where governments can not;
• CSOs can speak to parties governments cannot reach;
• CSOs can work on social change issues;
• CSO operations are more flexible and can be adapted to the context.

6. Institutional structures and mechanisms
There are several institutional structures and mechanisms to implement a relationship between governments and CSOs. These include:
• a common working group or Forum;
• a liaison officer for CSOs;
• secondment of staff;
• consultation on draft policy papers;
• training by CSOs to create an infrastructure for peacebuilding.

7. An infrastructure for Peace
The German, Kenyan and Ghanaian models show a particularly interesting peacebuilding infrastructure. These are exceptional cases that put into practice the call in the Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict (2006) for a national infrastructure for peace. While the policy itself, the design of the peacebuilding infrastructure and the structure are all important steps forward, implementation, overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and funding are among the challenges for the next phase. In all three cases, CSOs played a significant role in creating such an infrastructure.

8. Belonging to a global network
It is the experience of GPPAC and many participating organizations that they receive more weight and credit, if they belong to a global network, or participate in a United Nations conference. This increases their legitimacy.

9. Peacebuilding and the UN
The Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but focuses more on the management of conflicts than on prevention of conflicts. In the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, *In Larger Freedom*, it was recognized that peacebuilding is a major omission within the UN system. Since then, progress has been made with the establishment of the Peace Building Commission. But there is still a gap between the ambitious mandate of the PBC and what it is able to deliver. It focuses on only a few countries and has limited funds and capacity. On conflict prevention, the Interagency Framework Team works on building national conflict management capacity. UNDP-BCPR and DPA are expanding their efforts in this respect. Some progress has been made over recent years but a better international infrastructure on conflict prevention and peacebuilding is needed. This must incorporate better cooperation between the UN, regional organizations, governments, CSOs and other actors, better early warning and response mechanisms, more adequate civilian conflict prevention and more peacebuilding instruments and funding mechanisms.

10. Need for a Multi-Stakeholder Partnership on Peacebuilding
Many global issues are addressed at the global level by UN agencies, but there is no overall agency on Peacebuilding. This makes the need for cooperation between the different stakeholders even more compelling. As is pointed out in chapter 8 of this paper, UN agencies, governments, civil society actors and universities already cooperate on many global issues within the framework of a Multi-Stakeholder Partnership. A multi-stakeholder partnership on
peacebuilding (comprising UN agencies, some governments, CSOs, universities and research institutes and practitioners) could facilitate common agenda setting; prioritize issues; strategize, and implement programmes.

11. Lessons from humanitarian advocacy campaigns
The contributions of civil society organizations to the advancement of international peace and security have been growing in prominence, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Systematic collaboration between governments and civil society organizations has been the hallmark of a series of campaigns designed to aid in the prevention and resolution of violence conflict, and to reduce their human costs. As Don Hubert writes in his contribution, there are four main areas for potential cooperation between government and civil society: formulating the campaign message, mobilizing political will, negotiating international agreements and monitoring implementation. Civil society organizations commonly play a more prominent role in framing the issue and identifying core campaign objectives, while governments obviously have a central role in formal negotiations. Both sets of actors play important roles in mobilizing political will and in monitoring implementation, with the best outcomes emerging where collaboration between the two is close.

Although ‘partnership’ is a term frequently invoked when discussing cooperation between governments and civil society, ‘strategic collaboration’ is a more accurate characterization of the relationship. There can be no doubt that civil society organizations have become key participants in the development of global public policies to prevent and mitigate the effects of violent conflict. Where they can encourage the formation of effective governmental counterparts, the results can be truly impressive.

12. Costs of conflict, cost effectiveness of prevention and an increasing volume for conflict prevention
The costs of conflicts are immense, and the cost effectiveness of conflict prevention is large. Expenditure on conflict prevention and peacebuilding should be increased substantively. A better balance is needed between the huge amounts going to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping and the little currently spent on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

13. Supporting CSOs on peacebuilding
It is broadly acknowledged in the literature on fragile states that the international community should strengthen weak governments. It is also frequently said that the international community should work through CSOs because governments are considered unreliable or too corrupt. Northern donors hardly support local (peacebuilding) NGOs. If we really want to build capacity for peace and peacebuilding, we have to develop mechanisms so that local peacebuilding capacities are also enhanced. This relates to an overall broadening of the possibilities for southern NGOs to apply for support, but also to issues in support for peacebuilding modalities. Far greater flexibility, speed in disbursements and long term commitments are needed in providing resources for peacebuilding. A global fund or small secretariat, dealing with funding CSOs in the South is urgently needed. The German government established the zivik project that has supported hundreds of CSOs in peacebuilding, in the north and the south. Effectively we need a global zivik.
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is building new international consensus and pursuing joint action to prevent violent conflict and promote peacebuilding, based on its Regional Action Agendas and the Global Action Agenda. GPPAC maintains a global multi-stakeholder network of organizations committed to act to prevent the escalation of conflict into destructive violence at national, regional and global levels.

The primary function of GPPAC is to promote and support the implementation of the Regional Action Agendas and the Global Action Agenda. For this purpose, GPPAC represents important regional concerns on the international level, enhances the functioning of the international systems for conflict prevention and uses its capacities to assist the implementation of key regional activities.

Sub-programs are:

Promote acceptance of the ideas of conflict prevention
GPPAC supports regional efforts to raise awareness regarding the effectiveness of conflict prevention, and undertakes parallel efforts at the global level.

Promote policies and structures for conflict prevention
GPPAC generates ideas for improving policies, structures and practices involving interaction among civil society organizations, governments, regional organizations, and UN agencies for joint action for conflict prevention.

Build national and regional capacity for prevention
GPPAC strives to enhance the capacity of its regional networks and global mechanisms to undertake collective actions to prevent violent conflict.

Generate and share knowledge
GPPAC engages in a process of knowledge generation and sharing, by learning from the experience of regions and developing mechanisms for regular communication/exchange of such information. GPPAC activities aim to improve our mutual understanding regarding important methodologies and mechanisms for action.

Mobilize civil society early response actions to prevent
GPPAC develops the capacity of civil society organizations to contribute to early warning systems and to intervene effectively in impending crises/conflicts. In response to regional requests, the global network will a) mobilize coordinated civil society responses, based on early warning of impending conflict escalation; and b) pressure governments, regional organizations, and the UN system to respond to early warning information.

GPPAC’s Regional Initiators

Central and East Africa
Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
Kenya
Ms. Florence Mpaayei
fmpaayei@npi-africa.org
www.npi-africa.org

Southern Africa
ACCORD
South Africa
Mr. Kwezi Mngquibisa
kwezi@accord.org
www.accord.org.za

West Africa
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
Ghana
Mr. Emanuel Bombande
ebombande@wanep.org
www.wanep.org

Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research
Argentina
Mr. Andrés Serbin
info@cries.org
www.cries.org
North America
Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
Canada
Mr. David Lord
cpcc@web.ca
www.peacebuild.ca
and
Alliance for Peacebuilding
USA
Mr. Charles Dambach
chic@allianceforpeacebuilding.org
www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org

South Asia
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies
Sri Lanka
Mr. Syed Rifaat Hussain
edcss@sri.lanka.net
www.rcss.org

The Pacific
Pacific People Building Peace
Fiji
Mr. Jone Dakuvula

Southeast Asia
Initiatives for International Dialogue
Philippines
Mr. Augusto N. Miclat Jr.
gus@iidnet.org
www.iidnet.org

Northeast Asia
Peace Boat
Japan
Mr. Tatsuya Yoshioka
gppac@peaceboat.gr.jp
www.peaceboat.org

Central Asia
Foundation for Tolerance International
Kyrgyzstan
Ms. Raya Kadyrova
fti@infotel.kg
www.fti.org.kg

Middle East and North Africa
Arab Partnership for Conflict Prevention and Human Security
p/a Permanent Peace Movement
Lebanon
Mr. Fadi Abi Allam
ppmleb@idm.net.lb

The Caucasus
International Center on Conflict & Negotiation
Georgia
Ms. Tina Gogueliani
iccn@iccn.ge
www.iccn.ge

The Balkans
Nansen Dialogue Centre Serbia
Serbia
Ms. Tatjana Popovic
tanjap@sezampro.yu
www.nansen-dialog.net

Northern and Western Europe
European Centre for Conflict Prevention
Netherlands
info@conflict-prevention.net
www.conflict-prevention.net

Global Secretariat
European Centre for Conflict Prevention
Netherlands
info@conflict-prevention.net
www.gppac.net
Joint Action for Prevention

Civil Society and Government Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

European Centre for Conflict Prevention

Laan van Meerdervoort 70

2517 AN Den Haag

The Netherlands

Tel.: + 31 70 3110970
Fax: + 31 70 3600194

info@conflict-prevention.net

www.gppac.net